

ŚLOKAVĀRTIKA

A STUDY

L. D. SERIES 92

**GENERAL EDITORS
DALSUKH MALVANIA
NAGIN J. SHAH**

By
K. K. DIXIT



L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY AHMEDABAD-9

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FOREWORD

The L.D. Institute of Indology has great pleasure in publishing *Ślokavārtika—A Study* by Dr. K. K. Dixit. His aim in this study is to present a critico-analytical summary of the text.

In Chapter I Dr. Dixit tries to correct our general impression that Mimāṃsā is concerned with rituals only and has very little to contribute to Indian Philosophy. As a matter of fact, 'the Mimāṃsaka followers of Kumārila and Prabhākara have contributed gems to the treasure-house of Indian Philosophy'. Then he analyses the subject-matter of the *Ślokavārtika* of Kumārila and rearranges topics discussed in the text. Chapters II and III are devoted to the treatment of six ways of knowing (*Pramāṇas*). All the important and crucial problems pertaining to each *pramāṇa* are critically explained and examined. Chapter IV refutes the Buddhist idealism and Chapter V expounds the Mimāṃsā conception of soul. This shows that the work deals with all the main problems of Indian Philosophy. We are grateful to Dr. Dixit for this illuminating work.

It is hoped that the publication of this work will be of considerable value to the students of Indian Philosophy.

L. D. Institute of Indology
Ahmedabad-9
15th December 1982

Nagaj J. Shah
Director

P R E F A C E

The following appraisal of Kumārila's *Ślokavārtika* was attempted some nine years back as a part of the series which likewise took under its purview Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārtika* and Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*; (the texts were taken up for consideration in the order here indicated). The idea was to present before the readers of ancient Indian Philosophy a critico-analytical summary of these three most outstanding works of three most outstanding schools of ancient Indian Philosophy. Of course, a word of explanation is needed as to why precisely these works were regarded as the most outstanding works and these schools as the most outstanding schools. For it is quite possible to take a different view of the matter; nay, it is seldom – if ever – that these works and these schools are assigned so much importance as this.

To my mind philosophy is what Hegel calls 'a thinking consideration of things' and philosophy as thus understood reached maturity in India in the period lying between 300 A. D. and 1000 A. D.; what appeared before this period represented philosophy's infancy, what appeared after this period its senility. So it was in this intermediate period that most mature – that is, most logical – consideration of philosophical issues was undertaken by our authors who were divided into three great camps, viz. those manned by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Dinnāgite Buddhists and the Kumārila and Prabhākaraite Mīmāṃsakas. These authors defended their views in conscious confrontation with those of their rivals and the circumstance made for a considerable amount of clarification of issues. A close study – even a cursory study – of their texts reveals that these authors painstakingly sought to understand the rival views and do as much justice to them as was possible. Naturally, with the passage of time their views grew in maturity though a tendency to hair-splitting made its appearance towards the period under consideration (and it became a bane of what I have chosen to call the 'period of senility'). Thus it was that the most weighty texts of the Kumārilaite Mīmāṃsakas and Dinnāgite Buddhists, viz. Kumārila's *Ślokavārtika* and Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārtika* were composed in 6th–7th Centuries A. D. though – as if to serve as an exception to the rule just hinted – the most weighty text of the Nyāya School – viz. Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* – was composed in 10th Century A. D. Here is my reason for choosing these three texts by way of presenting before readers the most outstanding specimens of the ancient Indian philosophical speculation.

And as indicated above, my aim was to present a critico-analytical summary of the texts thus chosen. For a reader has to be acquainted with the entire range of problems discussed in these texts and with the mode and terminology adopted in the

course of pursuing this discussion – hence summary. Next he needs to be helped in following the logic of the arrangement given to the topics discussed (in case needed, by suitably rearranging these topics) – hence an analysis. Lastly, he is to be told about the most glaring weaknesses vitiating the positions adopted in these texts – hence a criticism. Details of this sort of treatment accorded to Kumārila's *Ślokavārtika* are to be gleaned from the pages that follow.

Ślokavārtika is primarily a text dealing with the problems of logic though here occasion is found to take up for consideration certain problems of ontology as well. And among problems of logic utmost importance is attached to those pertaining to verbal testimony. Hence the two chief chapters of the present monograph–viz. Chapters II and III– successively offer a critico-analytical summary of Kumārila's treatment of verbal testimony and that of his treatment of the remaining means of valid cognition. And the two subsidiary chapters –viz. Chapters IV and V – similarly offer a critico-analytical summary of Kumārila's treatment of two ontological topics which to him appeared to be considerably important – viz. the refutation of idealism and the elaboration of a doctrine of soul. This way it has been possible to summarise almost the entire content of the text, to analyse this content (after making minor rearrangements) and to criticise its most glaring weaknesses.

While rendering Kumārila's ideas into English my ideal has been to do no violation to the spirit of these ideas and yet to dress them up in readable English. How far this ideal has been realised is for the readers to judge.

For the Sanskrit text *Ślokavārtika* use has been made of the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series edition which also carries the commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Pārthasārathi Miśra.

Ajoy Bhavan
New Delhi
8-11-82

K. K. Dixit

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Students of Indian philosophy are generally accustomed to think that the Mīmāṃsā school, since it flourished under the patronage of priests wholeheartedly devoted to the problems of Vedic ritualism, has little to offer that should interest them. As a matter of fact, however, it is one of the three Indian schools whose philosophical output has been most original and extensive, the other two being the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and the school of Buddhist logic founded by Dīnāga and Dharmakīrti. There is doubtless something freakish about a Buddhist or a Mīmāṃsaka taking genuine interest in philosophy. For Buddha is already noted for his antipathy towards metaphysical speculations and it would have surprised no one if there never arose a school of Buddhism to cultivate philosophy in right earnest. Likewise, it would have surprised no one if the priestly propounders of Mīmāṃsā left philosophy severely alone. But as things stand, both the Buddhist followers of Dīnāga and Dharmakīrti and the Mīmāṃsaka followers of Kumārila and Prabhākara have contributed gems to the treasure-house of Indian philosophy. A case in point is Ślokavārtika, Kumārila's *magnum opus* and a very high-ranking philosophical masterpiece.

As a Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila stood committed to maintain the thesis that Vedas are an authorless composition. For in the eyes of his school and schoolmates some such thesis alone would ensure that Vedas are an absolutely infallible source so far as our knowledge of religious matter is concerned. The argument was that since religion deals with things supersensuous and since no man, however competent, can by himself cognize things supersensuous knowledge of religious matter cannot be yielded by a source originating from man. For various reasons, historically determined, the Mīmāṃsakas did not posit God and so they also could not say that knowledge of religious matters is to be yielded by a source of divine origin. Thus cornered (rather thus having cornered themselves) they fell back upon the thesis that knowledge of religious matters is to be yielded by Vedas which are a text devoid of origin, human or divine. To the outsiders this thesis sounded nothing short of preposterous but within the body of a Mīmāṃsaka's philosophical speculation it acted as a veritable running thread. For one thing, it is this circumstance that explains as to why the Mīmāṃsaka is so much preoccupied with the problem of verbal testimony and as to why he thinks it necessary to bestow consideration on the means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony placed at man's disposal. For he has to demonstrate that no means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony placed at man's disposal can yield knowledge of things supersensuous in general and religious matters in particular, and this necessitates a consideration of the nature of these

means of valid cognition; similarly, he has to demonstrate that Vedas are a case of verbal testimony requiring no personal agent as its source and this necessitates a consideration of the nature of verbal testimony in general. What other philosophical problems the Mīmāṃsaka cares to consider are incidental to these two central sets of problems. This, at least is the picture that is left on one's mind after a close perusal of *Śloka-vārtika*. Thus the text deals with important philosophical problems in its 18 sections bearing the following titles (what is here ignored being a very small portion devoted to relatively unimportant problems)

I	<i>Codanāsūtra</i>	X	<i>Citrākṣepavāda</i>
II	<i>Pratyakṣasūtra</i>	XI	<i>Sphoṭavāda</i>
III	<i>Nirālambanavāda</i>	XII	<i>Ākṛtivāda</i>
IV	<i>Śūnyavāda</i>	XIII	<i>Apohavāda</i>
V	<i>Anumānapariccheda</i>	XIV	<i>Vanavāda</i>
VI	<i>Śabdapariccheda</i>	XV	<i>Sambandhākṣepaparihāra</i>
VII	<i>Upamānapariccheda</i>	XVI	<i>Ātmavāda</i>
VIII	<i>Arthāpattipariccheda</i>	XVII	<i>Śabdānityatādhikaraṇa</i>
IX	<i>Abhāvapariccheda</i>	XVIII	<i>Vākyaadhikaraṇa</i>

Here as many as 9 sections take up questions related to the problems of verbal testimony; this as follows :

1. Section VI demonstrates how the acquisition of the meaning of a word on someone's part is not a case of inference,
2. Section X indicates as to what precisely is the type of relationship obtaining between a word and its meaning and as to how in practice one grasps this relationship.
3. Section XI demonstrates (i) that a letter or a word is a single eternal entity and not a perishing entity possessed of an appropriate universal, and (ii) that a word is an entity made up of the letters concerned and not an independent entity (called *sphoṭa*) made manifest by these letters.
4. Section XII demonstrates the existence of universals in the context of arguing that the signification of a word lies in a universal (rather than a particular possessed of the appropriate universal).
5. Section XIII refutes the Buddhist contention that the signification of a word lies not in a universal but in a bare conceptual demarcation.
6. Section XIV further develops the position maintained in section XII.
7. Section XV denies the possibility of a conventional fixing of the relationship between a word and its meaning—the argument being that this relationship is eternal and natural.
8. Section XVII argues that a letter or a word is something eternal and not something perishing.

9. Section XVIII demonstrates that a sentence yields meaning not through the instrumentality of its words but through that of the meanings corresponding to those words (the Sanskrit word for 'wordmeaning' being '*padārtha*' which also means an entity).

Similarly, five sections – viz. II, V, VII-IX – deal with those five means of valid cognition which the Kumārilite Mīmāṃsakas posit besides verbal testimony; these means are *pratyakṣa* or perception (II), *anumāna* or inference (V), *upamāna* or analogy (VII), *arthāpatti* or implication (VIII), *abhāva* or absence (IX). Then there remain only four sections – I, III, IV, XVI; of these, section I serves as an introduction to the whole text as is evident from the fact that it deals with the following four topics :

(i) The validity and invalidity of a piece of cognition—are they intrinsic to this cognition or extrinsic to it ?

(ii) Vedas as an authorless composition are alone an authority concerning religious matters.

(iii) No man can by himself acquire knowledge of things supersensuous in general and religious matters in particular.

(iv) What constitutes a religious act ?

Of the remaining ones sections III and IV are devoted to a refutation of Buddhist idealism while section XVI is devoted to demonstrating the existence and nature of soul; both these are pieces of philosophical speculation of considerable importance but viewed in the total present context they are of a somewhat miscellaneous sort—somewhat comparable to the interesting and important speculations strewn throughout the body of *Ślokavārtika*. (e. g. the refutation of theism in section XV, vv. 43-86, the refutation of momentariness in section XVII vv. 424-41)

It will therefore be advisable to examine the contents of *Ślokavārtika* under the following four heads :

I Verbal Testimony

II Means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony.

III Refutation of Idealism.

IV Doctrine of soul.

CHAPTER II

VERBAL TESTIMONY

Before taking up for consideration the relevant texts let us have a cursory glance at the way Kumārila views the problem of verbal testimony. On this question discussion is conducted on two levels not unconnected with one another; they might be called the ontological level and the logical level and they are not unconnected with one another for the reason that Kumārila maintains certain positions as regards the ontological status of words precisely because he has to defend certain positions as regards the logical status of verbal testimony. Kumārila finds it striking that a word means the same thing whenever it is uttered, wherever it is uttered, by whomsoever it is uttered, to whomsoever it is uttered; from this he concludes that a word must be an eternal and ubiquitous entity possessed of an inherent capacity to denote the thing it does. Of course, Kumārila concedes that one must acquaint oneself with the denotative capacity of a word if one is to employ it or understand it, but his argument is that this capacity must be already present there in this word if one is to acquaint oneself with it just as the thing to be seen must be already present there if one is to see it with the help of one's eyes and the accessories like light etc. Kumārila thinks that all this remains unaccounted for if a word is regarded not as an eternal entity but as a transient entity produced by the speaker (at the time of speaking) and perishing then and there. On this latter supposition—so thinks Kumārila—it cannot be said that the same word means the same thing whenever it is uttered; for how it should be impossible to say about two words uttered under different circumstances that they are the same words, Kumārila also says a lot about the conditions under which a word is uttered and heard, and his point is that what takes place under these conditions is that a word existing everywhere and always is made manifest here and now. In the times of Kumārila there also prevailed a view—called *sphoṭavāda*—according to which a word is not only an eternal and ubiquitous entity but also an impartite entity—so that the letters supposed to constitute it do not really constitute it but only manifest it at the time of its being uttered and heard. The distinction of this view from Kumārila's own is extremely subtle but he has thought it necessary to refute it in no uncertain terms. On Kumārila's view, the letters of a word are its real constituent units and what makes it manifest are not these letters but the vocal activity on the part of the speaker concerned—an activity aimed at pronouncing these letters. Kumārila himself finds it somewhat difficult to explain how both a letter and a word are of the form of an eternal and ubiquitous entity; for a word seems to be only certain letters arranged in an ordered succession but an ordered succession which is eternal and which obtains between elements that are themselves

eternal is not easy to comprehend. Kumārila has also discussed as to how a sentence yields its meaning. His understanding is that this meaning is yielded by the constituent words of this sentence not directly but through the mediation of their respective meanings. This thesis, apparently innocent, becomes intriguing on account of the ambiguity of the Sanskrit word *padārtha* which means both word-meaning and entity, so that Kumārila seems to be saying that the words of a sentence yield its meaning not directly but through the mediation of the entities they stand for, a puzzling statement. Then Kumārila has refuted the view according to which verbal testimony is but a case of inference; his point is that no inference of any sort is involved either in one grasping the meaning of a word or in one grasping the meaning of a sentence. Kumārila does not deny that we infer the truth or falsity of a sentence on the ground whether the speaker concerned is trustworthy or otherwise, but he would insist that no sort of inference is required to elicit meaning out of a sentence. It is difficult to see how a sentence – i. e., a sentence not judged to be true or false – can be a possible case of verbal testimony, and for all practical purposes Kumārila himself would concede that only a sentence judged to be true is a case of valid verbal testimony. It is a different matter altogether that Kumārila has persuaded himself that a sentence is judged to be true not only when the speaker concerned is found to be trustworthy but also when it is found to possess no speaker at all (Vedas being a collection of such sentences as possess no speaker at all). These so many aspects of Kumārila's understanding of the nature of verbal testimony have received a more or less elaborate treatment in different parts of *Śloka-vārtika*; we consider these parts one by one

Section I (Codanāśūtra)

This section which, as has already been noted, serves as an introduction to the whole text provides a good clue to the basic working of Kumārila's mind on the questions of philosophy in general and those of verbal testimony in particular. His central argument here is that Vedas are an absolutely infalliable text concerning religious matters because they are an authorless text. It is in this connection that Kumārila first undertakes a consideration of the general problem of intrinsic versus extrinsic validity of cognition (vv. 33–61) and then applies it to the particular case of verbal testimony (vv. 62–109). In a nutshell his position is that all cognition is valid unless proved to be otherwise (vv. 47–53); and proceeding further he argues that since in a verbal testimony the only possible source of invalidity is the untrustworthy character of the speaker concerned a verbal testimony devoid of all speaker is automatically proved to be valid (vv. 62–63). Needless to say, if Kumārila's present argumentation is valid and if Vedas are really an authorless text then whatever they say must be true. But the difficulty with Kumārila's argumentation is that a piece of cognition not proved to be invalid is not necessarily valid, it might be valid but it might as well be otherwise. And the less said the better about Kumārila's fond belief that Vedas are an authorless text. Be that as it may, it is in this background that we have to follow Kumārila's famous saying

atyantāsaty api hy arthe jñānam śabdāḥ karoti hi |
tenotsarge sthite tasya doṣābhāvāt pramānatā || 6 ||

In view of what has just been said the verse is to be translated as follows : “A word verily produces understanding concerning even an altogether absent object. Thus exhibiting the basic feature of all cognition – viz. self-validity—it is confirmed as a case of valid cognition when no defects are present in it.” It is difficult to see why a piece of cognition should require to be confirmed as valid if it is already self-valid to begin with and why it should be treated as self-valid to begin with if it later on requires to be confirmed as valid. In all this, however, Kumārila has posed in his own manner an important philosophical problem—viz. that of the mechanism through which words produce understanding concerning things; in future it will be his endeavour to attack this problem now from this side, now from that.

Section VI (Śabdapariśeḍha)

In this section Kumārila considers the question whether verbal testimony is to be treated as a case of inference. As he tells us, the Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas answer it in the affirmative, the Sāṅkhya etc. in the negative (v. 15). On his own part, Kumārila would side with latter but he feels dissatisfied with the procedure adopted by them in this connection, and mostly his difficulty with them is that the feature which according to them distinguish verbal testimony from inference are actually found even in certain cases of inference (vv. 15–37). For example, they say that a word is associated with its meaning according to an arbitrary convention but not so a probans with its probandum; he points out that when a particular bodily gesture is made to stand for a particular situation it is associated with the latter according to an arbitrary convention and yet it acts as a probans for the latter (vv. 19–20). Again, they say that a word and its meaning bear the same form but not a probans and its probandum; he points out that when reflection in a mirror is made the ground for inferring the thing reflected the probans and the probandum too bear the same form (26–27). Likewise, they say that a sentence not properly understood suggests various shades of meaning but nothing of the sort happens with a probans; he points out that a probans not properly discriminated suggests the presence of various probanda (v. 32). Lastly, they say that verbal testimony requires no mention of an illustration while an inference does; he points out that an inference with a well-known relation of invariable concomitance too can dispense with the services of an illustration (v. 33). Then Kumārila considers the position of certain Mīmāṃsakas who distinguish verbal testimony from the remaining means of valid cognition on the ground that it possesses an altogether unique subject-matter (vv. 38–43). He concedes that this description would well apply to Vedic verbal testimony but goes on to add that it would fail to cover the cases of human verbal testimony. The suggestion that the cases of human verbal testimony be treated as cases of inference he rejects on the ground that there is something unique even about these

cases. Lastly, Kumārila quotes the view of certain other Mīmāṃsaka according to which verbal testimony is that particular case of inference in which things are inferred from words (whereas in other cases of inference things are inferred from things) (vv. 44-45). He raises, no specific objection against this view but comes out with the general contention that to reduce verbal testimony to a case of inference must involve the supposition that all valid verbal testimony comes from an authoritative person, a supposition not applicable to Vedic verbal testimony (vv. 46-50). Consequently, he also rejects the definition according to which verbal testimony is the cognition yielded by the words of an authoritative person (v. 52). However, referring back to this own view formulated in section I and already considered by us he offers a counter definition according to which verbal testimony is the cognition yielded by words, a cognition that is valid in its own right and remains so unless defects are detected in it (v. 53). Then Kumārila undertakes a long refutation of the view that the acquisition of the meaning of a word on one's part is a case of inference (vv. 54-98). In this connection his chief argument is that all inference presupposes the cognition of a relation of invariable concomitance between the concerned probans and probandum but that the only relation obtaining between a word and its meaning is the relation of denoter-and-denoted, a relation whose very cognition renders superfluous inference sought to be based on this cognition (vv. 65/2-66/1, 76-77, 94). More significantly, Kumārila soon argues that the acquisition of the meaning of a word is not a case of acquiring valid cognition strictly so called which is always of the form of the cognition of a situation—a novel situation at that (the cognition of word-meaning being no cognition of a situation) (vv. 99-107). On this very ground, however, he would even not mind if the acquisition of word-meaning is proved to be a case of inference; for what he is chiefly interested in maintaining is that verbal testimony is not a case of inference while verbal testimony is always of the form of a rightly constructed sentence and never of the form of loose words (v. 108). As for the acquisition of sentential meaning itself, Kumārila is convinced that it is so unique a performance that it is impossible to reduce it to a case of inference; hence his taunt that the acquisition of word-meaning is sought to be reduced to a case of inference by people who find it frighteningly impossible to reduce to a case of inference the acquisition of sentential meaning (vv. 109-11).

Section X (Citrākṣepavāda)

In this section Kumārila makes his start with the following two pieces of inference (1) "A Vedic sentence is true, because in respect of its meaning it is independent of a speaker, just as a word is true because in respect of its meaning it is independent of a speaker." (v. 1). (2) "The cognition yielded by a Vedic sentence is valid because it is cognition yielded by an authorless sentence, just as the cognition yielded by any sentence is valid." (v. 2). The first inference is fallacious because a word is true in respect of its meaning only in the trivial sense that it means what it means, whereas

a Vedic sentence has to be true in the far more important sense that what it says is the case; glossing over this vital difference as regards the meaning of the word 'true' Kumārila argues that 'a word is true in respect of its meaning because nobody ever gave this word this meaning and a Vedic sentence is true because nobody ever composed it. Kumārila's position becomes still more vulnerable when it is remembered that each single word has a history of its being given the meaning it now expresses. Similarly fallacious is Kumārila's second inference. The cognition yielded by an ordinary sentence is valid only in the Kumārilian sense that it is valid unless proved invalid; but the cognition yielded by a Vedic sentence has to be valid in the sense that it is never going to be proved invalid. This is a gross discrepancy of contents but a formal discrepancy too lurks here. For the word 'authorless' occurring in the probans is anomalous inasmuch as the character of being authorless is lacking in the illustration cited. Be that as it may, Kumārila does not dilate upon the two inferences in question but only makes them the occasion for an opponent raising the objection that no relation can conceivably obtain between a word and its alleged meaning and that even if such a relation does obtain it must be a made affair (v. 5). The opponent's point is that the only relation conceivable between a word and the thing meant by it is the relation of conjunction but that such a relation is apparently absent here just as it is absent between the mountains Himālaya and Vindhya (vv. 6-7). Kumārila retorts that the relation of father-and-son is a relation and yet no relation of conjunction while there does obtain between the mountains Himālaya and Vindhya the relation called 'co-residence on the same earth.' (v.10) His positive point is that the relation between a word and the thing meant by it is that relation of denoter and denoted (v. 11). By way of elaborating his point Kumārila tells us that in the act called denotation the word acts in its capacity as agent or instrument while the thing meant acts in its capacity as object which is all that is understood when the word and the thing meant by it are said to stand in the relation of denoter and denoted (vv. 12-15). Kumārila concedes that once this relation is cognised one can offer inference to the effect that whoever utters such and such a word means such and such a thing, but he insists that the original cognition of this relation is not a case of inference but a type *sui generis* (vv. 16-20). Kumārila also describes how the relation in question is first learnt (vv. 20-25). Thus in some cases an expert tells the novice 'such and such a thing is meant by such and such a word'; in other cases, the novice first watches the experts acting in the wake of words having been uttered and then applying the method of concomitance in presence and concomitance in absence he comes to understand that such and such a thing is meant by such and such a word. Here the opponent objects that if this is how a word comes to acquire meaning for a novice then this word cannot be said to possess an inherent capacity to yield this meaning (v. 33). Kumārila's reply to the objection is considerably elaborate (vv. 34-44). Thus he points out that even if a thing possesses the capacity to yield a certain result this capacity is realized and result yielded usually in the

presence of certain accessories. This, however, does not mean that these accessories taken by themselves would yield the result in question. For example, an eye possesses the capacity to see things but it actually sees things only in the presence of an accessory like light; this however does not mean that a blind person would see things only if they are placed in a well-lit compartment. Similarly, a word comes to acquire a meaning for a novice only when he has cognised the relation obtaining between this word and this meaning, but that does not mean that this word could thus yield this meaning even in case it did not possess it originally.

Section XI (Sphotavāda)

In this section Kumārila seeks to explain what he understands by a word (rather by the generic entity in Sanskrit called *śabda* of which two subspecies are letter – Skt. *varṇa* – and word – Skt. *pada*). He comes out with the definition that a *śabda* is what is an object of auditory perception irrespective of whether it yields a meaning or not (v. 5). An individual letter is the case of a *śabda* yielding no meaning (v. 7), a word (–composed-of-letters) is the case of a *śabda* yielding meaning (v. 6). The exact import of this distinction becomes evident as Kumārila's argument develops. Thus he first undertakes a long description of what a letter is (vv. 9–64). He argues that since a letter is never found to possess constituent parts one and the same letter must be being pronounced whenever and wherever it is pronounced just as sky since it possesses no constituent parts is one and the same entity whenever and wherever it is observed (vv. 9–15). The opponent asks Kumārila to account for the difference that obtains between two cases of pronouncing one and the same letter; Kumārila retorts by asking the opponent to account for the identity that obtains between these very two cases (v. 15). The opponent submits that two cases of pronouncing the same letter are identical insofar as the same universal resides in them while they are different in so far as they are two seats of the same universal (v. 16). The sum and substance of the Kumārila's counter-argument is that two entities can be said to be two seats of the same universal only in case they are found to exhibit mutual similarity as well as mutual dissimilarity but that since two cases of pronouncing the same letter exhibit no mutual dissimilarity whatsoever (this in turn because a letter exhibits no constituent parts) they cannot be said to be two seats of the same universal (vv. 17–22). Soon afterwards, however, Kumārila, goes on to concede that whatever differences might be exhibited by two cases of pronouncing the same letter must be due to the two *nādas* (=air-vibrations) that are active in making manifest this letter in these two cases; nay, he even points out that he is speaking of one and the same letter being made manifest by two *nādas* precisely as the opponent speaks of one and the same universal being made manifest by two particulars falling under this universal (vv. 23–26). Little wonder that at the close of his argument Kumārila frankly admits that

he would not even mind if two cases of pronouncing the same letter are treated as a case of two particulars falling under the same universal; for all that he is interested in maintaining is that an entity existing everywhere and always is made manifest whenever one and the same letter is pronounced now here now there, a position defensible on the hypothesis of an unitary letter as also on that of a letter-universal (vv. 63-64). [In the mean-while (vv. 31-62) Kumārila discusses various ways how the unitary character of a vowel is to be defended—for it is admitted on all hands that a vowel is of three types, viz, short, long, double long. But the discussion is unimportant.] Then Kumārila investigates the nature of a word as against that of a letter (vv. 65-90). Here Kumārila's main endeavour is to demonstrate how the constituent letters of a word pronounced successively manage to yield a unitary cognition of this word. His simple argument is that it is the very nature of certain things that they cooperate in producing the same result by existing simultaneously while it is the very nature of certain other things that they do so by existing successively (v. 73)—the constituent letters of a word producing a unitary cognition of this word belonging to the latter category. By way of example it is said that the various steps of a ritual successively performed lead to the total result, one reading after another of a text leads to the mastery of this text (v. 74); it is also suggested that the entire period during which the successive acts in question take place can be treated as one grand present (vv. 79-82). Lastly, it is argued that the constituent parts of an apparatus—bullock cart, say—cannot be said to be useless simply on the ground that none of them taken singly is in a position to perform the function undertaken by this apparatus (v. 86); this even on the supposition that no contribution of this or that from among these constituent parts can be pointed out but as a matter of fact even such pointing out is not impossible (vv. 87-90). Much that Kumārila had said at the time of introducing the present section of his text and much that he has just said by way of describing the nature of a word make clear sense only in the context of his refutation of the doctrine of *sphoṭa* which he now starts and continues upto the end of the present section (vv. 91—137). Kumārila had earlier said that a *śabda* is what is an object of auditory perception and that it is either of the form of a letter or of the form of a word. As against this, the doctrine of *sphoṭa* maintains that a word is not only an eternal and ubiquitous entity but also an impartite entity, so that the letters alleged to be the constituent units of a word are not really its constituent units but just the agents that make this word manifest at the time when they are pronounced; (it is the word thus understood which is called *sphoṭa*—to be more precise, *pada-sphoṭa*). So when Kumārila says that a word is an object of auditory perception he means to hint that a word understood as *sphoṭa*, since it is admittedly no object of auditory perception, is no word at all, (a *sphoṭa* is no object of auditory perception because letters which are in fact an object of auditory perception are supposed only to make it manifest). Similarly, when Kumārila in the end says that a word is made up of the letters concerned he means to hint that a word understood as *sphoṭa*,

since it is admittedly not made up of letters, is no word at all; (a *sphoṭa* is not made up of the letters concerned because these letters are only supposed to make it manifest). And Kumārila has endeavoured so much to demonstrate how the constituent letters of a word cognized successively make possible a unitary cognition of this word precisely because the doctrine of *sphoṭa* crucially hinges upon the denial of this possibility. Kumārila's simple argument is that the difficulties he faces in this connection would not fail to be felt even by the advocate of *sphoṭa*, for the latter too will have to demonstrate how certain letters cognized successively make possible the manifestation of one single *sphoṭa* (vv. 91-93). Here Kumārila considers several hypotheses which should account for the possibility in question (vv. 97-121) but he persists in his charge against the advocate of *sphoṭa* that by giving the name 'word' to something, which is not made up of letters he is not only positing an uncalled for concept (vv. 94-96) but is also going against all popular usage, for plain people would always readily concede that a word is what is made up of letters (vv. 126).

Section XII (Ākṛtīvāda)

In this section Kumārila discusses the problem of the ontological status of a universal, and the occasion for it arises as follows (vv. 1-4). According to Kumārila a word is an eternal entity eternally related to the entity it means; this in turn requires that the entity meant by a word must itself be something eternal. On the other hand, it is admitted on all hands that a word stands for that feature which is shared in common by all the objects to which this word applies. Combining these two trains of thought Kumārila comes out with the view that the entity meant by a word is of the form of a universal which is an eternal entity residing in each and every object to which this word applies. Then he offers a positive account of the nature of universal and defends it against possible objections. He begins by making a general declaration to the effect that things are found to possess features that are common to several of them as also those that are peculiar to each and that neither set is a case of illusory appearance (vv. 5-11). This consideration is supposed to bestow at least *prima facie* plausibility on Kumārila's thesis on a universal. But he considers it necessary to answer the objection that several particular objects might possess the capacity to produce a cognition of identity in respect of themselves without their being the seat of a common universal (v. 12). On Kumārila's showing such a capacity must be (i) one in the case of all these particulars, (ii) different from these particulars, (iii) a cognized something, and then in his eyes it becomes just another name for the universal posited by him (vv. 13-18). He also considers the objection that several particular objects might be called by the same name without their being the seat of a common universal just as all the universals are called by the same name 'universal' without a new universal residing in them at all (v. 19). Kumārila's reply to this objection is interesting and many-pronged (vv. 20-23) but its net purport is that the universals are called by the same name not on account of this being the

seat of a new universal but on account of their sharing the feature 'while being one residing in many' or on account of their performing the common function 'producing the cognition of identity in respect of many' (v. 24), a terminology peculiarly reminiscent of Buddhists who with its aid seek to deny that anything like a universal at all resides in a set of particular objects. Kumārila next submits that a universal is not an ubiquitous entity inasmuch as it resides only in those places where there exists a particular body acting as its seat (v. 25). But he soon goes on to concede that a universal is an ubiquitous entity which is only made manifest at a place where there exists a body acting as its seat (v. 26). In this connection he considers the objection that there seems to be no reason why a particular object should make manifest just one universal when all the universals are equally present there; his reply amounts to saying that this is so because this is the very nature of things (vv. 27-34). Somewhat similar is Kumārila's answer to the objection that if the presence of a common feature in several particular objects necessitates the presence there of a universal then the presence of the common feature 'relatedness to the universal in question' should necessitate the presence of another universal in these very objects; for it virtually amounts to saying that the presence of the universal in question is and the presence of 'relatedness to the universal in question' is not a matter of plain observation (vv. 35-40). Kumārila concedes that the particular objects, which share a universal also share a corresponding capacity, but his point is that since this capacity is itself posited on the basis of the observation of this universal it cannot be made the basis for denying the existence of this universal (vv. 41-44). As for the common feature which corresponds to a common universal Kumārila first insists that it is quite different from the latter and is just a sign for the presence of the latter (v. 45), but he soon goes on to concede that the two are somehow identical with one another (v. 46-47). Kumārila also considers the view according to which there exists only one grand universal which is made manifest in the form of this universal or that when this particular object or that acts as the manifesting agent (vv. 48-50). Against this view his objection is that the alleged manifesting agent, unless possessed of a distinct feature, cannot make possible the manifestation of a distinct universal, but that this distinct feature can only be the possession of the universal in question—so that it is impossible to deny real reality to distinct universals. Kumārila next returns to the point with which he has started his argumentation—viz. to emphasize that a thing exhibits a common feature as well as a peculiar feature while this common feature and this peculiar feature are identical with one another as well as different from one another and both are identical with the thing itself as well as different from it (vv. 51-64). In this connection he considers the objection that it is logically absurd to treat as identical with one another a common feature and a peculiar feature; his reply to it is that identity and difference he is speaking of are not absolute identity and absolute difference but partial identity and partial difference (vv. 53-55). Here Kumārila incidentally remarks that a common feature belonging

to a thing is what a word stands for; he concedes that certain philosophers call this common feature a false feature because it does not represent the total nature of this things but he goes on to point out that even they admit that this common feature represents part-nature of this thing (vv.64-65). In the end Kumārila considers the view according to which a common feature of a thing consists in *sārūpya* (vv. 65-77). His objection against this view is that if *sārūpya* means 'possession of the same form' then it is but another name for universal (v. 66), but that if it means 'similarly' then it is difficult to specify this similarity. For example, if certain particular objects are called 'cow' not on the basis of their possessing the cow-universal but on the basis of their being similar to a sub-set of these objects then logic will demand that only this sub-set be called 'cow' (vv. 67-70), nor can it be said that these objects are called 'cow' on the basis of their similarity to an originally existing cow, for nobody knows how this mythical cow looked like (vv. 73-74). Moreover, on Kumārila's showing similarity means 'identity of parts', but identity of parts is inconceivable unless these parts be the seat of an identical universal (vv. 74-75), so that the hypothesis of similarity logically presupposes the hypothesis of universal.

Section—XIII (*Apohavāda*)

In this section Kumārila undertakes a refutation of the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* according which a word is applied to a set of objects not because these objects share any specific feature in common but simply because they are excluded from all the objects lying outside this set. Thus the Buddhist would say that the word 'cow' is applied to the objects which are characterised by 'exclusion from non-cows (*ago 'poha*)', the word 'horse' to the objects which are characterised by 'exclusion' from non-horses (*anaśvāpoha*)'. Kumārila submits that 'exclusion from non-cows' posited by the Buddhist must mean the very same thing as the cow-universal posited by him (v. 1) On his showing, 'exclusion from non-cows' must characterize neither anything more than all the cows nor anything less than all the cows. Certainly, 'exclusion from non-cows' cannot characterize horse, but nor can it characterize only certain types of cows, for in the latter case the cows not belonging to the types in question will cease to be cows (vv.4-8). But cow-universal is just the thing that resides neither in anything more than all the cows nor in anything less than all the cows; hence Kumārila's equation of 'cow-universal' with 'exclusion from non-cows' (v. 10). In this connection Kumārila examines a number of negative words on whose analogy the Buddhist might plead that even positive words are essentially negative in import (vv. 11-34); most important is his examination of the word 'non-Brahmin (Skt. a-brāhmaṇa)' (vv. 13-30). In the case of the word 'non-Brahmin' his verdict is that it means not just 'absence of Brāhminhood' but 'manhood-unaccompanied-by-Brāhminhood, (v. 22); and his general verdict is that a negative word always means 'a universal-unaccompanied-by-a-subspecies of itself' (v. 28). Kumārila has equated the Buddhist's 'exclusion' with his own universal but he takes

note of the fact the Buddhist dismisses a universal as unreal. So he argues that if a universal—and hence an 'exclusion'—is dismissed as unreal then the only real things will be extreme particulars (v. 35) but that since no practical dealing is possible in relation to extreme particulars the Buddhist's doctrine of 'exclusion' turns out to be a part of his nihilist campaign (v. 36). And then Kumārila's honest advice to the Buddhist is that he should only say that a universal is a mere mental construct but should not indulge in the misconceived venture of substituting 'exclusion' for universal (v. 37). Kumārila further argues that since an 'exclusion' is merely of the form of an absence nothing should distinguish one 'exclusion' from another (v. 42). He refused to concede that one 'exclusion' can be distinguished from another on the ground that the two have got two different seats; for his point is that the seat of a thing does not affect the nature of this thing (vv. 48-49). Nor does he concede that one 'exclusion' can be distinguished from another on the ground that the two have got two different sets of excluded things; for his point is that these excluded things are foreign to an 'exclusion' and what is foreign to a thing does not affect the nature of this thing (v. 52). Kumārila has also offered a rather ingenious argument to demonstrate that one 'exclusion' means almost the same thing as another; it runs as follows: "A cow is what is excluded from non-cows, a horse is what is excluded from non-horses. But the set of objects called 'non-cow' is virtually the same as the set of objects called 'non-horse', the two only differing in that the former includes horses and excludes cows while the latter includes cows and excludes horses. This mean that a non-cow is virtually the same thing as a non-horse, which in turn means that a cow is virtually the same thing as a horse (vv. 53-57). If it be said that the total set of objects called 'non-cow' is different from the total set of objects called 'non-horse', then we would point out that this totality is something of an enigma. For if it resides separately in the objects in question the 'exclusions' in question would cease to have one fixed locus each, and it obviously cannot reside in all these objects for the simple reason (among others) that so many of them are yet to come into existence (vv. 58-62)." More seriously, Kumārila argues that to say that a cow is what is excluded from non-cows involves the fallacy of mutual dependence; for just as a cow is being said to be what is excluded from non-cows, a non-cow will have to be said to be what is excluded from cows (vv. 65-66, 83-84). These are the most formidable difficulties urged by Kumārila against the doctrine of *apoha*, but his polemic continues. Thus he next offers one set of arguments (vv. 86-114) to demonstrate that on accepting this doctrine word-meaning becomes an impossibility and another set to demonstrate that on accepting it sentential meaning becomes an impossibility (vv. 115-134). Both sets are considerably elaborate but they bring out nothing that is much significant. In the case of the first set Kumārila's central contention is that the knowledge of word-meaning should enable us to deal with the real things of the world but that the relation of an 'exclusion'—which is what a word means according to the

Buddhist—to the real things of the world is ambiguous in the extreme. In one word, being itself unreal an 'exclusion' cannot have any real relation with the real things but it cannot play any meaningful role in the knowledge-situation unless it has some real relation with these real things. In the case of the second set Kumārila's central contention is that the entities meant by the words of a sentence, must stand in some meaningful relation with each other but that 'exclusions' which are what these words mean according to the Buddhist cannot stand in any meaningful relation with each other. Kumārila closes his polemic with a set of minor objections of a miscellaneous sort. Here are examples :

(1) The entity meant by a word must be capable of being assigned a gender, number and the like but an 'exclusion' is incapable of all this (vv. 135-37). (2) If an universal is of the form of an 'exclusion' it must be cognized by means of non-cognition which is the accredited means of cognizing 'absences', but it is never actually thus cognized (v.138). (3) In the case of a verb it is impossible to see how an 'exclusion' can be meant, so also in the case of words like 'not' and 'and' as also in the case of a sentence (vv.139-43). And his grand conclusion is that a word is to be said to mean an exclusion only in case it is explicitly a negative word while in every other case it is to be assigned a positive meaning (v. 164).

Section-XIV Vanavāda

In this Section Kumārila again grapples with the problem of universal. Here he considers some of the most acute objections that used to be raised against the position maintained by himself. The title of the section — viz. Vanavāda (a treatise on forest)—is significant, for a very serious argument against this position was that a universal is nothing over and above the particulars to which it is alleged to belong just as a forest is nothing over and above the trees of which it is made up. This argument Kumārila considers in great details but he also considers certain other arguments. Thus first of all he investigates the relation that obtains between a universal and the features through which it is usually recognized. On his showing, the bodily parts like dewlap etc. are found in each and every cow just as the cow-universal is found in each and every cow and yet the two are two distinct entities, between which there obtains the relation called 'co-residence in the same body' (vv.1-2). Kumārila would not even concede that the observation of dewlap etc. is a necessary condition for observing the cow-universal (v.4), for his fear is that if the cow-universal cannot be observed without observing dewlap etc. these latter too should not be observed without observing some third thing, and that would lead to an infinite regress (v. 5); moreover, in that case the cow-universal should not be observed unless dewlap etc. are observed in their totality—which latter observation would take time while as a matter of fact the cow-universal is observed all at once (vv.6-7). As to why the observation of the cow-universal does not take place without at the same time observing dewlap etc. Kumārila's explanation

is that it is so because the two are located at the same place (v.8). In the end, however, Kumārila concedes that there is no harm even in maintaining that dewlap etc. and the cow-universal are not absolutely different from each other (v. 10). The opponent argues that a universal is not different from the particulars concerned, because it is not cognized when the latter are not cognized just like a row, a herd, a forest (which are of the form of a group that is not cognized when its members are not cognized) (v. 11). Kumārila's first reaction is that such argumentation is of no avail when a universal is a matter of universal popular acceptance (vv. 12–15), but in his heart of heart he knows that it needs convincing rebuttal and so gets ready for that. But before doing that he incidentally argues that a universal is not the same thing as configuration (Kumārila's favourite Sanskrit word for a universal is *ākṛti* which literally means configuration). His point is that in the case of things like air and fire there arises no question of configuration (v. 16) while in a portrait of cow we observe the cow-configuration but no cow-universal (v. 19). Similarly, when one golden ornament is converted into another there is a change of configuration but a continuity of the gold-universal (the illustration is obscure) (vv.20–23); and when a heap of pulse-seeds is observed there is observed the universal concerned even in the absence of a configuration concerned (v. 24). Then coming to his original point Kumārila submits that a universal is a matter of plain perception, that being why even from a distance we observe a man as man though remaining in doubt whether he is Brahmin or not (v. 25). He however concedes that in certain cases a universal might be recognized on the basis of observing certain relevant features; e. g. gold is recognized as distinct from copper on the basis of its colour, oil as distinct from ghee on the basis of its smell and taste, ash-covered fire on the basis of its touch, a distant lying horse on the basis of the sound it makes (vv.26–28). Then Kumārila avers that there is nothing incongruous about a universal residing in each and every particular object that exhibits it, for that is what we plainly perceive (v.30). And he argues that a universal does not become different by being located in different particular objects simply for the reason that as a result of coming in contact with different objects a thing does not cease to be what it is (vv. 30–31). As for the ubiquitous and impartite character of a universal Kumārila recommends that it be established just as in the case of a word; (let us recall that on Kumārila's showing a word is ubiquitous and impartite because it exhibit absolutely the same form wherever it is uttered) (v.31). We are further told that a universal is eternal because it can possibly belong to the particulars that are separated by a time-gap (v.32). As for whether a universal resides in a particular partly or wholly Kumārila remarks that the question makes no sense in the case of an impartite entity like universal (v. 33). His point is that an impartite entity might well reside in its different seats in a manner *sui generis* (v.37), just as fire is hot in a manner *sui generis* (v.39) Kumārila then argues that the cognition of two cows as cow is not a case of just cognising two similar things; for the things in question have got an identity of form, and just as the valid recognition

of a thing as the same thing is not false so also is the cognition of identity-of-form in the case of two cows not false. (vv. 48-49). Hence coming back to an earlier point Kumārila remarks that when a universal is thus a matter of plain perception it is senseless to argue that a universal does not exist over and above the particulars concerned just as a forest does not exist over and above the trees concerned (v. 50). His point is that the perception of a universal is not a case of pseudo-perception even if the perception of a forest is (v. 53); certainly the falsity of the perception of a forest does not render false the perception of a universal, just as it does not render false the perception of taste etc. (v. 54). Here is Kumārila's account of how unlike the perception of a universal the perception of a forest is false. "On account of distance acting as a defect there arises the cognition of one forest over and above the trees concerned, but no such defect operates in the case of a universal (v. 55). On approaching close the cognition of oneness in respect of the trees concerned comes to an end; but the cognition of a universal never comes to an end (v. 56). The cognition of oneness in respect of forest which takes place without the employment of words is thus discarded but the same as taking place in connection with the employment of words persists even for a neutral person; however even this latter cognition is false because it finds no corroboration from perception etc. whereas a universal is cognized in an identical manner by all the means of valid cognition (vv. 57-58). Certainly, a word is properly applied only in the case of things that are already cognized by other means of valid cognition but as in the case of forest etc. it turns out to be false because not applied to things perceived (reading *dr̥ṣṭe prayuktasya* for *dr̥ṣṭe prayuktasya*) (v. 59). But Kumārila next quotes at length the view of certain other thinkers who treat forest as a real entity; it runs as follows "The cognition of oneness in respect of forest is true even when generated through words — this in spite of its not being corroborated by other means of valid cognition, just as the cognition of taste etc. is true (even in spite of its not being corroborated by other means of valid cognition) (v. 60). Certainly, it is not necessarily required that the cognition generated through words be corroborated by other means of valid cognition (v. 62). However, in the present case even such a corroboration is available; for after all a forest is but trees many in number, and they are already cognized by other means of valid cognition while the number one is cognized in the case of other objects (v. 63). On their part, certain others maintain that a forest is the universal 'manyness' residing in the trees concerned and this universal is already one (so that the cognition of oneness in respect of forest is not false) (v. 66) Nay, we might even concede that there exists a forest-universal which however lacks a single locus, just like a composite-whole (which has got numerous loci in the form of its component parts); true, the loci of the forest-universal are not conjoined to each other (just as those of a composite-whole are), but there is nothing incongruous about it because it is a matter of plain observation (vv. 66-67). Certainly, the cognition of forestness takes place in relation to all forests (just as cognition of

cowness takes place in relation to all cows) (v. 68). And then there are even other cases where a universal has got a locus whose elements do not appear all together but one after another (e.g. the universal motion-ness residing in an act of motion — which necessarily takes time to be performed) (v. 69). Or we might say that a forest is a single entity because the trees concerned perform one function — just as a cow is a single entity because it performs one function; certainly, we do not give the name 'forest' to trees standing far apart (vv. 69-70). Lastly, Kumārila quotes a view according to which the cognition of oneness in respect of a forest is only figurative but even on this view a universal remains a real entity; it runs as follows : "On the basis of an identity of place, time, function etc. there arises a figurative cognition of oneness even in the absence of one substance being present there — just as in the case of a row, a herd, a forest (vv. 70-71). However, it is not the case that just as the cognition of a forest arises in respect of a group of trees so also the cognition of cow-universal arises in respect of a group of cows; as a matter of fact, the cognition of cow-universal in the latter case corresponds to the cognition of trees in the forest (both being true) (vv. 71-72). Certainly, trees in the case of a forest are not found separate from one another and so are to be treated as a group, but cows in the case of the cow-universal are found separate from one another and so are not to be treated as a group (v. 73)." Kumārila now takes up a point already mooted and develops it in a new direction. Thus he argues that dewlap etc. (in the case of a cow) do not go to constitute the cow-universal, because they only manage to produce the cognition of identity in relation to the body of one particular cow whereas the cow-universal produces the cognition of identity in relation to one particular cow and another particular cow; so Kumārila feels that the cow-universal retains an independent role irrespective of whether there is or is not a composite-whole over and above its component-parts (vv. 73-74). Soon, however, he submits that a composite-whole does exist over and above its component-parts; his only suggestion is that it should not be treated as something absolutely distinct from these component-parts (v. 75). Kumārila's point is that a composite-whole is both somehow identical with its component-parts and somehow different from them, it being his conviction that things of the world invariably thus exhibit mutually contradictory features (vv. 76-80); (Kumārila has already argued and he reminds us of it in v. 76 that the relation between a universal and a particular too is that of partial identity and partial difference). As for the question whether a composite whole exists in its component parts partly or wholly, Kumārila remarks that it should be dismissed as senseless just like the question whether a universal exists in a particular partly or wholly (v. 82). And the following is what Kumārila says while finally concluding his 'treatise on forest': "A universal is a matter of plain perception and to say that what corresponds to the universal in the case of a forest is something unreal is to say that the trees of a forest are something unreal, a truly nihilist position. As for the forest conceived as something over and above the trees concerned it is certainly an object of pseudo-perception,

but it deserves no comparison with a universal which is an object of genuine perception (vv. 94-96)"

Section-XV (Sambandhāksepaparihāra)

In this section Kumārila considers the question whether the establishment of the relation between a word and its meaning be not the result of some sort of convention on someone's part. In this connection two views are taken into account, one according to which the connotation in question is established by a teacher at the time when he teaches the word-meaning concerned to a learner, the other according to which it is established by God at the time of world-creation (v.13). The following is how Kumārila argues against the first view. "If a new convention about the meaning of a word be established whenever a new teacher teaches it to a learner then there will be no unanimity as to the employment of this word which will thus be rendered practically useless (vv.14-21). Moreover, if a word uttered on different occasions is a different word then the word whose meaning the teacher had himself learnt will not be the same word whose meaning he is teaching to the learner —an obvious anomaly (vv.21-23). The difficulty is somewhat obviated if it be granted that a word uttered now and it uttered on another occasion both possess the same universal, for then this universal will be the common vehicle of meaning in the two cases, but the trouble is that a word does not exhibit a universal feature and a particular feature, it being one and the same whenever it is uttered (v. 27). As for the relation of a word to its meaning it is nothing but the denotative capacity of this word, and this capacity exhibits one and the same form whenever it makes its appearance — which too should mean that a word is one and the same whenever it is uttered (vv. 28-29). Of course, even if a word is a single entity possessed of a single denotative capacity this word becomes practically useful only to one who has taken cognizance of this capacity, but the point is that one cannot take cognizance of this capacity unless it already exists there in its own right (vv.30-36). To cite an analogy, a thing cannot be seen without an eye but it must already exist there if it is to be seen with the help of an eye (vv.37-39)." As against the view according to which the convention regarding word-meaning is established by God at the time of word-creation Kumārila's chief objection is that the very concept of God and world-creation on his part is untouchable. It will be conducive to convenience if this objection is quoted after notice has been taken of Kumārila's other objections against the view in question; they are as follows : "God is supposed to be a superordinary person but nobody can become superordinary person without performing religious observances, nobody can perform religious observances without knowing about them, nobody can know about them without learning Vedas, nobody can learn Vedas without being in possession of words etc. All this, in turn, means that the process of employing words is beginningless (vv.114-17). Then he emphatically refuted those who would argue that someone must have established convention regarding the meaning of a word because everyone is found to learn this meaning from a predecessor (vv.118-19). Another point. If a word yields meaning because it is assigned

this meaning by a an authoritative person then this person must be recalled whenever this word is used, just as a Buddhist would not put reliance on a religious utterance unless he makes sure that it is Buddha's own utterance (vv.123-25). In any case, one should not put reliance on a Vedic utterance without recalling its author, but since people put reliance on a Vedic utterance without recalling its author this utterance must be without an author (vv.130-131). It might be said that God at the time of world-creation established convention about the meaning of a word with the help of another set of words that were at his disposal, but the pity is that the only words we know of are those current in our midst (vv.134-36). It will not do to retort that on this logic — that is, if convention about the meaning of a word cannot be established without the help of another set of words — one might as well say that the meaning of a word cannot be learnt without the help of another set of words; for it is a matter of everyday occurrence that people learn the meaning of a word by observing that behaviour of their elders which takes place in the wake of an employment of words (vv. 138-39). Nor will it do to say that God at the time of world-creation established convention about the meaning of a word with the help of bodily gestures signifying this situation or that, for even the signification of bodily gestures must be already known to the learners concerned but there could be no such learners in the midst of beings that were first produced at the time of world-creation (vv. 139-40).” Thus having acquainted ourselves with what Kumārila has to say about matters directly relevant to his present inquiry we might take notice of his arguments directed against the hypothesis of God and world-creation on his part; they are as follows :

“When nothing whatsoever existed before world-creation who can tell us how God (Prajapati -- lit. the lord of creatures) looked like at that time (vv. 45-46)? And in the absence of all motive and all means why should God undertake world-creation at all (vv. 47-49) ? Moreover, why should he create a world so full of misery (v. 49) ? Pity could not be his motive, because at that time there was nobody to be pitied (v. 52) ? And if world-creation be an act of play on his part, that means he does not have all his desires fulfilled (v. 56). Granted that the beings first created found themselves in the presence of God, but how could they be sure that it was he who had created them (vv. 58-59) ? God's own words to that effect could well be false (v. 60); but Vedas too could yield no necessary information, for on the present hypothesis even Vedas are a creation of God (v. 61). Nor is there any logic behind the concept of an all-round world -- dissolution (v. 68). Certainly, why should it come about that no being whatsoever is reaping the consequence of his accumulated karmas (vv. 69-70) ? And if that be due to a desire on God's part then why not altogether give up the hypothesis of karma (v. 72) ? Maybe it is felt that an organization of component parts as is exhibited by a living body must be due to the controlling activity of a conscious agent, but even then why God and not the soul inhabiting this body be the agent needed (vv. 74-75) ? Moreover, in the very nature of things there can be no such controlling agent in the case of God's own body. If it be God himself

then he would require another body to do the controlling and that will lead to an infinite regress; for certainly a disembodied soul can undertake no function just as an emancipated soul does not (vv. 77-78). Equally untenable is the doctrine according to which there exists just one soul which gets itself transformed in the form of this world; for this soul is supposed to be free from all blemish while our world is so full of blemishes (v. 82). And if a factor like nescience is posited to account for this anomaly the doctrine will no more be a monist doctrine; moreover, in that case it will be difficult to see how the sole existing soul should ever be rid of nescience (vv. 84-86). The Sāṅkhya version of world-creation has its own difficulties. According to it, a soul is inactive while all activity takes place on the part of *guṇas* (= the constituent units of *prakṛti*, but such activity cannot take place at the time when there does not yet exist any factor possibly responsible for such activity (all such factors coming into existence as a result of this activity itself) (vv. 87-88). Certain people maintain that karmas - existing - in - the -- form -- of -- potency bring about the activity in question; but that is illogical; certainly, the capacity to produce curd exists in milk but that does not enable milk to produce curd-products (vv. 89-90). As a matter of fact, if karmas existing in the form of potency really cause the activity in question then it should always be possible for an emancipated soul to become a worldly soul, for karmas so described will never cease to be there (vv. 91-92). Certain others maintain that activity in question goes on so long a soul retains the capacity to be an enjoyer and the *prakṛti* the capacity to be the thing enjoyed; but since a soul's capacity in question is its being a conscious entity and the *prakṛti*'s capacity in question its being an unconscious entity and since the two capacities as thus understood will never cease to be there the emancipation of a soul will never come about (vv. 99-100). Similarly, defective is the Sāṅkhya contention that knowledge causes emancipation; true, a karma is caused by nescience but it vanishes not as a result of knowledge but as a result of producing its appropriate fruit (vv. 101-2). Certainly, if emancipation is caused by knowledge then like all caused entities it must be a perishing entity (v. 106). As a matter of fact, emancipation is non-perishing because it is of the form of an absence-of-all-karmas, an absence which is brought about as a result of enjoying the fruit of the past karmas and preventing the accumulation of new karmas (vv. 106-12).

Section—XVII (Śabdānityatādhikaraṇa)

In this section Kumārila seeks to clinch finally the problem whether a word^{*} is eternal or otherwise. It may be divided into four parts as follows :

(i) In vv. 8-228 there are put four major ontological considerations in support of the eternality of a word.

* Let us recall that *śabda* is the generic entity whose two sub-species are *varṇa* (=letter) and *pada* (=word). Earlier we had left the word '*śabda*' untranslated but in the present context we are translating it as 'word'. This will indeed cause some confusion but will facilitate English-rendering.

(ii) In vv.229–277 it is argued how the establishment of relation between a word and its meaning becomes impossible in case a word is not an eternal entity.

(iii) In vv.278–308, it is argued how not only a letter but a word too is an eternal entity.

(iv) In vv.309–440, there are put forth certain minor ontological considerations in support of the eternality of a word, the occasion arising in connection with the formal examination of certain rival inferences.

We take up these four parts one by one.

(i)

(vv.8–228)

Kumārila begins by posing in brief the opponent's case which is as follows: (vv.8–18) "A word is simultaneously observed at different places and that is because it is simultaneously produced at these different places; had the word been a single eternal entity this simultaneous observation would have been illusory (vv.9–14). It cannot be said that here is a case of one single word being made manifest at different places, for a manifesting agent like lamp when employed in number does not change from one into many a manifested entity like jar (v.15). Moreover, a word is found to be loud or slow under different conditions, but a manifesting agent like lamp when employed in number does not increase the size of a manifested entity like jar (v.16). Again, one impartite sky being the locus of all the words and all the alleged manifesting agents of the form of *dhvani* (=air-vibration) a word made manifest at one place should not be simultaneously made manifest at any other place (v.16). Lastly, there are cases (e.g. in a word-conjunction) where one letter is transformed into another (e.g. *l* into *ya*), and this means that a word is a perishing entity. (v. 17)" Kumārila launches his counter-attack by first pointing out that even rival philosophers concede the possibility of an entity existing there all right but being made manifest only under certain conditions. For example, the Vaiśeṣika philosophers posit a universal which while existing always and everywhere is made manifest only at a place where the relevant particular is available (v.21). Similarly the Sāṅkhya philosophers maintain that a soul is ever possessed of consciousness—which means that in the states of sleep, swoon etc. consciousness is present in an unmanifested form (v.21). Lastly, the Buddhist philosophers maintain that a thing undergoes destruction every moment but that this destruction becomes observable only when it assumes a gross dimension—which means that destruction not of a gross dimension exists there in an unmanifested form (vv.24–29). To all this is added the observation that even sky which exists always and everywhere becomes invisible when covered by a mass of water or a mass of earth and becomes visible again when this coverage is removed (vv.30–31). Kumārila's point is that a word exists always and everywhere and is only made manifest now here, now there (vv.33–36). He further remarks that the activity supposed to produce a word is nothing but the activity of pronouncing this word, an activity which only reveals this word.

which was existing since ever (vv. 37-40). As to why a word is cognized only for a moment Kumārla's reply is that it is so because the concerned manifesting agent is only of a momentary duration—like a flash of lightening in a pitch-dark night (v. 41). On Kumārla's showing, a lamp is called the manifesting agent in the case of a jar because it renders assistance to the visual sense-organ which is thus enabled to see this jar and a *dhvani* is similarly called the manifesting agent in the case of a word because it produces refinement in the auditory sense-organ which is thus enabled to hear this word (v. 42). Kumārla concedes that he has only postulated that there exists in a *dhvani* the capacity to produce refinement in the auditory sense-organ, but his submission is that the opponent too must postulate that there exists in a *dhvani* — or whatever be according to him the producer of a word — the capacity to produce a word (v. 43). Then Kumārla quotes at length an objection whose sum and substance is that if an auditory sense-organ is of the form of the ubiquitous sky and if a word too is something ubiquitous then whether a *dhvani* produces refinement in an auditory sense-organ or in a word there must arise the undesirable contingency that a word made manifest at one place for one person must be heard at every place by every person (vv. 51-65). His first reply is that he would not mind if sky be admitted to be made up of parts, an admission actually made by the Jainas and Sāṅkhyas (vv. 66-67); as a matter of fact, he would not mind if anything whatsoever which is different in the case of different persons is treated as an auditory sense-organ (vv. 67-68). But even granting that an auditory sense-organ is of the form of the impartite sky Kumārla would say that a word is heard by only that person whose ear-drum acting as the locus of this auditory sense-organ has received the necessary refinement (or, say, whose auditory sense-organ which is specifically his insofar as it is associated with his ear-drum has received the necessary refinement) (vv. 68-71). Alternately, he would say that even if an auditory sense-organ and a word are both ubiquitous a word is heard only at those places where there appear the *dhvanis* acting as a manifesting agent (vv. 78-79). And since one type of *dhvani* differs from another type of it we can also now see why the refinement produced by one type of *dhvani* makes possible the hearing of just one word; this exactly corresponds to the opponent's view according to which one type of *dhvani* — or whether be according to him the produce of a word — produces just one type of word (vv. 80-82). Then Kumārla pointedly raises objection against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account of how a word is produced and heard (vv. 88-106). According to this account a word produced near the mouth of the speaker gets propagated in all directions in the form of a series made up of momentary words where an earlier member produces its immediate successor, the last member of a series coming in contact with the auditory sense-organ of the hearer and there being heard by him (vv. 88-90). Against all this Kumārla remarks: "We do not find one word differing from another; it is illogical to say that another word is produced by a word which is by nature inactive, intangible, non-obstructive; there is no knowing

how long the series will continue; there is no explanation of the obvious fact that favourable wind facilitates the hearing of a word; there is no explanation why the alleged propagation should take place in all the directions; it is strange that a momentary entity perishing without a residue should produce another entity; wave-like motion is possible only in the case of entities possessed of a momentum and an activity; it is difficult to see why the propagation of a word-series should be obstructed by a wall or the like where too sky is available after all (vv. 90-99). At the close of his counter-argumentation, Kumārila remarks that better than this are the accounts offered by the Jainas and Sāṅkhyas (vv. 106-7), but he soon starts arguing against the latter too. According to the Jainas, words are a type of physical substances but Kumārila finds it difficult to conceive of any type of physical substances which can perform the function of a word (vv. 107-13). According to the Sāṅkhyas, an object first produces in the sense-organ concerned a modification bearing its own form while this modification then reaches where the object happens to lie (a special case being where a word is the object and the auditory organ the sense-organ). Kumārila finds it difficult to see how an object can act on a sense-organ from a distance or how the alleged 'modification' of a sense-organ should behave in the manner described (vv. 113-17), he particularly remarks that on this hypothesis it should be more difficult to hear a word when wind is flowing from it towards the auditory sense-organ (for the alleged 'modification' will now be travelling counter to the flowing wind) (vv. 118-19). In the end Kumārila makes a passing remark against the doctrine — subscribed to by the Buddhists — according to which the auditory sense-organ hears a word without coming in contact with it; his submission is that in that case there should be no reason why the auditory sense-organ should hear one word rather than another, should hear it distinctly rather than otherwise, and so on and so forth (vv. 120-21). After this much consideration of the views Kumārila offers his own account of the phenomenon in question, it runs as follows (vv. 121-30) : "The air from within the chest-region goes out but while going out it experiences conjunction-cum-disjunction with the vocal organs like palate etc. and assumes a specific form that corresponds to this conjunction-cum-disjunction (vv. 121-221). Since this air is possessed of a momentum its motion lasts only so long as the momentum lasts, and while on the move it experiences conjunction-cum-disjunction with the steady air that exists all around (vv. 123-24). It is this air which reaching the sky-region-confined-to-an-auditory-organ produces in it a refinement that enables it to hear a word (vv. 124). In the case of air like this it is easy to see why its motion should be obstructed by a wall or the like (v. 128). Moreover, since this air is possessed of a definite successive order while it itself as well as its momentum are of a limited duration it is also easy to see why the refinement produced by it should be possessed of a definite successive order and be intense or mild (vv. 129-30)." In this connection Kumārila vehemently and at length argues against the view of certain Mīmāṃsakas according to which the refinement in question is itself what constitutes the auditory sense-organ (vv. 100-

149). His central contention against it is that it goes against both the popular usage and a scriptural statement, for people understand by an auditory sense-organ a standing possession of a body and not something that is created temporarily (as the refinement, in question certainly is) (vv.133-34, 141-42) while there is a scriptural statement to the effect that sense-organs make their appearance in an organism while it is yet in the mother's womb (vv.137-38). In the end Kumārila advises these Mimāṃsakas that if they are so insistent on discarding the Nyāya-Vaiśāṣika view they should rather say that the auditory sense-organ is not of the form of sky but of the form of *dik* (=direction); for there is a scriptural statement to the effect that a dead man's auditory sense-organ goes back to *dik* just as his visual sense-organ goes back to the sun, a statement implying that the auditory sense-organ is of the form of *dik* just as the visual sense-organ is of the form of fire (vv. 149-52). Kumārila next considers the argument that a word is a produced entity because we often say 'Please produce a word (Skt. *śabdāṃ kuru*), (vv.157-60). In retort he remarks: 'But we also often say 'Please produce cow dung' (a literal paraphrase of the Sanskrit expression *gomāyāṇ kuru* meaning, please gather together the cow-dung). Nay, we even say, 'please produce sky' (a literal paraphrase of the Sanskrit expression *ākāśaṃ kuru* meaning 'Please make room'. His point is that the statements in question are all a figurative usage. Then is considered the objection that a word is not a single entity because it is simultaneously heard by different persons at different places, Kumārila's reply is that persons located at different places feel that the sun exists just over their head and yet at that time the sun actually exists at some one single place; his point is that a word is one single entity just as at one time the sun exists at some one single place (vv.163-69). The opponent says that in the case of the sun mistake is possible because a person located at one place does not know that persons located at other places too find the sun to be existing just over their head but that no such mistake should be possible in the case of a word (v. 170); Kumārila replies that even in the latter case mistake is possible because even if impartite and ubiquitous a word is made manifest only in those places where a *dhvani* is available in the form of a manifesting agent and the persons hearing this word at these different places might not be knowing all this (vv. 170-73). (In this connection Kumārila also shows how the illusory perception of sun as located at different places takes place in the case of one single person (vv. 178-90). He says that this happens when the sun is perceived as reflected in different water-filled pots. But the discussion is derailed because it has taken the form of a controversy between those who feel that the case in question is a case of illusory perception of the sun and those who feel that it is a case of genuine perception of the reflections of the sun). Kumārila next considers the objection that a word is not eternal because there are cases when one word is transformed into another; e.g. in the word - conjunction *dadhi+atra=dadhyatra* the letter *i* is transformed into the letter *y*. His answer is that the opponent has simply misconceived what has

actually taken place here; for here we are only being told that there are cases when the word which is usually found in the form *dadhi*, assumes the form *dadhya* (vv. 201-10). Lastly, Kumārila considers the objection that a word appears as loud or slow according as the means employed are more powerful of less but such a thing is possible only in case the means in question are a means of causation and not just a means of manifestation (vv. 210-21). His reply is that neither a letter nor a word-made-up-of-letters assumes a different form when different means are employed to make it manifest; on his showing, what does happen is that the manifestation is more powerful when the means employed is more powerful, it is less powerful when the means employed is less powerful. The point has been made clear with the help of a few illustrations. Thus the face reflected in a big mirror appears big, the same reflected in a small mirror appears small; and the reflection retains the same form in both cases (vv. 216). Again, when sky covered by a big mass of earth or water is made manifest the manifestation is big, when the same covered by a small mass is made manifest the manifestation is small, but in neither case is sky produced (vv. 217-18). Lastly, a jar is made manifest more powerfully by a more powerful light and less powerfully by a less powerful light, but it remains the same jar in both cases (vv. 219-20). Here ends Kumārila's defence of the eternal character of a word based on major ontological considerations. But before taking leave of the topic he raises a new point (vv. 221-28). We have seen that according to Kumārila *śabda* is a generic entity whose two subspecies are letter and word. This means that a tolerably correct translation of the word '*śabda*' will be articulate sound. But we have also found Kumārila saying that '*śabda*' is what is an object of auditory perception. This means that this classification is anomalous in that it makes no room for inarticulate sound which too is an object of auditory perception. So Kumārila now offers three alternative views of what an inarticulate sound (e.g. the sound made by a conch-shell) should be : (i) On one view, a *dhvani* which is of the form of air-vibration is what constitutes inarticulate sound—so that when employed to make manifest a letter it is heard along with an articulate sound, when not so employed it is heard alone (vv. 223-24). The difficulty with this view is that it makes a property of air an object of auditory perception (2) On another view, a *dhvani* when produced by a particular vocal organ makes manifest a particular letter, when produced otherwise it makes manifest all the letters taken together (vv. 224-28). The difficulty with this view is that it fails to account for the variety of inarticulate sounds. (3) On the third view, inarticulate sounds are a third sub-species of *śabda* (v.228). Logically, this view implies that all sorts of inarticulate sounds exist in an unmanifested form always and everywhere—just as all the letters exist in an unmanifested form always and everywhere.

(ii)

(vv. 229-77)

In this part of his text Kumārila argues that if a word be not an eternal entity then all talk of there being a relation between it and its meaning will turn out to

be nonsensical. The crux of his argument lies in the contention that if a word be not an eternal entity then the word 'cow' (say) uttered now and the word 'cow' uttered on another occasion must be as much different from each other as are the word 'cow' and the word 'horse' (vv. 243-44). On Kumārila's showing, a teacher at the time of teaching the meaning of a word to a learner employs this word two or three times and it acquires a meaning for the learner only when uttered last time, but if a word as uttered at one time is different from it as uttered at another time then this would mean that a word becomes meaningful to a learner as a result of being uttered in a meaningless fashion once or twice; nor can it be said that the two or three words in question are similar to each other, for a meaningful word cannot at all be similar to a meaningless word (vv. 248-50, 258-63). An essentially similar difficulty has been urged against the possibility of establishing relation between a word and its meaning, for at the time of establishing this relation too a word requires to be pronounced several times; nor can it be said that pronouncing a word, establishing relation between it and its meaning, and practically demonstrating this meaning—these three acts can be performed simultaneously, for it is the very nature of these acts that they are performed one after another (vv. 255-58). Kumārila also refutes the thesis that God at the time of world-creation established relation between a word and its meaning and that the subsequent generations of men employed a word similar to it, for on his showing this could be possible only in case those later men were acquainted with that word uttered by God (vv. 264). The following is how he continues his argument: "Nor can it be said that the first created men were in fact acquainted with God's word and that the tradition of employing words similar to it began from them, for this too requires that a last man employing this word is acquainted with the entire past tradition of employing it (vv. 265-66). Moreover, an act performed on the basis of similarity becomes a very different act within a space of few generations—so that on the opponent's hypothesis a word as uttered now must have become very different from the same as uttered by God at the time of world-creation (vv. 267-68). As a matter of fact, if a word is really employed on the basis of its similarity with God's word then his employment must be a case of mistaken performance just like the act of inferring fire on the basis of vapour rather than smoke (v. 269)."

(iii)

(vv.278-308)

In this part of his text Kumārila considers the question as to how a word-composed-of-letters is to be conceived as an eternal entity just like these letters themselves, a question that seems to have taxed his patience considerably. For on a later occasion (Section XVIII, v.112) he remarks as if in exasperation: 'It is with difficulty that we have established that the letters themselves are capable of acting as a word'. In this connection the opponent's case runs as follows (vv.278-93): "The words are of the form of letters following an order of succession, but since letters are themselves eternal the order of succession followed by them must be product of *dhvani* which

makes them manifest, and this in turn means that a word itself is a product of *dhvani*. So just as a jar-made-up-of-atoms is not eternal even if atoms are, a word-made-up-of-letters is not eternal even if letters are. Certainly, a word can be treated as an eternal entity only by those philosophers who consider it to be something over and above letters and something devoid of a successive order." Kumārila's first reaction is that a word is not of the form of successive order as such but of the form of successive order exhibited by letters (vv.284-87), but that was never denied by the opponent. He next observes that the successive order exhibited by a word is learnt by a learner from an elderly teacher, just as the relation of a word to its meaning is learnt by him from an elderly teacher (vv.281-89). But Kumārila has argued that the meaning-relation of a word can be learnt precisely because it already belongs to this word, and the point is whether he can similarly argue that its successive order already belongs to a word. Curiously, Kumārila concedes that the successive order exhibited by a word is not *kūṭasthanitya* i. e. eternal in its own right—but just *vyavahāranitya*—i. e. eternal by way of an uninterrupted tradition (v.289). This is anomalous, for his claim always is that a word is *kūṭasthanitya* not just *vyavahāranitya*, a claim repeated at the very beginning of the enquiry of the present section (v.6). As if to redeem the situation Kumārila emphasises that letters are nevertheless *kūṭasthanitya* while a successive order makes its appearance in them just as a jar is constructed out of atoms that are eternal (vv.290-91). But as a matter of fact this position is the opponent's position and this analogy too is his analogy. Be that as it may, Kumārila makes another valiant effort to prove that the successive order exhibited by a word is eternal (vv.295-301). But now his essential point is that this order owes its origin to *dhvani* which in turn is a product of a vocal organ like palate and that since this *dhvani* and this vocal organ are both possessed of an eternal universal this order too is somehow eternal. The difficulty is that Kumārila never concedes to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers the much simpler point that a word is eternal only in the sense that it as uttered on different occasions is possessed of an eternal universal; (to be sure, the point was once conceded but that was an isolated occurrence). Lastly, Kumārila argues that the various temporal properties exhibited by a word are in fact a case of Time being made manifest while Time is itself single and ubiquitous, which means that these properties do not affect the single and ubiquitous character of a word (vv.302-4). This too seems to be an argument of desperation.

(iv)

(vv.309-440)

In this part of his text Kumārila urges certain ontological considerations of minor importance that are supposed to indicate the eternal character of a word. The occasion for them arises in connection with examining the rival inferences and in many cases they are just flimsy. Here are examples :

(1) A word is eternal because it yields the knowledge of a universal based on the observation of a relationship, just like smoke-universal (which in an inference yields

the knowledge of fire universal based on the observation of the relation of invariable concomitance) (v.311).

(2) Since a word expresses meaning only in case it is eternal one who utters words with a view to expressing meaning and yet says that a word is not eternal contradicts himself (vv. 313-14).

(3) If one says that a word as such is non-eternal he must grant that even the word-universal is non-eternal, for it too is some sort of word (v. 322).

(4) The Vaiśeṣika philosopher is mistaken when he argues that a word is non-eternal because it is open to preception (v. 329). For a universal which too is open to preception is eternal (v. 331), atoms which are open to a yogin's perception are eternal (vv. 335-36), soul which is open to ordinary self-preception is eternal (v. 337).

(5) The Vaiśeṣika philosopher can be forced to concede his validity of the inference, 'A word is eternal, because it resides only in sky, just like the ubiquity belonging to sky' (v. 349).

(6) It takes time for one to grasp the meaning of a word and if it can stay that long it must stay for ever (vv. 363-66).

(7) A usage like 'pronouncing a word several times' makes sense only in case this word is the same in the case of all those pronunciations (vv. 367-71).

(8) Recognition of something as the same entity is mistaken when this something is in fact not one entity but a group or series of several similar entities; but the recognition of a word as the same entity is not thus mistaken (vv. 373-74). (In this connection Kumārila quotes at length the arguments of a disputant according to whom cognition is one entity which is only made manifest in the form of different pieces of cognition (vv. 404-10), action is one entity which is only made manifest in the form of different actions (vv. 399-403), white colour is one entity which is only made manifest in the form of different white colours (vv. 411-12). Kumārila's point is that in such cases one can suspend judgment inasmuch the party advocating oneness and the party advocating manyness both base themselves on inference but that in the case of a word its oneness is a matter of clear-cut perception (vv. 390-92).

(9) Even the momentarist considers a word to be non-eternal only on the general ground that everything whatsoever is momentary so that if the hypothesis of momentarism is refuted he will have no ground to deny the eternal character of a word (vv. 424-41). (In this connection Kumārila argues in some details against the hypothesis of momentarism. His main contention is that it will be impossible to establish fixed causal relationships if it is glibly declared that everything is momentary and that in a series of momentary entities the immediate successor is caused by the immediate predecessor (vv. 428-33). Moreover, he elaborately describes the mechanism of how flame operates—with a view to demonstrating that there is nothing momentary about it (vv. 434-38).

Section XVIII (Vākyaādhikaraṇa)

In this section Kumārila discusses the problem of sentential meaning. It is made up of two chief parts, one (vv. 1-110) containing the argument of an opponent who objects against all the theories of sentential meaning including Kumārila's, the other (vv. 110-369) containing the argument of Kumārila who objects against the rival theories while defending his own. The two parts manage to throw considerable light on the type of issues raised by the ancient Indian theorists in this connection and they deserve separate consideration. We take them up one by one. ■

(i)

(vv. 1-110)

The opponent opens his case by saying : "The meaning of a sentence is yielded neither by its constituent words taken singly nor by them taken collectively nor by any extra word. Nor is it yielded by the meanings of these words, either taken singly or taken collectively. For no relationship is known to obtain between any of these things on the one hand and the sentential meaning on the other (vv. 2-5)." His point is that the meaning of a word has a fixed relation to this word and so this word is meaningful to one who knows this relation but that the meaning of a sentence has a fixed relation to nothing whatsoever and so it is difficult to see as to who would find this sentence meaningful. Then it is argued that neither a sentence nor its meaning can be a unitary whole made up of parts—the reasons being two—viz. (i) it is difficult to prove either that the whole in question is different from its parts or that it is identical with them, (ii) the parts in question are found to exist not simultaneously but one after another (though even if they are found to exist simultaneously it should be impossible to cognize them simultaneously) (vv. 6-9). It is next argued that no relation whatsoever can be shown to exist between the words of a sentence or between the meanings of these words; not even the relation called 'co-producing the same cognition' is possible here because in both cases the cognition of one unit follows that of another and is not simultaneous with it; (as for the relation called 'eternally co-existing in the same sky' it obtains between all words and between all word-meanings and so would not explain how words or word-meanings pertaining to one sentence differ from those pertaining to another) (vv. 10-17). It is emphasised that to know a sentence or its meaning part by part is not to know it as a single unit (v. 18) while the thesis that a sentence and its meaning are each an impartite unit is dismissed summarily as going against what is self-evident (vv. 18-10). The opponent next examines the theory according to which the meaning of a sentence consists in 'connection' or 'disconnection' (these are two theories). To take the example of the sentence 'Here is a white cow', the theory of 'connection' will maintain that its meaning consists in connecting cowness (the meaning of the word 'cow') with whiteness (the meaning of the word 'white') while the theory of 'disconnection' will

maintain that it consists in disconnecting cowness from non-whiteness and whiteness from non-cowness. Against these theories, it is first argued that all talk of a 'connection' or 'disconnection' between X and Y makes sense only when it is possible for the cognition of X to exist simultaneously with the cognition of Y but that since that is not possible the theories are untenable (vv. 19-29). Then it is argued that no 'connection' is possible between cowness and whiteness because the two are two independent entities existing in their own right (vv. 29-31). It is conceded that a particular body can well be 'connected' with both cowness and whiteness, but it is at once pointed out that since a particular body is never what a word means this cognition of 'connection' will not be a case of verbal cognition (vv. 31-32); nay, it is even added that cowness and whiteness do not actually coexist in one and the same body (vv. 34-35). Against the theory of 'disconnection' it is urged that a mere employment of the word 'white' should not 'disconnect' cowness from blackness etc., for cows which are black etc. are a matter of common cognition (vv. 37-38); and granting that the word 'white' signifies disconnection from blackness etc. the question is asked why this disconnection should be linked with cowness—certainly, not simply because the word 'cow' exists in proximity to the word 'white' (vv. 38-39). This leads to a lengthy argumentation purported to maintain that a mere proximity of certain words should not suffice to establish a relation between their respective meanings (vv. 39-44); (it can easily be seen that the question is as to what distinguishes the proximity of words in a sentence from their meaningless proximity). Coming back to the theories of 'connection' and 'disconnection' it is argued that they do not constitute sentential meaning because they can be proved to be nothing over and above the word-meanings concerned (vv. 44-46). More generally, it is argued that nothing new existing objectively is produced by these word-meanings—so that to see the sentential meaning as something new produced by the word-meanings concerned is a case of subjective illusion (vv. 46-67). (in this connection a theory is refuted according to which the relation between two word-meanings exists eternally and is only made manifest when the words concerned are uttered in proximity (vv. 47-49). Then keeping in mind several theories of sentential meaning catalogued in a famous verse of the grammarians the following submissions are made summarily (vv. 49-55) :

(1) Certain words grouped together do not constitute a sentence because they do not render any service to one another (vv. 49-52).

(2) There exists no single impartite sentence (*vākya-sphoṭa*) just as there exists no single impartite word (*padasphoṭa*) (v. 52).

(3) There exists no sentence-universal just as there exists no word-universal (v. 52).

(4) The successive order obtaining among certain words does not constitute a sentence just as the successive order obtaining among certain letters does not constitute a word; (in the case of a sentence a further difficulty is that the words of the

same sentence can be placed in whatever successive order one wishes) (vv. 52-55). This verse also mentions the theory according to which the verb-word existing in a sentence is what really constitutes this sentence; this is Kumārila's own theory and the opponent now proceeds to argue against it.

According to Kumārila's theory, all sentence seeks to describe the details of an act of 'causing-something-to-be'—this being a rough English rendering of the highly technical word '*bhāvanā*' which is an abstract noun formed from the causative form of the verb '*bhū*' meaning 'to be' or 'to become'. It is understood that all 'causing' requires a chief agent (*kartṛ*) usually finding expression in a sentence in the form of a noun with nominative case-ending; and then it is said that there are three essential elements of it viz.

(1) an objective (*sādhya*) or the thing sought to be caused, usually finding expression in a sentence in the form of a noun with accusative case-ending.

(2) an instrument (*sādhana*) or the thing through whose instrumentation the 'causing' is undertaken — usually finding expression in a sentence in the form of a noun with instrumental case-ending.

(3) a manner-of-doing (*itikartavyatā*) or the employment of accessories with a view to assisting the instrument in its task, these accessories usually finding expression in a sentence in the form of nouns with all sorts of case-endings.

Thus in the sentence 'Devadatta cooks cooked-rice (*Devadattaḥ odanam pacati*)' Devadatta is the chief agent because he does the 'causing', cooked rice is the objective because it is sought to be caused, cooking is the instrument because through its instrumentation the 'causing' is done; (let it be noted that here the instrument is expressed by a verbal root rather than a noun with instrumental case-ending). As it stands this sentence is silent about the manner-of-doing, but if it is extended to assume the form 'Devadatta cooks cooked rice in a vessel by means of fuel sticks (*Devadattaḥ ukhāyām kāṣṭhaiḥ odanam pacati*), then the role of the vessel and that of the fuel sticks will constitute the manner of doing. Similarly, in the Vedic sentence 'One desirous of heaven ought to perform a sacrifice '*svargakāmo yajeta*' the person desirous of heaven is the chief agent, heaven is the objective, the performance of a sacrifice is the instrument; (here too the instrument is expressed by a verbal root while the word expressing objective is enclosed within a compound). As for the manner-of-doing it will here be found one from the context — that is, from other sentences placed suitably. The Mīmāṃsakas were chiefly interested in determining the syntactical and semantic nature of a Vedic injunction (*vidhi*) and their whole treatment of 'causing' bears a clear imprint of this interest. An injunctive sentence was defined as one that impels a person to undertake the 'causing' concerned; e. g. the Vedic sentence just quoted is an injunctive sentence and it is supposed to impel

the person desirous of heaven to cause heaven through the instrumentality of the performance of a sacrifice. All this deliberation of Kumārila's school is at the back of the opponent's mind in the present phase of his argumentation. The following is what he says :

"Even in the theory according which the verb-word on account of its centrality constitutes a sentence and 'causing' on account of its predominance constitutes the sentential meaning there obtains no objective relationship either between the agents concerned and the chief act, or between the agents concerned, or between the acts concerned (vv. 55-57). Thus in the sentence 'Devadatta cooks cooked-rice in a vessel by means of fuelsticks' the agents concerned are Devadatta, cooked rice, vessel and fuel-sticks but being absolutely independent of each other they stand in no need of each other—they are not even proximate to each other except in the sense that they find expression through words which as accompanied by different case-endings occur in the same sentence (vv. 57-59). Nor do the agents like fuel-sticks etc. as such have any relation with the chief act—viz. cooking; e.g. when fuel-sticks are wet they cause no cooking and even when they cause it they do so not by standing inactive (vv. 59-61). And if it be said that the fuel-sticks etc. cause cooking through their own acts like burning etc. then one difficulty is that here one act cannot cause another because the two are not related to each other—not even in the sense that they reside in the same locus (vv. 61-62). Moreover, if the cooking is done by burning then why should the fuel-sticks be called an agent (v.63)? Similarly, if what the fuel-sticks do is burning then why should they be called an agent in respect of cooking (v. 63)? And certainly, the things which do no cooking should here find no expression in the same sentence (v.64). Nor can it be said that the fuel-sticks etc. are really an agent in respect of burning etc. and that they are figuratively so called in respect of cooking; for in respect of burning etc. the fuel-sticks etc. are not instrument etc. (as they are in respect of cooking) but chief agent—so that the figurative attribution in question is impossible (vv.64-68). Even granting that the fuel-sticks etc. do cooking through thier own acts like burning etc. the fact remains that these acts are not expressed by the verb 'to cook'—so that in the context of sentential meaning the fuel-sticks etc. should have nothing to do with cooking (vv.68-69). Certainly, if the verb 'to cook' is to be linked with the fuel-sticks etc. it will have to be delinked from Devadatta—the chief agent (vv.69-70); and if it be said that it expresses the specific act of each and every agent then each and every agent will have to be treated as chief agent just like Devadatta (vv.70-71). Certainly, the agent whose specific act is expressed by the verb is nothing but chief agent, as is evident from the usages like 'The fuel-sticks cook cooked-rice' (vv.71-73). In one word, if the verb 'to cook' expresses the specific acts of the fuel-sticks etc. the question is why then use different case-endings in reference to them, if it does not the question is why the words standing for the fuel-sticks etc.

should form one sentence (and why should the usages like 'The fuel-sticks cook cooked-rice' be possible) (vv.73-75). Not can it be said that the specific acts of the agents other than the chief agent will be expressed by the verbal suffix, for that is not the function of a verbal suffix (vv. 75-76). As a matter of fact, on the present theory there obtains no relation between the verbal root and the verbal suffix (vv.77-79). For a verbal suffix expresses 'causing' which invariably requires an objective and an instrument; but the verb 'to cook', e.g., offers an objective in the form 'pākam' (= to cooking) and an instrument in the form 'pākena' (=through cooking)—neither of which is present there when we have before us in the form of 'pacati' (=cooks) the verbal-root 'pac' (=to cook) and a verbal suffix (viz. *tip*). Nor is any relation possible between a 'causing' (*bhāvanā*) and an 'injunction' (*vidhi*) (vv.79-86). For we are told that the same verbal suffix expresses 'causing' as well as 'injunction', and this means that an injunction has performed its job even before the 'causing' could get linked with an objective, an instrument, a manner-of-doing (vv. 79-80). But how can an injunction impel one to undertake 'causing' as such (vv. 80-81)? And if an injunction has thus forfeited the right to get linked with objective [etc. expressed in the same sentence then the Vedic scholar's practice to posit a manner-of-doing on the basis of contextual references becomes particularly objectionable (v.82). For there obtains no relation between the deficient sentence and the alleged contextual sentence just as there obtains no relation between the words, 'cow' and 'white' in the sentence 'Here is a white cow' (v. 83). Nay, in the latter case some relation might well be posited on the basis of an empirical evidence but in the former all establishment of a relation must prove utterly arbitrary (vv. 83-83)."

After having thus disposed of Kumārila's theory the opponent resumes his general onslaught. He pays tribute to Kumārila's theory by saying something which implies that it is strongest of all the theories that are in the field. For he argues, "The relation of agent and act is the root of all objective relations and when the former is shown to be untenable the latter must follow suit (vv. 86-87)". Then he seeks to show that the prefixes and particles have no independent meaning in a sentence but his chief endeavour lies in pointing out that whatever role is allegedly attributed to them by the theoreticians is anomalous (vv. 87-98). For example, a prefix is said to act as a qualifier in relation to a verb, but as a matter of fact in certain cases its employment is just redundant, in certain cases it altogether changes the meaning of a verb, in certain cases it gives to a verb a meaning just opposite of the original—none of which things a genuine qualifier is expected to do (vv. 90-93). Similarly, a particle denoting negation (say 'not') seeks to do away with a thing that has already been posited—an impossible task (vv. 96-97). Lastly, a particle denoting alternation (say 'or') proposes to attribute two contradictory features to the same thing—a still more impossible task (v. 98). By way of concluding his enquiry the opponent raises certain points that have already been discussed in some way or other. For he

says (vv. 100-107): "There obtains no relation between the meanings that belong to the words of a sentence (v. 100), As for the individual words of it they are found elsewhere too and so would not yield its meaning (v. 101), but they as taken together are found nowhere else and so would not yield a meaning (v. 102). Nor is sentential meaning just a jumble of the word-meanings concerned, for then even an arbitrary proximity of words should constitute a sentence (vv. 102-3). It too seems illogical that the meaning of a sentence should have nothing to do with the word-meanings concerned, for then this meaning should be evident even to one who is unacquainted with these word-meanings (vv. 105-6). So considering everything, there seems to be no basis for sentential meaning to be built upon (v. 107)."

(ii)

(vv. 110-369)

Like the opponent Kumārila too raises a host of issues, more or less interesting. He begins by conceding that a sentence as a unit made up of letters is not possessed of a unitary denotation just as a word as a unit made up of letters is possessed of a unitary denotation (vv. 111-12). This seems something like conceding the opponent's point, but as a matter of fact Kumārila has so many reservations to make. For one thing, denotation is learnt once for all but this can happen only in the case of individual words and not in the case of a sentence made up of words. Then Kumārila feels that it is already difficult to explain how certain letters cognized successively yield a unitary cognition of the word concerned and that it should be still more difficult to explain how certain letters cognized successively yield a unitary cognition of the sentence concerned (vv. 112-13). He therefore looks for a way to explain how the meaning of a sentence can be made out without cognising this sentence as a unit made up of letters (vv. 114-117); by way of solution he suggests that the cognition of the first word of a sentence is followed by the cognition of its meaning, then occurs the cognition of the second word followed by the cognition of its meaning, and so on and so forth, while the word-meanings thus learnt are ultimately recalled together and combined into a unitary whole which is what constitutes the meaning of the sentence in question. In Kumārila's language, this is the thesis that not words of a sentence but the meanings of these words are instrumental in yielding sentential meaning. It can easily be seen that this thesis virtually amounts to saying that the words of a sentence yield sentential meaning not directly, but through the mediation of their respective meanings, a version Kumārila will reject as invalid——on the ground that the supposition that a word yields meaning twice should be avoided if it can somehow be shown that the supposition that it yields meaning only once will also do. Be that as it may, in the background of such an understanding of a sentence and sentential meaning Kumārila was bound to oppose the view according to which a sentence is an impartite unit possessed of an impartite meaning, a view against which he polemizes in great details (vv. 118-228). Kumārila

argues that if on the basis of attributing denotative capacity to a limited number of words it can be shown how meaning is had by an infinite number of sentences now possessed of these words now possessed of these, then it would be cumbersome to attribute denotative capacity to these infinite number of sentences themselves (vv. 121–22). Not does he concede that a sentence is thought to be made up of parts on the basis of falsely observing a similarity between two sentences, for on his view all observation of a similarity between two things presupposes that these things be really possessed of corresponding parts; otherwise, one can as well tell us that a rabbit's horn is similar to a donkey's horn (vv. 123–29). Even granting that two impartite sentences can somehow be similar Kumārila points out that we usually extract out from a sentence letters and words that are common to several sentences, something which should not be possible if all sentences are equally impartite (v. 134). The opponent maintains that a sentence is an eternal, impartite entity which is made manifest by *dhvanis*; Kumārila retorts that *dhvanis* can make manifest a sentence never except part by part but that it is in the very nature of things impossible for an impartite sentence to be made manifest part by part (vv. 137–38). He next argues that if all part of a sentence is unreal then a small sentence which is part of a big sentence should be equally unreal; and if it is replied that the small sentence in question is real because it is found to exist even separately then it should equally be conceded that the words of a sentence are real because they are found to exist even separately (vv. 140–41). The opponent argues that individual words are unreal because they are never employed in practice (v. 143); Kumārila points out that there are cases when individual words assume practical importance. For example, while learning a text one seeks to know what each and every word of it means (v. 146). Then Kumārila argues that simply because they are not employed practically the individual words should not be dismissed as unreal just as simply because they are not employed practically the component-parts of a chariot should not be dismissed as unreal (v. 148). Nor is Kumārila frightened by the opponent's argument that if words are the parts of a sentence and letters the parts of a word then one might as well posit parts of a letter (v. 150); his plain point is that a thing does not become unreal simply because it is made up of parts (v. 151); at the same time he argues that simply because a word is made up of parts one should not insist that even a letter should be made up of parts just as simply because a jar is made up of parts one should not insist that even an atom should be made up of parts (v. 152). The opponent argues that the division of a sentence into words is false just as the division of a word into a root and a suffix is false; Kumārila retorts that there is nothing false about the division of a word into a root and a suffix; for example, the words *vrkṣam* and *vrkṣeṇa* have got the same root and different suffixes while the words *vrkṣam* and *ghaṭam* have got the same suffix and different roots (vv. 154–60). The opponent points out that in the meanings of the words *kūpa*, *yūpa* and *sūpa* nothing common corresponds to the common word-part *ūpa*; Kumārila replies that a word-part is declared to have a meaning only when concomitance in presence and

concomitance in absence prove it to have it but that they do not prove the word-part *ūpa* to have any meaning (vv. 161-67). The opponent argues that concomitance in presence and concomitance in absence do not suffice to attribute one fixed meaning to a word (vv. 168-81). For there are cases when the same letters can be construed as two or more very different words and cases where the same word appears in two or more very different forms; for example, the word *agāt* can be construed as the ablative-case form of the noun *aga* as also as a past-tense form of the verb *gam* (v. 175), while on the other hand the word *rājan* appears in the forms *rājā*, *rājñā* etc. (v. 177). The opponent's general conclusion is that the alleged parts of a sentence contribute nothing towards the meaning of this sentence just as the alleged parts of the word *aśvakarṇa* contribute nothing towards the meaning of this word; (*aśvakarṇa*) is the name of a tree which has nothing to do either with *aśva* meaning horse nor with *karṇa* meaning ear) (v. 181). Kumārila's answer is very elaborate (vv. 182-227) but its essential point is that even in the case of an ambiguous word the context should enable us to decide as to what meaning this word is to have and that similarly even in the case of a multi-formed word the context should enable us to make out as to why a particular form of it has been used. The following is Kumārila's concluding remark against the doctrine of an impartite sentence: "The meaning of a sentence is always found accompanied by the meanings of its constituent words; hence the fact that a sentence has its own specific meaning would not go to prove that it is an entity independent of its constituent words (v. 228)". This enables him to pick up his original thread, for in the present part of his text he is out to show how the meaning of a sentence is yielded through the instrumentality of the meanings of its constituent words. On Kumārila's showing, the meaning of a word is yielded by this word but the meaning of a sentence is yielded not by the words concerned but by the word-meanings concerned. It is therefore somewhat understandable why he emphasizes that the cognition of word-meaning is a case of verbal cognition inasmuch as it is a piece of cognition produced by words but that the cognition of sentential meaning is not a case of verbal cognition inasmuch as it is produced not by the words concerned but by the word-meanings concerned (v. 230). This however is a mere technical point. The material question is as to how on Kumārila's view sentential meaning is yielded by the word-meanings concerned. In this connection we find him using two expressions viz

(i) Sentential meaning is implied-by (*gamya*) the word-meanings concerned (v. 229).

(ii) Sentential meaning is absent-in-the-absence-of (*avinābhā*) the word-meanings concerned (v. 231).

Strictly speaking, both these expressions mean that sentential meaning is inferred from the word-meanings concerned. Aware of this Kumārila hastens to argue

that the acquisition of sentential meaning with the help of the word-meanings concerned is not a case of inference (v. 232). He feels that in this connection one can possibly propose only two pieces of inference, both invalid. Thus one might say 'These word-meanings yield this sentential meaning, because they are these word-meanings', or one might say 'This sentential meaning is yielded by these word-meanings, because they are these word-meanings'; against the first Kumārila objects that the thing acting as probans — viz. these word-meanings — already finds mention in the thesis, against the second that it finds mention not in the subject part of the thesis but in its predicate part (vv. 232-34). Both these objections are based on certain obscure formal considerations and are trivial; in any case, both the inferences in question are valid provided it can be shown that there obtains a relation of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum concerned. So Kumārila next argues — more by implication than in so many words — that no relation of invariable concomitance is known to obtain between sentential meaning and the word-meanings concerned; for if X and Y are to be cognized as possessing a relation of invariable concomitance then they both must be first cognized as such but on the present view sentential meaning is not cognized except with the help of the inferences under consideration (vv. 234-39). Kumārila's point is valid but it only means that if the acquisition of sentential meaning is to involve an inference this inference cannot be of so simple a form as considered by Kumārila. As a matter of fact, a sentence possesses a structure and a content, and on listening to it the hearer says to himself : "This sentence possesses such and such a structure and whatever sentence possesses such a structure yields this type of meaning. Again, this sentence possesses such and such a content, and this content as filling the structure in question makes this sentence yield this particular meaning"; (these steps of reasoning are clearly noticeable in the case of an adult person learning a new language). Be that as it may, Kumārila is of the view that it is in a manner *sui generis* that a sentence yields cognition concerning something not known before (vv. 240-42). He is ready to concede that a sentence (i.e. non-Vedic sentence) is taken to be true only when the speaker concerned is known to be an authoritative person and also that the hearer concerned resorts to an inference to the effect 'This sentence must be true, because it is uttered by an authoritative person', but his point is that a meaning is yielded by a false sentence as by a true one and that the yielding of a meaning on the part of a sentence requires no inference of any sort (vv. 242-46). Then Kumārila offers a detailed account of that celebrated theory of *bhāvanā* (causing) — by way of describing how the word-meanings manage to bring about sentential meaning; the following are the salient points of his account :—

"The verb-word occurring in a sentence expresses—either through its root-part or through the suffix-part, or through both (these being three alternative views)—a 'Causing' which in general stands in need of an objective, an instrument and a

manner-of-doing; in a particular case these three elements are availed of from three particular sources (vv. 248-51). Take for example the Vedic sentence 'One desirous of heaven ought to perform a sacrifice (*svargakāmayajeta*)'. Here heaven, since it is mentioned as something desired, acts as an objective and as such stands in need of a 'Causing'; thus it gets linked with the 'Causing' that is available through proximity (i.e. available in the verb-word *yajeta* (v. 252). However, the 'Causing' thus equipped with an objective stands in need of an instrument, for no act whatsoever (and 'Causing' is an act) is performed except with the help of an instrument; this instrument in the form of *yāga* (sacrifice) it receives from the root-part *yaj* available in the verb-word *yajeta*, an instrument which on its part stands in need of an objective (vv.253-54). Then comes the question of a manner-of-doing which as a general rule is available either in the same sentence or in another one (vv. 260-61). There is nothing incongruous about a sentence needing the services of another sentences just as there is nothing incongruous about the root-part of a word needing the service of its suffix-part or one word of a sentence needing the services of another word (v. 262). Now our sentence is silent about a manner-of-doing but an instrument does nothing unless equipped with a manner-of-doing; on the other hand, there are certain Vedic sentences enjoining certain subsidiary sacrificial acts with no apparent purpose in view and these sentences supply a manner-of-doing to our sentence which on its part is deficient in this respect (vv.263-64). Thus having become available to one and the same 'Causing' the three elements objective, instrument and manner-of-doing are on this very account said to render services to one another (vv.265-66). And just like the three elements of a 'Causing' the meanings of the words 'cow' and 'white' occurring in the sentence 'Bring a white cow' stand in need of each other, for thus needing each other they belong to the particular body which is required by the act expressed by the verb-word in question (vv. 267-69). Thus it is that a word occurring in a sentence expresses a most general meaning--viz. the universal concerned--but this meaning goes on becoming more and more particularized as it goes on getting linked with the meanings of more and more such words--till in the end the sentential meaning is got in the form of something most particular (v. 271). This means that a consideration of concomitance in presence and concomitance in absence somehow takes place also in the course of acquiring sentential meaning, but since it is so much unlike what takes place in an inference the acquisition of sentential meaning is not a case of inference (v 272). It is in relation to a 'Causing' equipped in the way described that injunctions and prohibitions operate (v. 273). Since the two are expressed by the same verbal suffix an injunction gets linked with a 'Causing' even before the latter is equipped with the necessary elements, but since no injunction can impel a person to undertake a 'Causing' deficient in any of the necessary elements it waits till the 'Causing' in question gets equipped with all the necessary elements (vv. 274-76). The theory of 'Causing' also explains how in the case of the sentence 'Devadatta cooks cooked - rice in a vessel by means of fuel-sticks (*Devadattaḥ ukhāyām kāṣṭhaiḥ*

odanam pacati), the acts like burning etc. undertaken by the agents like fuel-sticks etc. get linked with the chief act that is cooking; for here these acts constitute the manner-of-doing required by the act of cooking (vv. 287--88). In relation to cooked-rice which acts as objective cooking acts an instrument, but cooking does not take place unless it is undertaken and so it itself requires an instrument; and things like fuelsticks etc. or their acts like burning etc. act as instrument in relation to cooking (vv. 288--89). Certainly, a manner-of-doing is required wherever an instrument is spoken of, and what is manner-of-doing in relation to one act might well be instrument in relation to another; (thus in the present case fuel etc. and burning etc. constitute manner-of-doing in relation to the 'Causing' in question, the same constitute instrument and manner-of-doing respectively in relation to cooking which itself constitute instrument in relation to this 'Causing') (v. 290). Thus it is that agents like fuel-sticks etc. get linked with the chief act cooking through the mediation of their own acts like burning etc., as for the view that an act cannot cause another act we do not subscribe to it (v. 291). Then that point about agentship and chief agentship. The fuel-sticks etc. are certainly a chief agent in relation to their own acts like burning etc. but in relation to the act of cooking they are an agent of the form of instrument etc; for in the latter case a new capacity makes its appearing in them (vv. 293--94). As a matter of fact, it is precisely because the fuel-sticks etc. are found to be a chief agent in relation to their own acts like burning etc. that they are employed as an agent of the form of instrument etc. in relation to the act of cooking (vv. 294--95); and when thus employed they find their chief agentship suppressed by the chief agentship which now makes its appearance in Devadatta etc. (vv. 295--96). Nay, in case we do not wish to make mention of this suppression of their chief agentship we freely say 'Fuel-sticks etc. cook cooked-rice' (vv. 296--97). Since the principle is that the verb-word expresses the act of the chief agent we might concede that the acts of other agents, though operative there, are not expressed verbally; there is nothing anomalous about that. But this principle itself might be discarded and we might say that the verb-word expresses primarily the act of the chief agent and secondarily the acts of the other agents; for after all, in relation to the 'Causing' in question these latter acts go to constitute the manner-of doing which is as indispensable an element as any other (vv. 297--99)." After so much elaboration of the theory of 'Causing' Kumārila takes up the anomalies pointed out by the opponent in the behaviour of the particles of negation and those of alternation (vv. 300--330); the opponent had also pointed out anomalies in the behaviour of prefixes but this part of his argument Kumārila has incidentally disposed of earlier (vv. 277--287). All this too deserves some notice. Thus the opponent had argued that a prefix is supposed to qualify the verb to which it is attached but that what it usually does is to alter the very meaning of this verb—something no qualifier should do; Kumārila retorts that it is precisely by somehow altering the meaning of the verb to which it is attached that a prefix acts as a qualifier to this verb (vv. 282--87). Similarly, the opponent had said that a particle of negation seeks to do away with something that is already posited as existing; Kumārila

retorts that it does nothing of the sort but simply describes a thing as it is—viz. as an absent thing (v. 301); (in this connection Kumārila recalls several aspects of his general understanding that all negation somehow involves the affirmation of something positive, but that is not particularly relevant to his enquiry into sentential meaning). Lastly, the opponent had said that a particle of alternation attributes two contradictory features to one and the same thing; Kumārila again retorts that it does nothing of the sort but simply expresses the fact that the cognizer concerned is in doubt about the identity of the thing lying before him (vv. 320–21). By way of elaborating this point Kumārila has said something which is somehow relevant for his enquiry into sentential meaning. Thus he says that in the case of doubt what takes place is not that an objectively existing thing comes to acquire two contradictory attributes; what takes place is that two pieces of cognition arise in the same person one affirming one attribute in a thing the other affirming an opposite attribute in the same thing (vv. 321–24). And continuing the same train of thought he says that when two persons attribute two meanings to the same sentence what takes place is not that this sentence comes to acquire two contradictory meanings; what takes place is that two different aspects of the meaning of this sentence are taken note of by these two persons (vv. 325–329). In the rest of the section Kumārila goes on saying miscellaneous things about sentential meaning. Thus we are told that the meaning of a sentence verily consists in a 'Causing' that has turned variegated on account of its association with the meanings belonging to the various words of the sentence denoting a quality, a universal, an agent (vv. 330–31). Similarly, we are told that this 'Causing' is grasped through one single piece of cognition—but by a piece of cognition that has been produced by the variegated mass of impressions left by the earlier cognitions of the word-meanings concerned (vv. 331–32). Then it is added that the cognitions pertaining to the words concerned and those pertaining to the word-meanings concerned get related to each other through the mediation of this cognition pertaining to 'Causing' (v. 332). It is next explained how the word-meanings concerned are not prevented from getting related to each other even if while acquiring sentential meaning there alternately takes place the cognition of a word and the cognition of a word-meaning; the explanation lies in suggesting that the cognition of a word-meaning is the main thing and the cognition of a word the subsidiary thing while a subsidiary thing cannot prevent two main things from getting related to each other (vv. 333–35). While closing the explanation it is emphasised that this way the words concerned too get related to each other (v. 335). Then the assertion that the sentential meaning is cognized through the mediation of the word-meanings concerned is made an occasion for recapitulating certain points from the earlier refutation of the doctrine according to which a sentence and a sentential meaning are both an impartite unit (vv. 336–41). The role of the words concerned in the acquisition of sentential meaning is next explained with the help of an analogy: so just as fuel-sticks contribute towards the act of cooking only through the mediation

of their own act of burning, similarly words contribute towards sentential meaning only through the mediation of their own act of yielding word--meaning (vv. 342-43). As for 'Causing' it is said to constitute sentential meaning simply for the reason that all mutual relating of the word--meanings concerned takes place for the sake of 'Causing'; this is put forward as the explanation as to why there can be no sentence without a verb-word (vv. 344-46). Lastly, a point has been raised which has something anomalous about it and has attracted wide attention (vv. 355-60). Thus Kumārila begins by observing that both a word-meaning and a sentential meaning are made up of parts—the former made up of the meaning of the root-part and the meaning of the suffix-part, the latter made up of the word-meanings concerned (v. 355). Then it is pointed out that a word-meaning and a sentential meaning differ from one another in that the constituent parts of the former are never found to exist separately while those of the latter are found to exist separately (vv. 356-57). So far the sailing is smooth; but now Kumārila proceeds to assert that those who even while grasping a sentence are too lazy to grasp the word-meanings concerned would not grasp the sentential meaning (v. 360). This assertion too is perfectly understandable, but it is preceded by a strange piece of argumentation. For Kumārila says: "One who (from a distance) sees a glimmer of whiteness and hears the sound of neighing and the clattering of hoofs is at times found to acquire cognition to the effect that a white horse gallops over there even if one has not listened to the corresponding sentence; but one is never found to acquire the cognition in question in the absence of the padārthas (=word-meanings, things) concerned (vv. 358-59)." The first part of the argument makes sense, for under the conditions described one can well infer the existence of a white horse galloping over there and this inference will obviate the need for listening to the corresponding sentence; but it is difficult to see the linkage of this part of the argument with the next. For Kumārila talks as if he is referring to two contrary cases—one in which certain things are cognized but not the corresponding sentence, the other in which a certain sentence is cognized but not the corresponding things. However, as a matter of fact it can never be Kumārila's point—or anybody's point—that a sentence cannot be understood unless the things it speaks of are present there. The whole confusion seems to owe its origin to the intriguing ambiguity of the Sanskrit word 'padārtha' which means both 'word-meaning' and 'thing'. Kumārila's theory of word-meanings being the instrument of sentential meaning has difficulties no doubt, but they are mostly of a rather technical character; on the other hand, the argument under consideration seems to be a howler produced in this connection.

CHAPTER III

MEANS OF VALID COGNITION OTHER THAN VERBAL TESTIMONY

Kumārila's treatment of the means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony is perhaps even more important than his treatment of verbal testimony. For in connection with the latter treatment Kumārila has maintained certain positions which are well-nigh fantastic—e. g. the position that Vedas are an authorless composition or the position that a letter or a word is an eternal ubiquitous entity that is only made manifest at the time of being pronounced. No such anomaly mars Kumārila's treatment of the means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony. Not that no positions maintained by Kumārila in this connection are open to more or less serious difficulties, not even that none of these positions has vital connections with those near-fantastic positions related to verbal testimony; but the fact remains that these positions are on the whole sober and that they have their own independent legs to stand upon. Thus while developing his positions related to the means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony Kumārila has found occasion to express his considered opinion on a very large number of questions that usually need to be discussed by the Indian schools of logic. A common practice with these schools was to come out with a list of means of valid cognition and argue that so many—neither more nor less— and these were the items of this list. It seems that towards the very beginning the discussion was conducted in terms of an investigation into the classification and description of valid cognition (indiscriminately called *pramāṇa* or *pramā* or *pramiti*) but that in due course it came to be conducted in terms of an investigation into

- (1) the definition of valid cognition
 - (2) the criterion for testing the validity or otherwise of a piece of cognition
 - (3) the identification of what constitutes a means of valid cognition and what constitutes the corresponding valid cognition
 - (4) the classification and description of the means of valid cognition;
- (at this latter stage of development it became necessary to use the word *pramā* or *pramiti* for valid cognition and *pramāṇa* for means of valid cognition). Following the tradition of his school Kumārila proffered a list of means of valid cognition with the following six items :

- (1) *Pratyakṣa* or Perception
- (2) *Anumāna* or Inference
- (3) *Śabda* or Verbal Testimony

- (4) *Upamāna* or Analogy
- (5) *Arthāpatti* or Implication
- (6) *Abhāva* or Absence.

And he so conducted his discussion that besides offering a description of these six means of valid cognition he could also define his stand on

(i) the question as to what constitute the criterion for testing the validity or otherwise of a piece of cognition, and (ii) the question as to what constitutes a means of valid cognition and what constitutes the corresponding valid cognition. So before taking up for consideration Kumārila's treatment of the means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony it will be advisable to first dispose of his treatment of these two questions. We consider them one by one.

Kumārila's discussion of the question of the validity or otherwise of cognition is contained in *Codanāsūtra* (vv. 33-61) and we have already taken summary notice of its net finding; but it deserves a fuller examination. Now the normal understanding ought to be that a piece of cognition is born either as valid or as invalid and that the subsequent application of some criterion enables us to decide whether it is actually valid or invalid. But this manner of puttings would not suit Kumārila who is out to demonstrate that all piece of cognition is born as valid but that the subsequent application of some criterion enables us to decide whether it is not invalid. He also offers two criteria of invalidity by way of maintaining that a piece of cognition is declared to be invalid under two conditions viz.

- (i) when it is found to be invalid
- (ii) when the causal aggregate that had produced it is found to be defective.

However, to say that a piece of cognition is declared to be invalid in case it is found to be invalid is plainly tautological; so Kumārila is only telling us that a piece of cognition is declared to be invalid in case the causal aggregate that had produced it is found to be defective. But then how can he also tell us that all piece of cognition is born as valid? This latter statement makes sense only in case Kumārila is of the view that no subsequent application of criterion can prove a piece of cognition——born as valid——to be invalid, a view actually maintained by the Prabhākarite Mīmāṃsakas. In the technical language of Kumārila, to say that a piece of cognition is born as valid (or invalid) is to say that the validity (or invalidity) of a piece of cognition is intrinsic, while to say that the subsequent application of a criterion proves a piece of cognition to be valid (or invalid) is to say that the validity (or invalidity) of a piece of cognition is extrinsic. Expressed in this technical language Kumārila's view would be that the validity of a piece of cognition is intrinsic, its invalidity extrinsic, a view elaborated in vv. 47-61 and contrasted to three others viz.

- (i) that both the validity and invalidity of a piece of cognition are intrinsic,
- (ii) that both the validity and invalidity of a piece of cognition are extrinsic,

(iii) that the invalidity of a piece of cognition is intrinsic, its validity extrinsic.

The views (i) and (ii) are jointly explained and criticized in vv. 34-37, the view (iii) is explained in vv. 38-46. On Kumārila's showing, the view (i) is self-contradictory inasmuch as according to it all piece of cognition is born both as valid and as invalid; he might be correct. As for the view (ii) Kumārila calls it impossible on the ground that according to it a piece of cognition is born neither as valid nor as invalid; as a matter of fact, there is nothing wrong about this view which is committed to maintain not that a piece of cognition at the time of its birth is neither valid nor invalid but only that it at the time of its birth is not known to be either valid or invalid. Lastly, the view (iii) maintains that a piece of cognition is born as invalid but that it is proved to be valid in case it is subsequently found that the causal aggregate that had produced it possessed a special merit. It can easily be seen that this view is just the reverse of Kumārila's own and is vulnerable in an essentially similar fashion, for in the case of it too one might well ask as to how a piece of cognition can be said to be born as invalid if it is possible for a subsequent discovery to prove it to be valid. (As presented by Kumārila the view (iii) does not run parallel to his own view, but the context requires that it should be presented as running parallel to the latter. As it stands, the view (iii) only maintains that the causal aggregate possessed of a special merit produces cognition possessed of validity while the causal aggregate possessed of 'absence of a special merit' produces cognition possessed of 'absence of validity'; then it is argued that since 'absence of a special merit', being a mere 'absence', is automatically available all cognition is intrinsically invalid (vv. 39-41). But the argument loses all force when 'absence of a special merit' is described as 'either the absence of some member in a causal aggregate or the presence of a defect in the causal aggregate' (v. 42), for certainly 'presence of a defect' cannot be dismissed as a mere 'absence'. Nay, it can even be shown that special merit here spoken of can be nothing but 'absence of a defect'. For 'causal aggregate possessed of a special merit' can only mean 'properly constituted causal aggregate, while the latter expression can only mean 'causal aggregate possessed of "absence of a defect" (= non-defective causal aggregate)'. In later times the controversy was conducted in terms of two aspects of the problem viz.

(i) intrinsic versus extrinsic validity and invalidity as regards the production of a piece of cognition, and

(ii) intrinsic versus extrinsic validity and invalidity as regards the cognition of a piece of cognition. In the controversy conducted in terms of the former aspect the point of issue was whether the same causal aggregate which produces a piece of cognition also produces its validity (or invalidity), in that conducted in terms of the latter aspect it was whether the same causal aggregate which brings about the cognition of a piece of cognition also brings about the cognition of its validity (or invalidity).

dity). In Kumārila's mind the two aspects in question are present in a somewhat tangled form. So in his account of the view (iii) the former aspect gains prominence while in his account of his own view the latter. We have seen how the view (iii) should stand when understood as running parallel to Kumārila's view as presented in Ślokavārtika; the following is how Kumārila's view should stand when understood as running parallel to the view (iii) as presented in Ślokavārtika : "The causal aggregate possessed of a defect produces invalid cognition while the causal aggregate possessed of 'absence of a defect' produces valid cognition; but since 'absence of a defect', being a mere 'absence', is automatically available all cognition is intrinsically valid." Now when it is recalled that causal aggregate possessed of "absence of a defect" can mean nothing but 'properly constituted causal aggregate' the net meaning of Kumārila's view turns out to be exactly the same as that of the view (iii); it would be that a properly constituted causal aggregate produces valid cognition while a defective causal aggregate produces invalid cognition. There is nothing objectionable about this net meaning, but it runs counter to the central slogan of the view (iii) that all cognition is intrinsically invalid as also to the central slogan of Kumārila that all cognition is intrinsically valid. For certainly, if only that piece of cognition is valid which is produced by a properly constituted causal aggregate then not all piece of cognition can be called either intrinsically valid or intrinsically invalid. In this connection something might be said about the view (ii) as well. We have opined that there is nothing objectionable about it, but that is so only when it is examined in terms of the second of the aspects here under consideration. For as expressed in terms of the first aspect it should maintain that the causal aggregate possessed of a special merit produces valid cognition while the causal aggregate possessed of a defect produces invalid cognition, and as thus expressed it is open to the objection that 'causal aggregate possessed of a special merit' can mean nothing but 'properly constituted causal aggregate'. Kumārila's own presentation of the view (ii) is extremely brief but since it was the view actually maintained by the famous Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school we can be very certain about its exact import. It is rather the view (iii) as also the view (i) about which we cannot be certain as to who, if anyone ever, maintained it.)

Let us next take up Kumārila's consideration of the question as to what constitutes a means of valid cognition and what constitutes the corresponding valid cognition; (it occurs in Pratyakṣasūtra vv. 53-82 and an additional remark follows in Anumānapariccheda vv. 51-53). As was hinted earlier, the oldest authors simply spoke of the types of valid cognition and they would seek to offer a characterization of each of the types posited by them; but the later authors thought it necessary to raise in the case of each type of valid cognition the question as to what here constitutes the means of valid cognition and what the resultant valid cognition——the question of *pramāṇaphalabhāva* as it was called in Sanskrit, the question of means – and – resultant as we would abbreviate it in English. For example, the author of Nyāyasūtra had declared that perceptual cognition is the type of cognition born of sense-object

contact, but in the course of commenting upon this very declaration the later authors raised the question as to what constitutes the means of valid cognition in the case of the perceptual type of valid cognition. As a general rule, these authors posited various successive steps which are supposed to be taken in the course of acquiring perceptual cognition and it was given out that an earlier step acts as 'means' in relation to its immediate successor. Thus according to them, sense-object contact was 'means' in relation to indeterminate perception, indeterminate perception 'means' in relation to determinate perception, determinate perception 'means' in relation to the memory of a past experience related to the object concerned, memory 'means' in relation to the act now being undertaken in relation to the object. Besides, it was understood that sense-object contact is accompanied by the contact of *manas* with the sense-organ concerned and that of soul with *manas*; sometimes it too was given out that this or that from among these contacts acts as 'means' in relation to perceptual cognition, sometimes that the three together do so; sometimes the sense-organ concerned was by itself given out to be the 'means' of perceptual cognition. A new turn altogether was given to the discussion by the Buddhists who argued that nothing lying outside a piece of cognition can act as 'means' in relation to it; so on their showing a piece of cognition itself is a 'means' insofar as it bears the same form as the object concerned while it is a 'resultant' insofar as it is of the form of the apprehension of this object. The Buddhists thought that the merit of their position lay in that according to it the 'means' and the 'resultant' have to do with one and the same-thing—their fear being that this would not be the case if the 'means' is something that precedes the 'resultant'. The Buddhists were divided into two parties, some being realists and positing the reality of physical objects, the others being idealists and denying the reality of physical objects; both had their own ideas on the topic under consideration. Kumārila had closely studied the Nyāya and Buddhist positions on the question of 'means' and 'resultant' and what he actually does is to quote with approval the Nyāya position (vv. 59–73) and to offer critical observations against the Buddhist position (vv. 74–82). But before doing these two things he indulges in an independent piece of speculation which is interesting because of its some affinity with the Buddhist line of thinking (vv. 53–56). Thus the author of *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* had declared that birth of cognition taking place in the wake of a contact (of the objects) with the sense-organs is perception. This was a simple description of perceptual cognition but Kumārila reads into it a clarification relating to the problem of 'means' and 'resultant'. For on his showing the aphorist has spoken of 'birth of cognition' in order to make it clear that cognition is unlike other instruments inasmuch as it undertakes its appropriate operation in the very process of being born—thus e.g. being unlike a sense-organ which first comes into existence and then undertakes an operation with a view to bringing about perceptual cognition. But granting that cognition is an instrument the question arises as to what constitutes its 'operation' and what its 'resultant'. To this question Kumārila's answer amounts to admitting

that a piece of cognition is itself an 'instrument', its 'operation' as also its 'resultant'; thus a piece of cognition is treated as 'instrument' when one says that through it the object concerned is apprehended, it is treated as 'operation' when one says that it works by way of apprehending the object concerned, it is treated as 'resultant' when one says that it is of the form of the apprehension of the object concerned, so that it is a mere manner of speaking whether one calls a piece of cognition an 'instrument', an 'operation' or a 'resultant'. Some similar ideas were at the back of the Buddhist's mind when he had declared that a piece of cognition is a 'means' insofar as it bears the form of the object concerned while it is a 'resultant' insofar as it is of the form of the apprehension of this object. Kumārila, of course, did not subscribe to the theory of a piece of cognition bearing the form of the object concerned, but his first criticism against the Buddhist is that he is going counter to the popular usage by calling one and the same thing a 'means' as well as a 'resultant' (v. 74) — something which, as we just saw, Kumārila has himself done in his own manner. His another point of criticism against the Buddhist is that if 'bearing the same form as the object concerned' be the 'means' and 'self-cognition' be the 'resultant' then the 'means' and 'resultant' do not have to do with one and the same thing (v. 79); but this criticism is based on some misunderstanding inasmuch as according to the Buddhist the 'resultant' here is 'apprehension of the object concerned' and not 'self-cognition'. Kumārila's third point of criticism against the Buddhist is that a piece of cognition is said to bear the same form as the object concerned but that in that case this form as borne by this piece of cognition will require another piece of cognition for its own cognition (v. 82); this criticism too seems to be misplaced, for whatever cognizes this piece of cognition will cognize its alleged form as well and since according to the Buddhist a piece of cognition cognizes itself his answer to Kumārila's criticism will be that it will cognize itself along with its form. An essentially similar difficulty Kumārila urges against the idealist version of the thesis of cognition—having-a form (vv. 81--82), but in that case more to the point is his general criticism that in the absence of a physical object nothing can impart form to a piece of cognition (v. 80). As for the Nyāya position on the question which Kumārila quotes with approval, its essential points are verily those that were enumerated by us earlier. Thus he is ready to concede that 'means' of perceptual cognition could be either the sense--organ, or the sense--object contact, or the sense--manas contact, or the soul--manas contact, or all the three contacts in question (v. 60); similarly, he declares that indeterminate perception is 'means' in relation to determinate perception, determinate perception 'means' in relation to the memory of a past experience related to the object concerned and if this memory be ignored then directly in relation to the act now being undertaken in relation to this object (vv. 70--73). Of some interest is Kumārila's answer to the Buddhist's objection that if soul - manas contact be treated as 'means' of perceptual cognition then the 'means' and the 'resultant' will not be having to do with one and the same thing; his

sub-mission is that even soul-manas contact is operative in relation to that very object which happens to be the object of perceptual cognition (v. 66). And on this question his general verdict Kumārila conveys to the Buddhist in the form of the following address : “You say that the ‘means’ and the ‘resultant’ not having to do with one and the same thing is like an axe falling on one tree and cutting taking place in another; but then the ‘means’ and the ‘resultant’ being one and the same thing is like an axe and cutting being one and the same things (v. 75).” In the chapter on inference Kumārila declares that in relation to inferential cognition the means could be either the probans or the cognition of probans or the relation of invariable concomitance or the memory of this relation—all these being operative in relation to that very object which happens to be the object of inferential cognition (vv. 51-52).

Having thus disposed of Kumārila’s treatment of two preliminary questions of Logic we take up for consideration his treatment of the means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony. As already noted, such means are five, viz. perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*), implication (*arthāpatti*), absence (*abhāva*). We consider them one by one.

1. Perception (*Pratyakṣa*)

Kumārila’s treatment of perception is in essence a treatment of the following five topics :

- (i) Denying the possibility of suprasensuous perception.
- (ii) Defending the possibility of indeterminate perception.
- (iii) Defending the possibility of determinate perception.
- (iv) Arguing that the object of sense-perception can be unitary despite the multiplicity of sense-organs perceiving it.
- (v) Arguing that the words are not superimposed on the things cognized through them.

As we shall see, in the case of each topic Kumārila was polemizing against a view prevalent in his times. So let us consider them one by one.

(i) Why No Suprasensuous Perception

(vv. 1-53, 84-111)

The occasion for taking up this topic arose because of certain textual problems faced by Kumārila. Thus the author of *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* had said first that perceptual cognition which possesses such and such a characteristic is incapable of yielding information about religious matters and then that verbal testimony which possesses

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such and such a characteristic is capable of doing the same. This raised two questions, viz.

(i) While saying that perceptual cognition possesses such and such a characteristic, was the aphorist offering a full-fledged definition of perception? If he was, then why is his wording apparently deficient in this respect? (vv. 1-2, 10)

(ii) Why does the aphorist maintain silence about the remaining means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony which too are after all incapable of yielding information about religious matters? (vv. 2)

By way of answering these questions Kumārila made two submissions, viz.

(i) that the aphorist did not here intend to offer a full-fledged definition of perception but only to argue that perceptual cognition is incapable of yielding information about religious matters because it possesses such and such a characteristic—to be precise, because all perception is necessarily sense-perception while religious matters are something supra-sensuous (though with some effort a definition of perception can nevertheless be elicited out of the aphorist's wording) (vv. 21, 38-39),

and (ii) that the aphorist maintained silence about the remaining means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony because it was understood that their very possibility depends on some sort of perception or other—so that if perception fails to yield information about religious matters they must follow suit (v. 22).

It is doubtful if Kumārila correctly fathomed the aphorist's intentions but that is immaterial, for the noteworthy point is that this way of looking at things enabled him to discuss three important questions of Logic, viz.

(i) Why is all perception necessarily sense-perception?

(ii) What definition of perception is to be elicited out of the aphorist's wording?

(iii) In what sense does the very possibility of the remaining means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony depend on perception?

Kumārila's discussion of all these questions is more or less revealing. Thus in his times the belief was widespread that a yogin can perceive even things past and future—so much so that it was shared by a large number of logicians even who therefore offered such a definition of perception as should equally apply to the alleged extraordinary perception of a yogin. Kumārila refused to concede that anyone—even a yogin—can perceive things past and future. True, his ultimate motive was the fear that if a yogin can perceive things past and future, then he can also see what result a priestly performance of *yajña* is going to bring about at a distant date with the result that all consultation of Vedas for the purpose will be rendered useless. But whatever his motive, Kumārila stuck to the position that all perception

is necessarily sense-perception and as such perception of a present object. Hence his submission that the aphorist was not interested in offering a definition of perception but only in insisting that perception does not yield information about religious matters because its object is necessarily a present thing and that in turn because it is born of sense-object contact (vv. 17-18). It is by way of elucidating this submission that repeated mention is made of the alleged yogic perception——the purpose being to deny the possibility of such a perception (v. 21, vv. 26-32, vv. 35-36).

Then the question about the aphorist intending or not intending to offer a definition of perception. It was felt that what the aphorist has said about perceptual cognition is doubtless true of all valid perceptual cognition but that it is equally true of certain cases of invalid perceptual cognition. To be explicit, the aphorist says that perceptual cognition arises in the wake of sense-object contact and this description is of course not true of an invalid perceptual cognition like dreaming which takes place without there being any sort of sense-object contact but it is true of an invalid perceptual cognition like misperceiving nacre for silver which certainly takes place as a result of some sort of sense-object contact (vv. 10-11).

An old commentator—the reputed Vṛttikāra—had sought to obviate the difficulty by proposing a variant reading (it consisted in reading *tat* for *sat* and vice versa) which should make the aphorism mean 'valid perceptual cognition of an object is that cognition which arises in the wake of a sense-organ coming in contact with this object' (vv. 13-14). Kumārila reports all this but in the end opines that even as it stands the aphorist's wording can be made to yield a good definition of perception; for the aphorist's word for contact is *samprayoga* and this, on account of the prefix *sam*, can be made to mean not any sort of contact but just the proper sort of it—that is, contact with just that object which happens to be the object of perceptual cognition (vv. 38-39). In this connection Kumārila even suggests that the word *prayoga* might be made to mean not contact but operation, and in that case the proposed definition should be acceptable even to the Buddhists according to whom the visual and auditory sense-organs perceive their respective objects not through coming in contact with them but merely through operating from a distance (vv. 40-43). Lastly, the question about the aphorist's silence about the remaining means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony, Kumārila begins by quoting an opponent who in essence avers that this silence could be understandable in case a definition of perception implied a definition of those remaining means inference etc. or in case these inference etc. necessarily presupposed perception (vv. 2-8). That a definition of perception does not imply a definition of inference etc. is obvious and Kumārila does not consider the point. But in the end he does consider the view of an opponent who seeks to show that inference etc. do not presuppose perception and that in some sense even Vedic testimony presupposes perception (vv. 87-94). E. g., on the showing of this opponent inference does not presuppose

perception because what is being made an object of inference is not at the same time being made an object of perception (v. 91); on the other hand, Vedic testimony presupposes perception because the words of Vedas too have to be made an object of auditory perception (v. 94). Kumārila answers by pointing out that in the case of inference etc. perception plays an extremely vital role——so vital that their very possibility depends on it (v. 96, cf. 22). But the point is not elaborated and for that we will have to wait till Kumārila offers a detailed account of inference etc. However, what Kumārila here soon says by way of showing that inference, analogy and implication are incapable of yielding information about religious matters gives some idea of the way his mind works on the question. About inference his contention is that it necessarily requires the establishment of a relation of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum but that since this establishment of relation in turn requires frequent joint observation of the probans and the probandum it should not be available in the case of religious matters which are *ex hypothesi* not open to observation (vv. 96-99). About analogy his contention is that it necessarily requires the observation of a similarity but that such observation should not be available in the case of religious matters which are *ex hypothesi* not open to observation (v. 100). On the other hand, in the case of implication he is forced to concede that it is possible to posit certain religious matters in the form of a necessary implicate of some observable state of affairs even if these religious matters are themselves not open to observation; but even here his contention is that Vedas alone can specify as to what these religious matters could have been in this case or that (vv. 101-9). So it cannot be Kumārila's position that supra-sensuous entities——even apart from religious matters——do not exist, for he would readily posit such an entity if that alone accounts for an observable state of affairs; (an obvious instance is the Mīmāṃsaka's very common practice of positing a 'capacity (*śakti*)'——necessarily suprasensuous——to account for all sorts of observable phenomena). Kumārila's only point is that a suprasensuous entity cannot be an object of perception. This is a logical corollary of his identification of all perception with sense-perception, but even here let us note that according to Kumārila *manas* too is a sense-organ and one that is instrumental in observing the psychological states like pleasure, pain etc. (v. 83). Thus according to Kumārila there exist physical entities that are perceptible through external sense-organs, psychical entities that are perceptible through an internal sense-organ called *manas*, ordinary suprasensuous entities --e.g. a 'capacity'-- to be posited on the basis of implication, one group of suprasensuous entities——called 'religious matters'——to be learnt of exclusively through Vedic statements. *

(ii) Why Posit Indeterminate Perception

(vv. 112-19)

The oldest authors when they spoke of perception always meant by it our everyday perception of a cow, a horse, a tree, a man, or the like. But in course of

time they began to distinguish this 'everyday' perception from a 'nebulous' perception which was supposed to constitute the inevitable starting point of all 'everyday' perception. The understanding was that the 'nebulous' perception became more and more specified as more and more thought was given to the matter at hand—this specified perception being our 'everyday' perception. It is perhaps not possible to be certain about the exact circumstances that were responsible for the emergence of this concept of a twofold perception, but certain trends of thought appearing within the Buddhist camp seems to have had a big hand in it. The surmise is strengthened by the fact that it was the Buddhist logicians who identified all perception with indeterminate perception as also by the fact that the terminology employed by them in this connection left its imprint on the final situation as it crystallized. For *kalpanā* was the Buddhist logicians' word for thought-element and they defined perception as the type of cognition devoid of all *kalpanā*; on the other hand, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā logicians, when they came to distinguish between the 'nebulous' perception and 'everyday' perception, gave to the former the name '*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* (= indeterminate perception)' and to the latter the name '*savikalpaka pratyakṣa* (= determinate perception)' (*vikalpa* too being a word employed by the Buddhist logicians as a synonym for *kalpanā*). Be that as it may, the Buddhist logicians came out with the view that reality in its ultimate form and in its entirety is revealed in perception — necessarily indeterminate—while post-perceptual thought either recalls it partly or just falsifies it. This is the *prima facie* view Kumārila considers in details in the course of his account of determinate perception which is pretty elaborate. On the other hand, his account of indeterminate perception is very brief and the *prima facie* view considered in this connection is a different one——though it too regards indeterminate perception as a revealer of reality and post-perceptual thought as a falsifier of it. According to this latter view, the ultimate reality is of the form of a unitary entity devoid of all difference whatever——this ultimate reality appearing whenever anything, be it a cow or a horse, is made an object of indeterminate perception and differences of all sorts, say that between a cow and a horse, appearing whenever things are made an object of post-perceptual thought (vv. 114-16). Kumārila objects to this view on the ground that even in indeterminate perception one object appears as different from another (v. 117). By way of elaborating he says that an object is invariably possessed of a generic feature and a specific feature and is noticed as such even in indeterminate perception (the wording of a crucial step in the argument is obscure) (v. 118). But Kumārila has earlier said (in v. 113) -- and he repeats the idea soon afterwards (in v. 119) —— that what is revealed in indeterminate perception is neither the generic feature of an object nor its specific feature but this object as such. Kumārila's wavering is unmistakable and the solution of his difficulty lies in recognizing that what he calls indeterminate perception is in fact not any cognitive act but the physiological act taking place in the wake of sense-object contact; this physiological act is possessed of a generic feature and a specific feature' but is not itself of the form of a cognition of a generic

feature and a specific feature (such a cognition—the same thing as what Kumārila calls determinate perception—takes place on the basis of the physiological act in question). Kumārila has some inkling of all this when he compares indeterminate perception with the cognition of an infant or that of a dumb person (v. 112) — his idea being that indeterminate perception is devoid of all employment of words, a description true of the physiological act in question; but as a matter of fact, even determinate perception can proceed on without an employment of words and the more important thing to realize is that the physiological act in question is not at all an act of cognition. Further light falls on this question when we consider Kumārila's account of determinate perception.

(iii) Why Posit Determinate Perception

(vv. 120–55, 229–54)

The Buddhists maintain that perception is that cognitive act which immediately follows sense-object contact—so that memory etc. which are soon after employed with a view to determining the nature of the object concerned in this respect or that are not themselves a part of perception but certain post-perceptual thought-processes. By way of supporting this position he offers two arguments, one based on etymological consideration the other based on factual considerations; they run as follows :—

(i) The very etymology of the word *pratyakṣa* (the Sanskrit word for perception and being of the form *prati + akṣa* where *akṣa* means sense-organ) suggests that perception ought to be a sense-born process but memory etc. in question are not a sense-born process and so ought to fall outside the limits of perception proper.

(ii) The object concerned in all its particularity is already cognized by the time memory etc. in question start operating with a view to seeing this object as a thing possessed of these features and those——so that to the extent that these features actually belong to this object their observation is a case of memory and to the extent that they do not belong to it their observation is a case of false superimposition.

Kumārila's consideration of these two Buddhist arguments is a mixed up lot but it should be possible to disentangle his refutation of the first from that of the other. Thus the following is what he urges against the first argument: “Even indeterminate perception is not born of a sense-organ alone—so that to say that perception is that cognitive process which is sense-born is merely a matter of definition or a matter of popular convention; nay, so far as popular convention is concerned it rather supports the identification of all perception with determinate perception. (vv. 130–33). Then according to the Buddhist himself there are cognitive processes (e.g. self-cognition on the part of an act of *kalpanā*) which are perceptual and yet take place without the instrumentality of an ordinary sense-

organ; in such cases his plea is that the processes in question are *perceptual* because they take place through the instrumentality of *manas* conceived as a sense-organ, but then we might say this very thing about memory etc. in question, the idea being that it is merely a matter of definition as to which cognitive acts taking place through the instrumentality of *manas* are to be called perceptual and which not (vv. 134-37). Certainly, memory etc. in question should be treated as no part of perceptual process only in case the concerned sense-object contact has broken off by the time they ensue but never otherwise) (vv. 123-25, 128)". As against the second Buddhist argument posed above Kumārila urges following points : "The fact that the features taken note of by determinate perception do not present themselves as soon as sense-object contact takes place does not mean that these features do not exist there in the object; for there are cases when the very existence of an object is not noticed even after sense-object contact has gone on for a pretty long time (this e.g. happens when one enters an unlit underground room after having stayed in sunshine for a long time (vv. 126-27). Nor can it be said that the features seen in an object are a false superimposition—like the superimposition of water on mirage-sands, for these features——generic as well as specific——are a part of the very make-up of this object (vv. 140-42). Even the case of a white crystal appearing red on account of the proximity of a piece of lac is a case of the things concerned exhibiting certain features that really belong to them (vv. 143-43). The Vaiśeṣika philosophers are certainly wrong when they posit absolute difference between a thing and its features (and a relation called *samavāya* to account for the connection of this thing with these features), but even they are not wrong when they say that there exist real things possessed of real features (vv. 146-50, 154-55). Nor can it be argued that all talk of a thing possessing certain features is mistaken because these features are not found to exist apart from this thing; for it is the very definition of a thing that it persists in the midst of its changing features—so that it should be impossible for this thing to be found apart from these features (vv. 151-52). As a matter of fact, the greater number of features one detects in a thing the deeper must be one's knowledge of this thing, and the stage of indeterminate perception should be treated as lasting exactly so long as no features begin to be detected in a thing (vv. 237-46). As for determinate perception being an act of memory, we do not deny that determinate perception does necessarily require the memory of a feature as belonging to a past thing; but the point is that the object of determinate perception is not this feature as belonging to a past thing but the same as belonging to a present thing (vv. 232-34). So determinate perception is not a case of memory. Nor can it be insisted that the stage of perception must come to an end as soon as memory begins operating, for the rule ought to be that this stage persists so long as sense-object contact persists——irrespective of whether memory begins operating or does not (vv. 234-37)". This controversy of Kumārila with the Buddhist makes it somewhat clear that the

act which the Buddhist calls 'perception' and Kumārila 'indeterminate perception' is in fact a physiological rather than cognitive act. For that is the logical meaning of the Buddhist's insistence that perception is a sense-born process and one involving no thought-element at all. Kumārila himself moved in the same direction when he made out that indeterminate perception is a process that involves no employment of speech, but to be logical he will have to side with the Buddhist in toto. On the other hand, the Buddhist himself is being illogical when he talks as if perception—necessarily indeterminate—reveals the total nature of a thing, for here Kumārila is right when he insists that all revelation of the nature of a thing takes place through the instrumentality of memory etc. that begin operating in the wake of sense-object contact. In this connection one point of difference, which in a way was also a point of agreement between the Buddhist's position and Kumārila's deserves notice. Thus the Buddhist had argued that memory etc. that take place in the wake of sense-object contact are no part of perception because they are of the form of a thought-element while perception is *ex hypothesi* devoid of all thought-element. To this Kumārila had replied that memory etc. when they take place in the presence of sense-object contact are a part of perception while the same when they take place in the absence of sense-object contact are a part of inference etc. This way Kumārila was making the important point that perception is in essence a process of identifying a present object while inference etc. in essence a process of learning about an absent object; but while doing so he was at the same time conceding the force of the Buddhist's contention that post-perceptual thought, insofar as it is of the form of a thought-element, is essentially akin to inference etc. which too are of the form of a thought-element. Not that the Buddhist would deny the specific significance of the cases when post-perceptual thought proceeds in the presence of sense-object contact, nor that Kumārila would deny that perception and inference etc. are essentially similar insofar as both involve memory etc., but the former point was properly emphasized by Kumārila and not the Buddhist while the latter point was properly emphasized by the Buddhist and not Kumārila. All this should become clearer when we come to examine Kumārila's treatment of inference etc.

(iv) Object of Sense—Perception—Unitary or Otherwise

(vv. 156-70)

In Kumārila's times one somewhat ticklish question concerning sense-perception was also often examined; it was as to what constitutes an object of perception. On the basis of usages like 'this thing is seen, heard, touched, tasted, smelled' it was suggested that the object of all the five sense-organs eye, ear, skin, tongue and nose is one and the same, while on the basis of the usages like 'the colour of this thing is seen, its sound heard, its touch touched, its taste tasted, its smell smelled' it was suggested that the five sense-organs have five different objects. The dilemma was sought to be solved sometimes by maintaining that the thing supposed to be the

common seat of colour, sound, touch taste, smell is not in fact one, sometimes by maintaining that the five sense-organs are not in fact different. Kumārila on his part comes out against both these proposed solutions. As against the first he argues : "If a thing ceases to be one simply because its colour and sound are perceived by two different sense-organs then its colour itself should cease to be one because it is perceived by two different eyes. And if it is said that the two eyes are after all eyes, then we would say that the two sense-organs are after all sense-organs (vv. 156-57)". And the position that the five sense-organs are not different but one he dismisses by pointing out that in that case it should be impossible for one to lack a particular sense-organ while not lacking the rest (v. 163). However, it too is not Kumārila's argument that sense-organs are infinite in number because the sensory features can be graded in infinite ways; for his simple position is that all the sensory features can be classified into five groups that correspond to the five sense-organs (v. 169). Of course, Kumārila also has in mind certain features which are not commonly called sensory features but which on his showing are perceived through sense-organs; keeping this in mind is necessary if we are to follow his following submission : "The features 'existent-ness' and 'qualified-ness' are perceived through all the five sense-organs, the features 'substance-ness' and 'corporeal-ness' through two (viz. eye and skin) the five features colour etc. through the five sense-organs eye etc. respectively (v. 170)". We thus see that on the question whether the object of sense-perception is one or many Kumārila moves back and forth, but that is something not out of tune with his general position that a thing and the features that characterise it are neither absolutely one with each other nor absolutely different from one another. However, in the present context Kumārila does not rest content to appeal to this general position but also emphasizes that it is on the basis of observing concomitance in presence and concomitance in absence that we have to conclude as to which sense-organ perceives which sensory feature (vv. 168, 161). To quote his examples, on having observed that a deaf person does not hear sound and a non-deaf person does we conclude that ear perceives sound (v. 164), on having observed that one recalls a past experience of colour etc. even when the corresponding sense-organ is absent we conclude that the instrument of memory is *manas* that is something different from the five sense-organs (v. 162), on having observed that sound is not perceived when ear is absent even while *manas* is present we conclude that sound is not perceived though *manas* (v. 164), on having observed that there takes place memory of a past experience of sound we conclude that at the time when ear perceives sound *manas* too perceives it (v. 166, cf. 160), on having observed that the absence of none of the five sense-organs prevents one from noticing one's psychological states like pleasure, pain etc. we conclude the instrument of perceiving these states is *manas* that is something different from the five sense-organs (v. 160).

(This entire topic is discussed by Kumārila in the course of his polemic against the Buddhist position on the question of determinate perception, but in view of the

importance of the issues it raises it is advisable to study it separately. The same is true of the topic considered next which in Ślokavārtika occurs immediately after the present one.)

(v) No False Superimposition of Words on the Things They Denote

(vv. 171–228)

In Kumārila's times there prevailed a fairly large number of views according to which the things of our everyday experience are an illusory manifestation of this alleged verity or that. Most well-known among these was Buddhist idealism which posited consciousness as the ultimate reality and which Kumārila is going to refute with great fanfare, a lesser known one was the view which posited words as the ultimate reality and which Kumārila now refutes in passing though at considerable length. Kumārila was a stark realist in whose eyes the things of our everyday experience are as real as anything can be; naturally therefore the view under consideration appeared to him nothing short of fantastic. For according to this view these things are an illusory manifestation of the words which denote them; (the word actually used in this connection is *adhyāsa* meaning illusory superimposition, a word whose employment makes this view even more vulnerable than it actually is). Kumārila begins by observing that it is never our experience that a thing is identical with the word that denotes it, for even after employing a word to denote this thing we find it to remain the same as it was before (v. 172). The opponent argues that a thing is identical with the word denoting it because it is our experience that one not conversant with the word 'cow' does not notice the common feature cowness (vv. 173–74); Kumārila dismisses the argument as invalid on the ground that the common feature cowness can well be noticed even by one who is not conversant with the word 'cow' (vv. 175–76) —further adding that even one who is conversant with the word 'cow' distinguishes it from the thing cowness inasmuch as the former is perceived through ear the latter through eye (v. 177). Kumārila's point is that a word is just a means of cognizing this or that from among the features that characterise a thing and so it cannot be identical with this feature, just as a lamp or an eye which is a means of cognizing colour is not identical with colour (vv. 178–79, cf. vv. 205–7, 216–18, 226–27). More trenchantly Kumārila argues that if the word 'cow' and cowness are one thing there can be no superimposition because a thing is not superimposed on itself, if they are two things there can be no superimposition because one real thing is not superimposed on another real thing (vv. 180–81). These are Kumārila's most weighty observations against the view under consideration; they are followed by certain relatively minor ones which can be summarized as follows :—

(1) In popular practice the same word does refer to a thing, the word denoting this thing, and the cognition of this thing; e. g. the thing cow is referred to as *gauḥ iti padārthaḥ*, the word cow as *gauḥ iti śabdaḥ*, the cognition of cow as *gauḥ iti*

jñānam. And yet it is always easy to distinguish from one another a thing, the word denoting this thing, and the cognition of this thing (vv. 182-85).

(2) If a word is identical with the thing it denotes then a word denoting more than one thing should be identical with more than one thing, which is impossible (vv. 186-90).

(3) Different words belong to different grammatical types because they stand for different types of things, but if there exist no things apart from words nothing should distinguish one grammatical type from another, which should make impossible all meaningful employment of words (vv. 191-99).

(4) There are persons who are conversant with a word but not with the corresponding thing, those who are conversant with a thing but not with the corresponding word, those who are conversant with both, those who are conversant with neither, but all this should be impossible if a word is identical with the thing it denotes (vv. 200-4, cf. vv. 220-22).

(5) If a thing is identical with the word denoting it then a thing denoted by more than one word should be identical with more than one word, which is impossible (v. 208).

(6) A thing is superimposed on another either because the two are similar or because they stand close by, but neither relationship is possible between a word and the thing denoted by it (vv. 209-12).

(7) If a word is identical with the thing denoted by it then all determinate perception is false (because) in a piece of determinate perception a thing is cognized as denoted by the corresponding word not as identical with this word, which in turn should mean that all inference is false and so also all verbal testimony (both being dependent on determinate perception) (v. 213).

(8) In the case of a thing (e. g. a new-born child) to which a proper name is assigned before our very eyes we see the thing existing in its own right before even *prima facie* assertion is made that it is identical with the word denoting it (vv. 223-25).

(2) Inference (Anumāna)

Before examining Kumārila's treatment of inference it is necessary to recall to ourselves as to what constitutes the essence of the inferential process. For that should enable us to judge better as to how far Kumārila has been and how far he has not been able to get at the crux of the matter. To put it symbolically, the inferential process is a piece of cogitation of the form 'A possesses the feature Y because it possesses the feature X, since whatever thing possesses the feature X possesses the feature Y, just like B'. In this connection the most important task is to establish a

relation of invariable concomitance between X and Y, a relatively less important task to quote the instance B and to make sure that A possesses X, while to conclude that A possesses Y is a mere logical corollary of these preliminary steps. In the technical terminology employed by the schools of Indian Logic (i) the problem of establishing a relation of invariable concomitance between X and Y is the problem of *vyāpti*, (ii) the problem of quoting the instance B is the problem of *dṛṣṭānta*, (iii) the problem of making sure that A possesses X is the problem of *pakṣadharmatā* (iv) the problem of concluding that A possesses Y is the problem of *pakṣa*. Kumārila discusses all these problems but not each at one place and not always under these very titles; the following is how matters stand :

(1) The problem of *vyāpti* is discussed under this very title in vv. 4-23, but certain aspects of it are covered while investigating the *hetvābhāsa sandigdha* (vv. 83-96) and *viruddha* (vv. 96-107) and still others while investigating *dṛṣṭānta* (vv. 107-45).

(2) The problem of *dṛṣṭānta* is discussed under this very title in vv. 107-45.

(3) The problem of *pakṣadharmatā* is discussed while investigating the *hetvābhāsa asiddha* (vv. 75-83).

(4) The problem of *pakṣa* is discussed under this very title in vv. 23-75.

(The discussion of these rather technical problems related to inference is followed by a discussion of the general question as to whether the object of inferential cognition is real or something fictitious (vv.146-88)—this by way of refuting the Buddhist who seems to uphold the latter alternative.)

So Kumārila has conducted his treatment of inference under the titles *vyāpti* (vv. 4-23), *pakṣa* (vv. 23-75), *hetvābhāsa* (vv. 75-107), *dṛṣṭānta* (vv. 107-45) and in doing so he was following the general practice of Indian logician; we however find it more logical and convenient to examine this treatment under the titles *vyāpti*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *pakṣadharmatā* and *pakṣa*. We consider these latter topics one by one.

(i) The Problem of Vyāpti

Kumārila begins by discussing three questions related to *vyāpti*, viz. (i) What is *vyāpti*? (ii) How is a *vyāpti* grasped? (iii) What begrounds a *vyāpti*? Thus he defines *vyāpti* as the relation that obtains between the feature acting as probans (=the ground of inference) and the feature acting as probandum (=the object of inference), in which connection the former feature is to be called *vyāpya*, the latter *vyāpaka* (v. 4). Thus seen, *vyāpti*, *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka* are all technical designations but their literal connotation too are somewhat revealing. For literally, *vyāpti* means pervasion, *vyāpya* the thing pervaded and *vyāpaka* the thing pervading; but as Kumārila elucidates, the *vyāpya* is that feature which in extent is either smaller than the feature acting as *vyāpaka* or equal to it (v. 5). So roughly speaking, *vyāpti* of Indian logic is the same

thing as the relation called class-inclusion spoken of in Western logic, for in Western logic the probans represents that class of things which is either an equivalent class or a sub-class of the class of things represented by the probandum. By way of caution Kumārila remarks that even when two features are equal in extent that one is to be called *vyāpya* which is actually used as a probans (vv. 7, 9); (the caution is necessary because in such a case either feature is potentially a probans). And issuing another caution he says that if the relation of *vyāpti* has been established between two features then at the time of employing it in a particular case of inferring it must be made sure that the features acting as probans and probandum are precisely the same between which the relation of *vyāpti* had been established earlier (vv. 10-11). Kumārila's point is that a feature is always found accompanied by certain accidental sub-features but that the relation of *vyāpti* obtains between one feature as such and another feature as such and not between them as accompanied by this or that sub-feature of theirs; that is why at the time of making practical application of a relation of *vyāpti* obtaining between two features the sub-features concerned have to be disregarded scrupulously. The point becomes clearer when Kumārila considers his next question, viz. how is a *vyāpti* grasped? For in connection with answering it he submits that the relation of *vyāpti* obtains between two features taken in their universal aspect, that is, between them as they stand when they are divested of all their accidental particularity (v. 12). By way of exception Kumārila concedes that the relation of *vyāpti* might possibly obtain between features that are unique in the sense that they are possessed of no accidental sub-features (v. 12-13), but the concession is of doubtful validity. To judge from the illustration cited, Kumārila feels that in case the rise of the constellation Rohiṇī is inferred from the rise of the constellation Kṛttikā the features concerned are unique in that the constellations in question are each unique; as a matter of fact, the rise of these constellations is not something unique even if they themselves are something unique. Be that as it may, we have now to examine Kumārila's main answer to his question as to how a *vyāpti* is grasped.

On Kumārila's showing, a *vyāpti* is grasped on the basis of frequent observation (v. 12). Thus when one on several occasions observes that X is accompanied by Y and on no occasion observes that X is not accompanied by Y one feels justified in saying that a relation of *vyāpti* obtains between X and Y (X being *vyāpya* and Y *vyāpaka*). However, even if one has not come across a case when X is not accompanied by Y but if there actually are such cases it will be wrong on one's part to say that a relation of *vyāpti* obtains between X and Y and one will have to admit one's mistake as soon as even one such case is pointed out to one. This is the whole point behind two parties engaging in a debate where one seeks to find fault with the *vyāpti* proposed by the other, and yet in spite of their so much preoccupation with the problems of debate the point was missed by all the Indian logicians—including Kumārila—who went on talking as if a *vyāpti* once found to be valid must remain

valid for all times to come. Only Kumārila once at least and vaguely at least hinted at the correct position. Thus in the course of his treatment of *arthāpatti* (*Arthāpatti-Pariccheda* vv. 39-40, 42) Kumārila considers the objection that unless one has observed all the cases of the occurrence of X one cannot say that X is never present in the absence of Y; he answers that the difficulty applies only against that disputant who here says that X is never present in the absence of Y but that he himself only says that X has not been found to be present in the absence of Y. The wording of Kumārila's answer suggests that he is having a dig at the Buddhist whose position too is open to the present objection, but that is a secondary consideration. For the really noteworthy thing is that Kumārila seems to be thus making out that a *vyāpti* proposed by some party in a debate is valid only in the sense that no party has yet shown it to be invalid. Curiously, the point could occur to Kumārila because of his general thesis on self-validity of all cognition. For this thesis maintains that all cognition is valid unless proved to be invalid and as applied to the case of *vyāpti* it ought to maintain that all *vyāpti* is valid unless proved to be invalid. However, Kumārila himself was not consciously aware of all the implications of his present point and so he too, like his other logician-colleagues, eagerly looked for strategems that should ensure acquisition of an all-time valid *vyāpti*. This becomes further clear as Kumārila's argument proceeds first of all in connection with his consideration of his next question, viz the question as to what begrounds a *vyāpti*.

Kumārila's consideration of the question as to what begrounds a *vyāpti* has deservedly attracted wide attention. For the question is somewhat crucial and Kumārila's consideration of it is somewhat significant. The following is full translation of the two verses that are of cardinal importance :

“In the case of all *vyāpti* that we ever come across some one particular feature acts as its begrounder. As for the presence of what feature necessitates the presence of what feature it has to be determined on the basis of a consideration of the capacity involved. So far as the remaining features are concerned they are merely subservient to the *vyāpti* already begrounded by one particular feature—which is why when one of these features is present even then there is no knowing that the *vyāpaka* concerned will also be present (vv. 13b-15a)”.

Kumārila's point is that if the feature X is to act as a probans (*vyāpya*) for the feature Y then the former must be such a one that its presence necessitates the presence of the latter. By way of elucidation it is added that the presence of X necessitates the presence of Y only in case X causes Y (in the language of the Mīmāṃsaka the phrase 'consideration of capacity' is synonymous with the phrase 'causal consideration'). And by way of a logical corollary it is added that if a certain feature is present along with X in this case or that, that would not make this feature a probans for Y; for the presence of this feature is sheer accidental so far as the causation of Y on the part of X is concerned. Kumārila seeks to corroborate his

point with the help of certain illustrations which are all noteworthy. Thus according to him it is fallacious to argue 'this act is an irreligious act, because it is an act of violence', for an act being irreligious has nothing to do with its being or not being an act of violence—this because the cause of an act being irreligious is its being prohibited by Vedas; it is fallacious to argue, 'this piece of cognition is false, because it is a piece of cognition (or because it is a produced entity)', for a piece of cognition being false has nothing to do with its being or not being a piece of cognition (or its being or not being a produced entity)—this because the cause of a piece of cognition being false is its being found false or its causal aggregate being found defective; it is fallacious to argue 'a Śūdra attains heaven through a sacrificial performance because he is man', for someone attaining heaven through a sacrificial performance has nothing to do with his being or not being man—this because the cause of someone attaining heaven through sacrificial performance is one's being a member of the three upper castes; it is fallacious to argue 'this thing is perishable, because it is cognized after an effort', for a thing being perishable has nothing to do with its being or not being cognized after an effort—this because the cause of a thing being perishable is its being a produced entity or its being a composite entity (vv. 17-21). Here in each case Kumārila quotes a feature which according to him is a genuine probans for the probandum concerned and that because it acts as a cause to this probandum; at the same time he quotes a feature which might often be present along with his probans but is not a part and parcel of this probans precisely because it is not always present along with this probans. However, these very illustrations also make it clear as to how difficult—if not actually impossible—it ought to be for one to get at a *vyāpti* that is valid for all times to come. For example those not sharing Kumārila's religious convictions would find it impossible to concede that that act is alone an irreligious act which is prohibited by Vedas. Another point. It is true that all valid *vyāpti* ought to be a *vyāpti* based on causal considerations, but the dictum should not be mechanically interpreted to mean that the probans is always what acts as a cause to the probandum. For example, in that standard illustration of Indian logic smoke is a probans for fire but it does not act as a cause to fire; on the contrary, it is rather fire that acts as a cause to smoke. The exact principle is that the total cause can be a probans for the effect while the effect can be a probans for the total-cause as also for a part-cause and the case of smoke being a probans for fire is a case of the effect being a probans for a part-cause.

These fundamental questions related to the problem of *vyāpti* Kumārila discusses under this very title, but certain aspects of the same are touched upon while investigating the *hetvābhāsa sandigdha* and *viruddha* (vv. 83-107); they too deserve examination. Under the title *hetvābhāsa* or pseudoprobans Indian logicians consider certain cases of inference where the probans appears to be genuine but is not in fact genuine, and our investigation into the nature of pseudo-probans throws light on the nature

of genuine probans just as an investigation into the nature of invalid cognition throws light on the nature of valid cognition. The title *hetvābhāsa* covers three sub-titles, viz. *asiddha*, *sandigdha*, *viruddha*; of these, only the last two have to do with the problem of *vyāpti*—the first having to do with the problem of pakṣadharmatā. That is why Kumārila's treatment of just these two is being examined for the present.

In a debate as conceived by Indian logicians there are two parties, one called *vādin* or the original disputant the other called *prativādin* or the rival disputant. The original disputant is supposed to formulate a *vyāpti* and quote a corroborative instance which might be either of a homologue type in that both the probans and the probandum are present here or of a heterologue type in that they are both absent here; the rival disputant is supposed to quote a contrary instance where the probans is present but the probandum absent. Now the rival disputant's procedure is understandable, for even a single contrary instance is sufficient to invalidate the *vyāpti* formulated by the original disputant. But it is difficult to see what the original disputant gains by quoting just one corroborative instance (even of the homologue type); (such quotation can at the best indicate that the *vyāpti* concerned is *prima facie* plausible but that is nothing much). However, the phenomenon of quoting an instance is to be constantly kept in mind if we are to make an intelligent appreciation of Kumārila's account of the *hetvābhasas sandigdha* and *viruddha*. To take *sandigdha* first, it is defined as the probans whose capacity to establish the presence of the probandum is doubtful; and it is said to be of three types, viz. *sādhāraṇa*, *asādhāraṇa* and *viruddhā-vyabhicārin*. (i) Thus in the case of the subtype *sādhāraṇa* it is possible to quote a contrary instance where the probans is present but the probandum absent. It is a simple case of invalid *vyāpti*, for a valid *vyāpti* is one in whose case it is impossible to quote a contrary instance. But the fact is expressed by saying that in the case of the subtype *sādhāraṇa* the presence of a contrary instance renders it doubtful whether the probandum is actually present in the case under dispute. (ii) Again, in the case of the subtype *asādhāraṇa* it is impossible to quote a single corroborative instance (of the homologue type) or a single contrary instance—so that here the case under dispute is the only case where the probans and the probandum might be possibly present. It is a simple case where a *vyāpti* is altogether impossible, for the relation of *vyāpti* obtains only between two such features as are possibly present in several cases besides the case under dispute (let us ignore that Kumārila has also conceded—wrongly—that this relation can possibly obtain between two absolutely unique features). But the fact is expressed by saying that in the case of the subtype *asādhāraṇa* the impossibility of quoting a corroborative instance renders it doubtful whether the probandum is actually present in the case under dispute. (iii) Lastly, in the case of the subtype *viruddhā-vyabhicārin* it is possible to apply to the case under dispute a rival *vyāpti*—that is, a *vyāpti* where the probandum is 'absence of the original probandum'; clearly, here the original *vyāpti* cannot be proved valid unless it is first proved that the rival *vyāpti* is invalid or that the probans of

the rival *vyāpti* is absent in the case under dispute. But the fact is expressed by saying that in the case of the subtype *viruddhāvyabhicārin* the presence of a rival *vyāpti* renders it doubtful whether the probandum is actually present in the case under dispute. Thus we see that the three subtypes of the *hetvābhāsa sandigdha* are in fact three different types of cases where the *vyāpti* is invalid for three different reasons, and if all these cases seem to show the common feature 'rendering doubtful the presence of the probandum in the case under dispute' that is because any case of invalid *vyāpti* is bound to do that. This should become clear on examining the type of *hetvābhāsa* called *viruddha*—which, as we have noted, is the only other type of *hetvābhāsa* having to do with *vyāpti*. In the case of *viruddha* the *vyāpti* is so much invalid that instead of the probans indisputably establishing the presence of the probandum it indisputably establishes the absence of it—so that while in the case of *sandigdha* we are left in doubt whether the probandum is present in the case under dispute in the case of *viruddha* we are left in no doubt that it is absent there. So logically speaking, Kumārila has no option but to bring under the type *sandigdha* all the most diverse cases of invalid *vyāpti* barring those few ones which belong to the exceptional type *viruddha*.

The above represents the kernel of Kumārila's account of the *hetvābhāsas sandigdha* and *viruddha*, but his actual words too deserve notice. Thus he begins by saying that the three subtypes of *sandigdha* are a cause of doubt because :

(i) the subtype *sādhāraṇa* is found to be present along with the probandum and also in the absence of it,

(ii) the subtype *asādhāraṇa* is found to be present neither along with the probandum nor in the absence of it,

(iii) the subtype *viruddhāvyabhicārin* involves the contingency of two contradictory features being attributed to one and the same thing (vv. 84-85).

Then are cited four illustrative cases for the subtype *sādhāraṇa*, one for the subtype *sādhāraṇa* and one for the subtype *asādhāraṇa*. The illustrative cases for *sādhāraṇa* are (a) when the probans is 'being knowable' and the probandum 'being eternal'. (b) when the probans is 'being transient' and the probandum 'being not born of effort', (c) when the probans is 'being transient' and the probandum 'being born of effort', (d) when the probans is 'being incorporeal' and the probandum 'being eternal'; in each of these cases it is possible to quote an instance where the probans is present along with the probandum as also an instance where it is present in the absence of the probandum (v. 86). The illustrative case for *asādhāraṇa* is when the probans is 'being possessed of smell' and the probandum 'being eternal'; here earth is the only thing where the probans

is to be found—so that there can be no instance where this probans is present along with the probandum nor one where it is present in the absence of the probandum (v. 86). By way of elucidation Kumārila remarks that in the case of *sādhāraṇa* a doubt arises because there is caused an understanding that the probandum is present and also an understanding that it is absent while no choice between the two alternatives is possible; on the other hand, in the case of *asādhāraṇa* a doubt arises because there is caused neither an understanding that the probandum is present, nor an understanding that it is absent while it is impossible for the probandum to be present and also absent at one and the same place (vv. 87-89). It can be seen that Kumārila is being unnecessarily prolix while describing simple things. Then Kumārila thinks it necessary to add that the same probans which might be *sādhāraṇa* or *asādhāraṇa* in respect of one probandum can well be a valid probans in respect of another; e. g. 'being incorporeal' is a valid probans in respect of 'being inactive' and 'being possessed of smell' a valid probans in respect of 'being a part of earth' (vv. 89-91). The point hardly needs emphasis. Then Kumārila cites and examines an illustrative case for the subtype *viruddhavyabhicārin*; the case occurs when air is sought to be proved to be imperceptible on the ground of its being uncoloured and it is sought to be proved to be perceptible on the ground of its being touchable (v. 91-92). We are told that some people regard *viruddhavyabhicārin* as a new subtype of *sandigdha* while others say that each of the two probantia concerned is a case of *sādhāraṇa* while the two together a case of *asādhāraṇa* (vv. 92-93). Kumārila thus talks as if one and the same disputant formulates two rival *vyāptis* but that is an impossible situation. And as for his submission that the probantia concerned are a case of *sādhāraṇa* when taken separately and a case of *asādhāraṇa* when taken jointly that may be true of his particular illustrative case, but theoretically it is possible for two probantia to be a case of pseudoprobans in all sorts of ways. Lastly, Kumārila makes a general submission to the effect that two probantia which might be a case of *sandigdha* when taken separately can well be a case of valid probans when taken jointly; e. g. the features 'being possessed of an upright configuration' and 'being possessed of a crow' when taken separately do not establish the presence of the feature 'being a stump of tree' but when taken jointly they well do the same (vv. 94-95). This again is a point that hardly needs emphasis.

Kumārila's account of *viruddha* is cumbresome in the extreme—so much so that the very essence of the matter is in the danger of being missed altogether. He begins by saying that the *viruddha* probans contradicts what is intended to be proved explicitly (v. 97). This is an odd way of saying that the *viruddha* probans has the relation of *vyāpti* with the absence of the probandum concerned rather than with this probandum itself; and the mention of implicit intention is positively misleading because as a logical category the probans has to be examined only in terms of what it explicitly seeks to do. Then Kumārila speaks of the *viruddha* probans of as many as six types according as it contradicts a character, a particular aspect of a character,

a thing characterised, a particular aspect of a thing characterised, both a character and the thing characterised, a particular aspect of a character and one of the thing characterised. The illustrative cases cited in connection with all these types except the first are more or less obscure and the disputant seems to have in mind just one corroborative instance (of the homologue type) with whose help to buttress his *vyāpti*. This is evident from the procedure adopted by Kumārila in criticizing these illustrative cases; for in each case he just shows that the corroborative instance cited is possessed of the probans along with an absence of the probandum. But a probans can be those proved to belong to the type *viruddha* only if there are no other corroborative instance (of the homologue type) except the cited one; for otherwise it could well happen that the corroborative instance cited is possessed of the probans along with an absence of the probandum but that there are other instances which are possessed of the probans along with the probandum (while a *viruddha* probans can have no instance where the probans is present along with the probandum). Be that as it may, in connection with the first type Kumārila's illustrative case is 'this thing is eternal, because it is a produced entity'; here no corroborative instance is cited but Kumārila's point is clear—viz. that the feature 'being a produced entity' is a probans for the feature 'being not eternal' rather than for the feature 'being eternal' (v. 97). In connection with the second type the illustrative case is 'the form of a word before its denotation is grasped is accompanied by the entity denoted, because it is possessed of a case-ending, just as the form of a word after its denotation is grasped is accompanied by the entity denoted'; Kumārila points out that even after its denotation is grasped the form of a word is not accompanied by the entity denoted (v. 98-100). In connection with the third type the illustrative case is '*samavāya* is a category apart from the categories substance etc., because it causes the notion "this exists in that", just like contact', Kumārila points out that contact is not a category apart from substance etc. (it being a member of the category quality) (vv. 101-2). In connection with the fourth type the illustrative case is '*samavāya* is one single entity because it causes the notion "this exists in that" just like contact', Kumārila points out that contact is not one single entity (vv. 102-3). In connection with the fifth type the illustrative case is 'soul exists as an eternal entity, because it is an impartite entity, just like sky'; Kumārila says that the probans here is of the *viruddha* type in the eyes of the Sautrāntika Buddhist who does not believe that sky is eternal or that soul exists (vv. 103-4); it is difficult to see how soul's existence is a probandum here and as Kumārila himself will wisely say in another context that the validity or otherwise of a probans has nothing to do with the private beliefs of this person or that—so that if sky is really eternal even the Sautrāntikas should say so and if it is not even others should not say so. In connection with the sixth type the illustrative case is 'eyes etc. exist for the sake of something else, because they are a composite entity, just like a bedding'; Kumārila points out that the disputant being a Sāṅkhya philosopher must hold that eyes etc. exist for the sake of soul which is something incom-

posite and that they are made up not of physical elements but of *ahankāra* while on the other hand a bedding is meant for someone who is something composite not something incomposite and it is made up of physical elements not of *ahankāra* (vv. 104-7); here too it is difficult to see how these private beliefs of the disputant are relevant for a consideration of the validity or otherwise of the *vyāpti* in question—the only relevant task being to see whether there obtains a relation of *vyāpti* between the feature 'being a composite entity' and the feature 'existing for the sake of something else'. Then Kumārila feels that in the case of the first type the probans contradicts a character because 'being eternal' is a character of the thing in question, in the case of the second type it contradicts a particular aspect of a character because the form of a word is a character of it while 'this form before the denotation concerned is grasped being accompanied by the entity denoted' is a particular aspect of this character, in the case of the third it contradicts a thing characterized because *samavāya* is a thing characterized, in the case of the fourth type it contradicts a particular aspect of a thing characterized because its unity is a particular aspect of *samavāya*, in the case of the fifth type it contradicts both a character and the thing characterized because 'being eternal' is a character and soul the thing characterized, in the case of the sixth type it contradicts a particular aspect of a character and one of the thing characterized because 'existing for the sake of something else' is a character, 'existing for the sake of something incomposite' a particular aspect of this character, eyes etc. the thing characterized, 'eyes etc. being made up of *ahankāra*' a particular aspect of the thing characterized. All this is nothing but making the confusion worse confounded, for all this has little to do with the logical character of the *viruddha* type of probans.

These aspects of the probans of *vyāpti* are touched upon by Kumārila while investigating the *hetvābhāsa sandigdha* and *viruddha*, certain others are brought to light while investigating *dṛṣṭānta*; these latter too deserve examination. The word *dṛṣṭānta* is used by Indian logicians in a broader sense and in a narrower sense; in the broader sense it means *vyāpti*-along-with-a-corroborative-instance, in the narrower sense it means just corroborative-instance. Following this tradition Kumārila too fully discusses under the title *dṛṣṭānta* questions that have to do with the problem of *vyāpti* rather than with that of corroborative instance. For example, his discussion on *dṛṣṭānta* opens with a detailed advice as to how in a debate one should and how one should not present one's *vyāpti* (vv. 108-14). This however is a purely formal question. Later on Kumārila discusses as to how *vyāpti* of X with Y is exactly equivalent to that of not-Y with not-X (vv. 121-26 cf. 134-37). To a great extent this too is a formal question. But then Kumārila is somehow led into discussing a question of material importance. For he had said that the *vyāpti* of X with Y is exactly equivalent to that of not-Y with not-X and so the opponent reasons as follow : "Then

one should not at all bother about formulating *vyāpti* between X and Y, for corroborative instances for that might not be easily available; on the other hand, corroborative instances for the *vyāpti* obtaining between not-Y and not-X can be easily had in plenty (vv. 131-32)." In reply Kumārila repeats his recently made assertion (vv. 128-29) that *vyāpti* between not-Y and not-X is formulated just with a view to substantiating that between X and Y—so that formulating the latter *vyāpti* is always in place (vv. 131-32). More significantly, Kumārila—as if refuting the opponent in advance—had argued that even in the case of *vyāpti* between X and Y a stray collection of corroborative instances will not do, for distinction has to be made between a *vyāpti* proper and a mere co-presence (vv. 129-30). The argumentation has a very important implication. Thus Kumārila had come to notice not only that corroborative instances of the heterologue type can be ruled off by way of supporting any and every *vyāpti* but also that even corroborative instances of the homologue type are not much difficult to collect in support of an invalid *vyāpti* (vv. 117, 130-31). Hence his emphasis on the need for distinguishing between a *vyāpti* proper and a mere co-presence. Logically, this distinction should have implied the recognition that a *vyāpti* has to be formulated after making an exhaustive observation of a most varied type of corroborative instances and that even in the end the proviso has to be added that the *vyāpti* thus formulated is to be deemed valid so long—and only so long—as no contrary instances come to anyone's notice. Kumārila was certainly aware of some part of this implication but not of the whole of it. This becomes evident from the fact that he soon proceeds to explain how an all-time valid *vyāpti* is acquired on the basis of the observation of just few instances; his explanation lies in maintaining that the relation of *vyāpti* obtains between two features taken not in their particular aspect but in their universal aspect while this universal aspect of theirs is signified by the presence of an eternal-ubiquitous entity called 'universal' which resides in its entirety in its this locus or that (v. 133). If this explanation is really valid then it becomes difficult to see why the observation just one corroborative instance should not make possible the establishment of the *vyāpti* concerned; for the 'universals' between which the *vyāpti* is alleged to obtain allegedly exist in their entirety in one corroborative instance as in another. In any case, this way Kumārila is led to discuss the question as to why then the old Mimāṃsā author distinguished between *pratyakṣatodṛṣṭa anumāna* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna*, for since the former phrase means 'inference based on perceptual cognition' and the latter 'inference based on generic cognition' the latter type of inference alone seems to be based on a *vyāpti* that obtains between 'universals' (vv. 138-43); his verdict is that all *vyāpti* is a *vyāpti* obtaining between 'universals' but that those cases of the application of a *vyāpti* where the presence of the probans is cognized perceptually are called cases of *pratyakṣatodṛṣṭa anumāna* while those where the presence of the proban is cognized inferentially are called cases of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna* (vv. 144-45). This is a

question of secondary importance and the validity or otherwise of Kumārila's answer to it depends on the validity or otherwise of his general thesis on 'universals'. (Here begins Kumārila's discussion of the question as to whether the object of inferential cognition is something real or something fictitious, a discussion to which we shall return at the end of our enquiry into Kumārila's treatment of inference).

(ii) The Problem of *Dr̥ṣṭānta*

The problem of *dr̥ṣṭānta* or corroborative instance becomes better manageable after that of *vyāpti* is first disposed of. For the only purpose that a corroborative instance can serve in an inference is to somehow lend support to the *vyāpti* concerned. But the question is as to how it is that a corroborative instance lends support to a *vyāpti*. For as Kumārila came to realize, the mere possibility of quoting one corroborative instance (not even the possibility of quoting a number of such instances) will validate a *vyāpti* that is otherwise invalid. So the real problem is to specify the precise conditions that make a *vyāpti* valid. A solution of this problem was hinted at by Kumārila through his thesis on *prayojakatā* or 'begrounding'. For according to this thesis X is a valid probans for Y only in case the presence of X necessitates the presence of Y — which necessitation, in its turn, is possible only in case X causes Y. That Kumārila's solution received support from later logicians is evident from their discussion on what they called an *aprayojaka*, *anyathāsiddha* or *sopādhika* probans. For these logicians discovered that there are cases when a probans fulfils all the conditions laid down in their textbooks and is yet invalid. Deeper thought convinced them that the trouble with such a probans is that its presence does not necessitate the presence of the probandum. It was with a view to understanding the nature of such anomalous cases that the concept of *aprayojaka*, *anythāsiddha* or *sopādhika* probans was first introduced, but when thus introduced it enabled our logicians to clearly realize that even in ordinary cases of inference a probans fulfils its assigned role only by virtue of being something that necessitates the presence of the probandum. And it was now that the problem of quoting one corroborative instance turned into a vestigial problem reminiscent of an age when the concept of something like Kumārila's *prayojakatā* had not appeared on the thought-horizon of our logicians. Viewing this problem thus one can take leave of it without wasting many words on it—as is actually done by Kumārila; (if things said by Kumārila under the title *dr̥ṣṭānta* are so many that is simply because most of these things have to do with the problem of *vyāpti* rather than with that of corroborative instance). Thus Kumārila in essence simply tells us that a corroborative instance might be either of a homologue type in that it possesses both the probans and the probandum or of a heterologue type in that it lacks both of them, and he elucidates his point by citing an illustrative case where a corroborative instance of the homologue type is invalid because it lacks either the probans or the probandum or both and a corroborative instance of the heterologue type is invalid because it possesses either

the probans or the probandum or both. In this illustrative case probans is the feature 'being incorporeal' and probandum the feature 'being eternal'. Here three invalid corroborative instances of the homologue type are an action (which lacks the probandum), an atom (which lacks the probans), a cloth (which lacks both) (vv.115-16), while three invalid corroborative instances of the heterologue type are an atom (which possesses the probandum), a piece of cognition (which possesses the probans), sky (which possesses both) (v. 128). While quoting the first set of corroborative instances Kumārila says two noteworthy things about sky, viz.

(i) that sky, inspite of possessing both the probans and the probandum, will not be a valid corroborative instance for the disputant who denies the existence of sky (v. 116),

and (ii) that sky, inspite of possessing both the probans and the probandum, will not make the probans in question a valid probans since there exists an instance—viz. an action—where it is present along with an absence of the probandum (v. 117).

The first point is questionable, for, as already noted in another connection and will say be noted in one more connection, in a debate what exists for one party must exist also for the other. The second point is important; for it virtually amounts to conceding that all quoting of a corroborating instance (even of the homologue type) is a useless venture. And after quoting the set of invalid corroborative instances of the heterologus type Kumārila emphasizes that even this type of corroborative instance, though immediately showing forth the co-presence of 'absence of the probans' and 'absence of the probandum', is ultimately aimed at establishing a *vyāpti* between the probans and the probandum (v. 128); (immediately afterwards the point is re-emphasized that the mere availability of an instance where both the probans and the probandum are present will not establish a *vyāpti* between the probans and the probandum (vv. 129-130)). Again, here also it is noted that inspite of there being available a valid corroborative instance of the heterologue type in the form of a jar (which lacks both the probans and the probandum) the probans in question is an invalid probans since there exist an instance—viz. an action—where it is present along with an absence of the probandum (vv. 130-31); this virtually amounts to conceding that all quoting of a corroborative instance of the heterologue type is a useless venture. That the concept of a corroborative instance of the heterologue type is a particularly useless concept does not become clear from Kumārila's present illustrative case where the feature acting as probans and that acting as probandum are both such that everything possesses it or its absence; when the features concerned are not of this nature, all sorts of utterly irrelevant things can be said in

the name of offering a corroborative instance of the heterologue type—this becoming specially evident in the case of those extremely artificial pieces of inference (technically called *kevalavyatirekin*) about which it is claimed that they can be buttressed only with the help of a corroborative instance of the heterologue type. All this however is not to deny that the quoting of a corroborative instance (of either type) only too often facilitates the comprehension of a point at issue, a circumstance responsible for the persistence of the practice even after our authors were clearer about the relative logical status of a *vyāpti* and a corroborative instance.

(iii) The Problem of *Pakṣadharmatā*

In connection with inference the third most important problem after that of *vyāpti* and that of *dṛṣṭānta* is that of *pakṣadharmatā*. Thus in the inferential proposition “A possesses the feature Y because it possesses the feature X, since whatever thing possesses the feature X possesses the feature Y, just like B” the proposition-part “A possesses the feature X” signifies *pakṣadharmatā* and difficulties about it arise when one party in debate asserts it while the other denies it. The denial might be made either on the ground that A does not possess X or on the ground that A does not exist at all. All this is discussed by Kumārila while investigating the *hetvābhāsa asiddha* (vv. 75–82). Thus on his showing the case of A not possessing X is a case of the subtype of *asiddha* called *svārūpāsiddha* while the case of A not existing at all a case of the subtype of *asiddha* called *āśrayāsiddha*; moreover, both a *svārūpāsiddha* probans and an *āśrayāsiddha* probans might be either definitely known to be such or just suspected to be such. To quote Kumārila’s examples, a case of *svārūpāsiddha* definitely known to be such is ‘fire is cold (hence a non-burner)’ or ‘a word is visible (hence transient)’ (vv. 76–77); a case of *svārūpāsiddha* suspected to be such arises when even while doubting whether a spot possesses smoke or vapour one says ‘that spot possesses smoke (and hence fire)’ (vv. 78–79). In this connection Kumārila also makes a distinction whose propriety he himself denies later on. Thus he begins by telling us that in a debate a case of *asiddha* might arise in three ways, viz. when the proposition concerned is invalid (or suspicious) in the eyes of the original disputant, when it is so in the eyes of the rival disputant, when it is so in the eyes of both. The examples quoted above belong to the third variety: an example of *svārūpāsiddha* in its first two varieties will be found when in a debate where the Mīmāṃsaka is a party the proposition is made by one party or the other—that a word is a produced entity or that it is a quality (v. 77), an example of *āśrayāsiddha* in its first two varieties will be found when in a debate where the Buddhist is a party the proposition is made — by one party or the other—that a soul is active everywhere (hence ubiquitous) (vv. 80–81). But in the end (vv. 81–83) Kumārila disputes this triple distinction of *asiddha* on the ground that in a debate what is

valid, invalid or suspicious in the eyes of one party must be so in the eyes of both. His point is that if a debater is convinced that A possesses X then he should say so even if he knows that the rival is likely to challenge him on this score; for in case he is actually challenged then if he successfully meets the challenge the proposition in question becomes valid in the eyes of both the parties, if he fails to meet the challenge it becomes invalid in the eyes of both. Kumārila's contention certainly holds good for the cases of oral debate but not for those of written debate—that is, debate conducted through polemical books; for the author of a book can well charge his rival with having made a proposition that is invalid (or suspicious) in his eyes or in the latter's own eyes or in the eyes of both. The point is that in a book it is impossible to settle all issues or to settle even one single issue for all times to come—though even in an oral debate an issue is apparently settled only for the time being; for as soon as an oral debate is over the defeated party (unless turned turncoat) is bound to revert back to its cherished position. And as a matter of historical record, whatever might have been the situation in the very beginning in later times our scholars were chiefly conducting their mutual debate through books rather than through mouth and in the course of it more and more issues were clarified more and more even if none was ever settled to the satisfaction of each and every one.

(iv) The Problem of *Pakṣa*

In connection with inference the last important problem is that of *pakṣa*. We have already come across the word *pakṣa* while speaking of *pakṣadharmatā*—a compound whose etymology remains to be considered. The word *pakṣadharmatā* means 'being a feature of the *pakṣa*', and all valid probans has to be a feature of the *pakṣa* while an *asiddha* probans is invalid precisely because it is not such a feature. As thus understood *pakṣa* obviously means the locus where the probans is found to be present and the probandum is to be proved to be present (in terms of the symbolism adopted by us A is *pakṣa* because X is found to be present in it while Y is to be proved to be present in it). However, by the word *pakṣa* Kumārila mean the thesis to be proved through an inference—as is evident from his long account of it given in vv. 54–75; and it is difficult to see how a probans can be a feature of the *pakṣa* as thus understood. As if to obviate this difficulty the account is preceded by an elaborate treatment of the question as to what constitutes the thing-to-be-inferred (*anumeya*) (vv. 27–51)—the implication being that this thing too might be called *pakṣa* in some sense while there is nothing inherently impossible about a probans being a feature of such a thing. Kumārila's discussion makes it abundantly clear that the thing to be inferred must fulfil two conditions, viz.

- (i) that the probans must be a feature of it, and

(ii) that the probans must have with it the relation of *vyāpti*.

Now the common locus of the probans and the probandum is something whose feature the probans is while the probandum is something with which the probans has the relation of *vyāpti*, but nothing apparently fulfils both the conditions in question. Arguing broadly on these very lines Kumārila himself concedes that these two conditions are fulfilled neither by the locus alone nor by the probandum alone nor by the two taken together (v. 30); but he abruptly suggests that they are actually fulfilled by the locus-as-characterized-by-the-probandum (v. 34). In this connection Kumārila thinks it necessary to argue that the thing-to-be-inferred is the locus-as-characterized-by-the-probandum rather than the probandum-as-characterized-by-the-locus (v. 36-38), his contention being that the probans cannot be—at least directly—a feature of the latter as it can be of the former; but when reminded that the probans cannot have—at least directly—the relation of *vyāpti* with the former as it can have with the latter he simply brushes aside the difficulty (v. 38). Plainly, so far as their capacity to fulfil Kumārila's two conditions is concerned, both the alternatives here considered by him are deficient, one in one respect the other in the other. But Kumārila's demand is an impossible demand and his difficulty is rooted in the ambiguity that gradually came to be attached to the word *pakṣa* which would sometimes mean the thesis to be proved, sometimes the common locus of the probans and the probandum. Kumārila also argues at length against the position that the thing-to-be-inferred is 'probandum-as-characterized-by-a-locus' (vv. 39-47). In this connection several fantastic meanings are alternately attributed to the phrase 'probandum-as-characterized-by-a-locus' and the resultant view criticized (vv. 39-43), but the sensible meaning the-given-case-of-probandum-as-characterized-by-the-given-locus is dismissed by saying that the given locus comes to mind even before the given probandum does—so that the former cannot be left in a position subordinate to the latter (vv. 44-47). In fact, the point is not as to what comes to mind first and what next but as to what comes to mind in what capacity—so that if the locus is noticed as locus and the probandum as probandum then it is immaterial as to which of them is noticed first and which next. Lastly, Kumārila considers—in an approving fashion—the position that the thing to be inferred is 'probans as characterized by the probandum (v.48). In this connection he answers the objection that in that case the probans becomes a part and parcel of the thing-to-be-inferred, an undesirable contingency inasmuch as the probans has to be something already established (v. 60). The answer consists in pointing out that what here constitutes a part of the thing-to-be-inferred is the given case of probans and not probans as such (v. 51); it is valid but the fact remains that Kumārila's whole treatment of the subject is marred by his unawareness of the ambiguity vitiating the word *pakṣa*: As for Kumārila's treatment of *pakṣa* understood as the thesis to be proved through an inference, it is apparently fairly long (vv. 54-75). But in essence he here does just one thing, viz. to emphasize that a thesis to be proved through an

inference should not be such a one as stands contradicted by the findings of another means of valid cognition. And since according to Kumārila the means of valid cognition are six in all he divides an invalid *pakṣa* into six subtypes each contradicted through one particular means of valid cognition (vv.58-59). For example, preception contradicts the thesis 'a word is imperceptible' (v. 59), inference contradicts the thesis 'a word is inaudible' (vv. 60-61). The thesis contradicted through verbal testimony might be of three types, viz.

(i) that contradicted through one's own words—e.g. someone saying 'I never speak' 'All statements are false' 'My mother is barren',

(ii) that contradicted through the established position of one's school—e. g. the Buddhist saying that a word is eternal,

(iii) that contradicted through popular usage—e. g. someone saying '*candra* is not the word for moon' (vv. 91-95).

The remaining subtypes are illustrated through the well-known examples that Kumārila employs while offering an account of the three remaining means of valid cognition, an account we have yet to examine (vv. 65-69). When illustrations have been offered for all the six subtypes Kumārila relates that in all those illustrations what stood contradicted was a character but that similarly there might be cases where what stands contradicted is a thing characterized, both a character and the thing characterized, a particular aspect of a character, a particular aspect of a thing characterized, a particular aspect of a character and one of the thing characterized (in each case the thing contradicted being mentioned explicitly or implicitly) (vv. 70-71). But as we have already found in connection with our examination of Kumārila's account of the *hetvābhāsa viruddha* all this is very much confusing.

(v) The Object of Inferential Cognition

Something Real or Something Fictitious

Kumārila closes his treatment of inference with a discussion of the general question as to whether the object of inferential cognition is something real or something fictitious. The occasion for the discussion arises because of certain positions maintained by the Buddhist. Thus the Buddhist posits just two means of valid cognition, viz. perception and inference and it is his understanding that perception is competent to cognize a particular object but not the common features exhibited by it while inference competent to cognize the common features exhibited by a particular object but not this particular object—also that a particular object is something real while the common features exhibited by it something fictitious. All these positions Kumārila seeks to controvert in the present part of his text. On his showing the common features exhi-

bited by a particular object signify the presence in this object of the corresponding 'universals' which are of the form of an eternal—ubiquitous object as real as the particular object itself; and it is his understanding that a 'universal' is grasped by preception as much as by inference. So Kumārila begins his polemic by emphasizing that the object of inferential cognition is something indisputably real (v. 147), that a 'universal' is something real (v. 148), that a 'universal' is cognized through perception (v. 148). Then he argues that to say that a common feature is cognized through inference alone must lead to an infinite regress (vv. 149-53). For an inference must require the prior cognition of the probans which has to be of the form of a common feature, but if a common feature is cognized through inference alone then the cognition of this probans must require another inference and the process should go on and infinitum. Kumārila also rejects the defence that the probans of an inference is cognized not through inference but through another means of cognition (vv. 154-56). For if this means is a means of valid cognition then being competent to cognize a common feature it should render redundant the positing of inference as a means of valid cognition while if it is merely a means of cognition then the cognition of the probans through its instrumentality should not lead to a valid inference—just as the mistaken cognition of vapour as smoke does not lead to the valid inference of fire. Kumārila similarly rejects the submission that the probans of an inference is cognized through memory and that even if memory is not a means of valid cognition the memory of probans is instrumental in a valid inference just as the memory of *vyāpti* is (vv. 157-60). For the memory of a *vyāpti* is possible because this *vyāpti* was once cognized through preception, but the memory of a probans is not possible because this probans is of the form of a common feature while on the Buddhist's view a common feature is never cognized through perception. As Kumārila biting remarks, if one can have memory of what one has not cognized through perception then one can as well have memory of a barren woman's son. His point is that unless a common feature is actually perceived at the time of perceiving a concerned particular object no subsequent perception of this particular object should call back to mind this common feature (vv. 161-65). Lastly, Kumārila dismisses the suggestion that the cognition of a probans takes place on account of the *vāsanā* or impressions retained in mind (v. 167). He does not argue that such an impression too presupposes a prior perceptual cognition (perhaps for the fear of being answered back that this impression could well be a heritage of a past birth) but only that in that in case the cognition of the probandum too should take place on account of the *vāsanās* themselves—without needing an inference. Kumārila goes on to and that one who like him posits additional means of valid cognition besides perception and inference can possibly conceive of a case where the probans is cognized neither through perception nor through inference but that this alternative is not open to the Buddhist who points just two means of valid cognition (vv. 168-69). As a general rule, however, Kumārila's own position is that a probans is cognized either through perception or through inference (v. 170-71). Then keeping in mind

that not only inference but even verbal testimony, analogy etc. (i. e. the additional means of valid cognition posited by him) somehow or other necessarily presuppose a prior perception of a common feature Kumārila administers to the Buddhist a final advice to the effect that the latter must concede two positions—viz. that all means of valid cognition necessarily presuppose perception and that perception is competent to cognize a common feature (vv. 172–73). Kumārila closes his discussion with an enquiry that is almost purely ontological (vv. 174–88). Thus he begins by observing that even a particular object is a common something when viewed in relation to certain other objects; e. g. colour is a particular object but it is a common something in relation to the particular colour blue etc. while blue colour itself is a common something in relation to the particular shades of blue colour—so much so that even a dyad is a common something in relation to its constituent atoms. (vv. 174–75). So on Kumārila's showing an atom should be the only particular object that the Buddhist is entitled to speak of, and then he objects that neither is any practical dealing possible in relation to atoms nor are they open to perceptual cognition—either taken singly or taken in aggregate (v. 177). The Buddhist does say that the atoms taken in aggregate become perceptible, but Kumārila feels that the position remains untenable unless it is further granted that the atoms in aggregate give rise to a new product called 'composite substance'—which wholly resides in its each and every component-part just as a 'universal' wholly resides in each and every concerned particular object (vv. 179–82). Further strengthening his own position by saying that the Mīmāṃsaka is not committed to posit the existence of an atom Kumārila ridicules the Buddhist position by saying that to deny the reality of a composite substance on the ground that atoms really exist is like denying the reality of a rabbit on the ground that a rabbit's horn really exists (vv. 183–84).

3 Analogy (*upamāna*)

Analogy is the fourth means of valid cognition posited by Kumārila after perception, inference and verbal testimony. Obviously it is not as important as these latter three and one has the impression that Kumārila defends its independent character simply because the tradition of his school so demanded. In any case, Kumārila's attention is drawn to the fact that what his school understands by analogy is something different from what is understood by it in common parlance as also something different from what is understood by it in the Nyāya school where too it is posited as an independent means of valid cognition. Thus in popular parlance a case of analogy arises when, for example, a townsman enquires from a forest-dweller as to what a *gavaya* is like and the latter replies that it is like a cow (v. 1). Kumārila however thinks that analogy as thus understood is but a case of verbal testimony (v. 2). Then keeping in mind the Nyāya view of analogy Kumārila says that according to some a case of analogy arises when a townsman who was earlier told by a

forest-dweller that a *gavaya* is like a cow goes to the forest, comes across a *gavaya* and finds it to be similar to a cow (v. 6). But on his showing analogy as thus understood is but a case of perception and a case of memory put together, *gavaya* being an object of perception and its similarity-with-a-cow learnt earlier being an object of memory (vv. 7-10). Kumārila particularly objects that with the present understanding of analogy it becomes difficult to see why the townsman should be told by the forest-dweller that a *gavaya* is like a cow, for even without being told so the former should be in a position to notice that a *gavaya* is like a cow (vv. 10-11). The Nyāya logician submits that unless the townsman was earlier told by the forest-dweller that a *gavaya* is like a cow the former even while noticing that a *gavaya* is like a cow should not be in a position to make out that such an entity is what the word '*gavaya*' stands for (v. 12). Kumārila retorts that it is immaterial whether the townsman makes out or does not that the entity being perceived by him is what the word '*gavaya*' stands for, for even in case he was earlier told by the forest-dweller that a *gavaya* is like a cow it was at that very time and not at the time of the actual perception of a *gavaya* that he learnt what the word '*gavaya*' stands for (the reason being that the denotative capacity of a word is something supersensuous and so not something that can be learnt earlier and recognized later on) (vv. 12-14). Kumārila admits that the object of analogical cognition has to be a thing characterized by similarity but he is dissatisfied with the way the Nyāya logician conceives this object (v. 15). However, before formulating an alternative concept of it Kumārila thinks it necessary to offer a definition of 'similarity' and defend it against possible objections (vv. 18-35). This part of his argumentation is particularly noteworthy because of the light it throws on the way his mind works on the question of a 'universal'. On Kumārila's showing two objects are similar when they are a seat of two different 'universals' and yet have some number of component parts in common (v. 18). The implication is that two objects are not just similar but identical when they have not just some but all of component parts in common—this being the simple meaning of these objects being a seat of the same 'universal'. To put it symbolically X and Y are identical, i. e. are a seat of the same 'universal' when a, b, c, d happen to be the total set of component parts possessed by X as well as Y; X and W are similar when some (at least one) from among X's component parts a, b, c, d also happen to be the component parts of W. So for Kumārila two seats of the same 'universal' are not just similar but identical; e. g. two cows are not just similar but identical. That is why when he says that two objects have a component part in common what he means is that this component part as existing in one of them and the same as existing in the other are a seat of one and the same universal; e. g. two cows have a horn in common because a horn of one cow and that of the other are a seat of the same 'universal' horn-ness, so also do a cow and a *gavaya* have a horn in common because a horn of a cow and that of a *gavaya*

are a seat of the same 'universal' hornness. So when Kumārila defines similarity as two objects having some number of their component parts in common what he means is that one of those component parts as existing in one of those objects and the same, as existing in the other are a seat of one and the same 'universal', this explains why Kumārila always refuses to identify a 'universal' with similarity—on the plea that far from being identical with a 'universal' similarity itself presupposes a set of 'universals'. These are the central ideas present in Kumārila's mind while considering the nature of similarity in the present part of his text. Two more points are noteworthy. Thus we are told that sometimes two objects are said to be similar not because they have some number of component parts in common but because a component part of one and a component part of the other have some number of component parts in common; e. g. this is the sense in which an eye is said to be similar to a lotus-petal (v. 19). Again, Kumārila consider the objection that two twins too are said to be similar even if they are not a seat of two different 'universal'—both being a man; he answers by simply exclaiming 'Well this is what we observe. So what do you say?' (v. 22). Logically Kumārila should here recall his general position that even when two objects are a seat of one and the same 'universal' they are also a seat of their respective particular features—so that they are not only mutually identical but also mutually different and that two things which are mutually identical as well as mutually different can well be said to be mutually similar; but he does not say all this because of the fear that all this will amount to identifying a 'universal' with similarity, a contingency Kumārila dreads like anything. Be that as it may, Kumārila next proceeds to consider the question as to what has to be the specific object of analogical cognition. He begins by observing that similarity resides in its entirety in each of the two parties concerned just as a 'universal' resides in its entirety in each and every one of the concerned particular objects (v. 35). So on Kumārila's showing when one perceives a *gavaya* in the forest one also perceives 'similarity—obtaining-between-a-cow-and-a-gavaya' as characterising this *gavaya*; and if at the same time one also recalls that one's cow at home is characterized by this very 'similarity' then this cow as characterized by this 'similarity' or this 'similarity' as characterizing this cow will be what constitutes an object of analogical cognition (vv. 35-37). Kumārila goes on to add that in this case 'similarity' is an object of perception, cow an object of memory but cow as characterized by 'similarity' is an object of a new means of valid cognition called 'analogy'—just as in that famous case the mountain is an object of perception, fire an object of memory but the mountain as characterized by fire is an object of a new means of valid cognition called 'inference' (vv. 38-39). In this connection Kumārila thinks it necessary to argue that the case under consideration is not a case of inferential cognition (vv. 43-51). In a nutshell his argument is that no inference can have for its thesis 'that cow is characterized by this "similarity"', for no probans will be ever available for that; this 'similarity' as belonging to that cow cannot act as such a probans because that yet remains to be cognized (v. 43), this 'similarity' as belonging to

this *gavaya* cannot do so because that does not characterize that cow (v. 44). Kumārila also considers the fantastic possibility that such a probans might be this *gavaya* (v. 45) or the possession of horns etc. on the part of this *gavaya* (vv. 47–50), but a really serious consideration he dismisses rather lightly. For the fact of the matter is that X's similarity with Y logically implies Y's similarity with X, so that if the former is perceived the latter is inferred; Kumārila denies this on the ground that this should be possible only in those limited number of cause where X and Y happen to have been once perceived jointly (vv. 45–46), but his denial is invalid inasmuch as the implication in question holds good for all values of X and Y. As we shall soon see, Kumārila correctly realized that the cases of implication constitute an important class of logical phenomena (this being the meaning of his positing 'implication' as an independent means of valid cognition), but his endeavour to show that those cases have nothing to do with inference always results in one folly or another.

4. Implication (Arthāpatti)

Implication is the fifth means of valid cognition posited by Kumārila—following the tradition of his school. As a matter of fact, the cases of implication are certain more or less interesting cases of inference but Kumārila has somehow persuaded himself that they are not so and the reasoning adopted by him in this connection throws significant light on how he understands the specific nature of an inferential situation; it is this that makes his treatment of implication worthy of close attention. On Kumārila's showing a case of implication arises when a phenomenon X cognized through one of the six means of valid cognition remains unaccounted for unless another phenomenon Y not cognized otherwise is posited (v. 1); here the cognition of the phenomenon Y thus taking place is said to be a cognition brought about through a new means of valid cognition called implication. To judge from the examples cited by Kumārila implication is mostly employed to posit a capacity (meaning a causal capacity) in a thing acting as a cause. Thus :

(i) on having perceived that fire burns one posits in fire the capacity to burn (v. 3),

(ii) on having inferred that the sun moves one posits in the sun the capacity to move (v. 3),

(iii) on having cognized through analogy that a cow is similar to a *gavaya* one posits in this cow the capacity to be cognized thus (v. 4),

(iv) on having observed the denoting function of a word one posits in this word a denotative capacity and having thus posited this capacity in this word one posits eternality in this word (v. 5).

So here the phenomenon X is cognized in the case (i) through perception, in the case (ii) through inference, in the case (iii) through analogy, in the case (iv) through implication and barring the case (iv) the phenomenon Y is always a capacity (while in the case (iv) too the phenomenon X is a capacity). Kumārila himself elsewhere concludes his treatment of implication by talking as if its sole function is to posit a capacity in a thing acting as a cause; but he also there says that its another function is to act as it does in what is his case (v) (v.47). In his case (v) the phenomenon X is cognized through the means of valid cognition called absence and its treatment is inordinately long (covering 39 verses—viz. vv. 8-46—of the total 88). Kumārila is here silent about his case (vi) which he treats almost as a class by itself and which he describes after the concluding remark in question has been made; in this case the phenomenon X is cognized through verbal testimony and its treatment too is inordinately long (covering 38 verses—viz. vv.51-88—of the total 88). So, according to Kumārila a case of implication arises either

- (i) when a capacity is posited in a thing acting as a cause, or
- (ii) as in his case (v), or
- (iii) as in his case (vi) We consider the three alternatives one by one.

Kumārila thinks it necessary to argue why the case of positing a capacity in a thing acting as a cause is not a case of inference. Thus in his view inference necessarily requires the establishment of *vyāpti* between the probans and the probandum and this in its turn requires that both the probans and the probandum be of the form of something open to observation; but since the capacity posited by him is *ex hypothesi* something supersensuous it cannot act as a probandum in any inference—not even in one where the effect concerned acts as a probans (vv.48-49). We have earlier found Kumārila describing a valid probans as one whose presence necessitates the presence of the probandum concerned and this description should apply to the case where an effect is a probans and the capacity residing in the cause concerned the probandum. But now he seems to be making a new point that a supersensuous thing can never act as a probandum in any inference—so that the logical necessity compelling one to posit the existence of a supersensuous thing must be a case not of inference but of implication. A somewhat similar trend of thought emerges in connection with Kumārila's case (v) to which we turn next.

On Kumārila's showing, the observation that a living person (named Caitra) is absent inside his house logically necessitates the assumption that he is present at a place outside his house (v. 8). In this connection he undertakes a very long and laborious argument to show that here the knowledge that Caitra is present at a place outside his house cannot be acquired through any inference whatsoever. Kumārila's point is that, all inference requires a locus, a probandum and a probans but that in

the case under consideration it is impossible to find out these three things; various possibilities are considered and all found wanting (vv. 11-13). Thus the locus and the probandum could be Caitra and a place-outside-house respectively or a place-outside-house and Caitra respectively; the probans could be either Caitra's absence-inside-house or the house's absence-of-Caitra. But a place-outside-house cannot be the locus because the probans in neither form can be a feature of it; and the house's absence-of-Caitra cannot be a feature of Caitra even. So the only remaining possibility is that the locus is Caitra, the probandum a place-outside-house (rather presence at a place-outside-house), the probans Caitra's absence-inside-house; and it is interesting to watch how Kumārila rejects this possibility. First of all we are told that in this case the probans cannot be a feature of the locus inasmuch as Caitra's absence-inside-house cannot be observed to be a feature of Caitra (vv. 12-13); the idea seems to be the fantastic idea that if Caitra's absence-inside-house is to be observed as a feature of Caitra then both Caitra's absence-inside-house and Caitra should be observed together. Before coming to this point once more, another difficulty is urged—viz. that in this case the locus is not a thing observed earlier (v. 16); the idea seems to be the irrelevant idea that Caitra is not being observed for the time being. Then it is argued that Caitra's absence-inside-house cannot act as a probans for Caitra's presence at a place-outside-house, because a living person's absence at a place cannot be ascertained unless his presence at a place-outside-this place is already presumed—so that since in the case under consideration Caitra's presence at a place-outside-house is already presumed there remains nothing to be inferred (vv. 19, 25, 27-28); the argument is simply astounding inasmuch as there is nothing difficult about ascertaining a living person's absence at a place without already presuming his presence at a place-outside-house. Lastly, it is argued that in the case under consideration it is impossible to establish *vyāpti* between the probans and the probandum (vv. 34-55). For some reasons Kumārila does not consider the more relevant case of *vyāpti* between absence-at-one-place and presence-at-another-place but the less relevant case of that between presence-at-one-place and absence-at-another-place, but that is not the real difficulty. The real difficulty is about his whole way of looking at the problem, for what he says in this connection amounts to demanding that if one were to establish the *vyāpti* in question one must be in a position to observe simultaneously each and every place that is there in the world, an obviously impossible demand. Be that as it may, this is how Kumārila argues that on the basis of observing a living person's absence-inside-his-house to posit his presence-outside-house is not a case of inference but that of implication. It cannot be denied that Kumārila is here drawing our attention to an interesting class of cases where an absolutely valid *vyāpti* is obtained without much effort, but the fact that this *vyāpti* is absolutely valid and that it is obtained without much effort misleads him into thinking that what is thus obtained is not a *vyāpti* but something else. As a matter of fact, in these cases a

vyāpti is obtained not on the basis of a more or less wide-ranging observation but on the basis of a more or less elementary law of logic. For example, in the cases under consideration the law concerned is that if X is either a or b or c and if X is neither a nor b then X must be c; (to give the given variables the values needed,

X – Caitra, a – being dead,
 b – being present inside house,
 c – being present outside house).

Kumārila has a clear enough realization of this when he repeatedly says that in the case of a living person his presence barred from the house must obtain at a place outside the house (vv. 22, 24, 46); he has only to realize that this too is a case of obtaining a *vyāpti* between absence-inside-house and presence-outside-house.

Lastly, we come to Kumārila's case (vi) where a phenomenon X cognized through verbal testimony remains unaccounted for unless another phenomenon Y is posited. Thus when an authoritative person says to someone 'the fat Devadatta does not eat during daytime' the information conveyed remains unaccounted for unless it too is presumed that Devadatta eats during nighttime. In this connection Kumārila's enquiry is as to what precisely is posited here by way of implication and how. To get at an answer to this query he discusses another question viz. what is it that here makes possible the cognition of the fact that Devadatta eats during nighttime. The alternative that the sentence uttered does so is dismissed on the ground that this sentence conveys just so much information as is yielded by its own words (vv. 55-58, 78). So there remains the only alternative that the cognition in question is made possible by another sentence. (the alternative that this cognition is made possible by the meaning of the sentence actually uttered is later on—i. e. in v. 78—dismissed on the doubtful ground that being of the form of a determinate cognition the cognition in question must be brought about through a sentence). And then arises the question as to how this other sentence is cognized. That it is not cognized through perception is obvious (v. 60) but that it is not cognized through an inference is argued at length (vv. 60-73); it too is added that it is not cognized through analogy (v. 74). Thus there remains the only alternative that this sentence is posited on the basis of implication—it being found that the sentence actually uttered fails to convey its own meaning unless this new sentence is posited (v. 76). By way of elucidation Kumārila seeks to remove an objector's misgiving that being in no way connected with the sentence actually uttered this new sentence should not be in a position to play the role attributed to it (vv. 79-86). The elucidation is found necessary because Kumārila feels that in an inference the probans is connected with the probandum by way of *vyāpti* but that in implication the phenomenon posited has no connection with that on the basis of

which it is posited; his feeling is mistaken inasmuch as the phenomena appearing in a case of implication are as much connected by way of *vyāpti* as are the probans and the probandum appearing in an inference. In any case, it can be seen that in connection with his case (vi) Kumārila is considering an altogether different sort of question. For had he adopted here the procedure of the earlier cases his question would have been as to how the knowledge that the fat Devadatta does not eat during daytime necessitates the knowledge that Devadatta eats during night-time? To this question the answer would have been essentially the same as that to the question posed in connection the case (v). For here too there come in picture three possibilities of which two are barred so that the third holds the field; there Devadatta could be lean and thin or he could eat during daytime or he could eat during nighttime, but since the first two alternatives are denied the third must be affirmed.

5. Absence (Abhāva)

Absence is the sixth and the last means of valid cognition posited by Kumārila—allegedly following the tradition of his school. On Kumārila's showing an 'absence' is as much of a real entity as a positive thing; e. g. in case no jar exists on a floor the 'absence of jar' existing on this floor is as much real as the floor and the jar themselves. And it is his understanding that an 'absence' cannot be cognized by five means of valid cognition perception, inference etc.; positively his understanding is that 'absence' is that means of valid cognition which is exclusively competent to cognize an 'absence'. With a view to demonstrating all this Kumārila divides his discussion into three parts viz.

- (i) the part arguing that an 'absence' is a real entity (vv. 1-10),
- (ii) the part arguing that perception is incompetent to cognize an 'absence' (vv. 11-29),
- (iii) the part arguing that inference is incompetent to cognize an 'absence' (vv. 29-55). We consider them one by one.

Kumārila divides 'absence' into four classes (as a matter of fact, one of his arguments is that 'absence' cannot be unreal because it is divided into classes (v. 8). Thus the absence of an effect in its cause (e.g. that of curd in milk) is called prior absence, the absence of a cause in its effect (e. g. that of milk in curd) 'posterior absence', the absence of one thing's identity with another (e.g. that of a cow's identity with a horse) 'mutual absence' utter absence of one thing in another (e.g. that of horns on a rabbit's head) 'absolute absence' (vv.2-4). Kumārila's feeling is that unless there so many types of 'absence' are something real curd should be found in milk, milk should be found in curd, a cow should be found identical with a horse, horns

should be found on a rabbit's head (v.5); he thus refuses to concede that when a particular thing is found to exist at a place then to say that 'absence' of this or that other thing exists at this place is a mere manner of speaking. In any case, this whole position of Kumārila will have to be kept in mind if we are to follow the further course of his argumentation.

Kumārila at once proceeds to argue that an 'absence' is cognized not through perception, inference etc. but through the means of valid cognition called 'absence' which is of the form of 'non-production of perception, inference etc.', (v.11). This rather enigmatic position he seeks to vindicate by first arguing that an 'absence' is not cognized through perception because perception requires a sense organ's contact with the object while there can take place no contact between a sense organ and an 'absence' just as there takes place a contact between a sense organ and a positive thing (vv. 18.26). Kumārila must have been encouraged to argue this way because sense object contact does always produce the perception of a positive thing while all cognition of an 'absence' is the result of a subsequent process of cogitation. Kumārila even describes this process of cogitation by saying 'after a positive thing has been grasped and an absent thing recalled there takes place the mental cognition of an 'absence'—this without needing a sense organ' (v. 27). But this itself should suffice to warn Kumārila that the means of valid cognition through which an 'absence' is cognized is not merely of the form of 'non-production of perception, inference etc.', for the process of cogitation just described is a positive cognitive process. A still more serious objection against Kumārila's position will be that his description of this process is incomplete and that when completed it should become the description of an inferential process. Thus a mere perception of X and a memory of A would not yield the cognition that X possesses 'absence of A' for this cognition would arise only when the cognizer concerned says to himself, 'I perceive X but I do not perceive A, and so X possesses 'absence of A' a statement which relates an inferential process. Somehow aware of just this difficulty Kumārila next argues that an 'absence' is cognized not also through an inference (Kumārila would not deny that an 'absence' existing in an absent locus might well be cognized through inference, but the question just now under consideration is whether an 'absence' residing in a present locus can be cognized through inference.)

Kumārila begins by noticing that in an inference seeking to prove the thesis "X possesses 'absence of A,'" the locus will be X and the probandum 'absence of A' and he develops his argument by way of showing that nothing can be found to act as a probans here. That A cannot be such a probans is obvious (vv.29-30) but nor can it be X because no *vyāpti* obtains between X and 'absence of A'; certainly X is sometimes accompanied by 'absence of A', sometimes not (vv.31-35). (Kumārila also objects that X

cannot be a valid probans because it is already the locus (v.31), but that objection is invalid). As a matter of fact, for Kumārila nothing can act as a probans here because whatever it be it must have *vyāpti* with the probandum which in this case is an absence while on the opponent's view an absence can be cognized only through inference so that the cognition of this probandum even at the time of grasping the *vyāpti* concerned will require another prior *vyāpti* and this phenomenon of requiring a prior *vyāpti* should go on ad infinitum (vv.39-37). However, Kumārila does not leave the matter at that, for as we noted above the real probans for inferring 'absence of A' is absence of 'perception of A'; so he next endeavours to show that 'absence of perception etc.' too will not be a valid probans in the inference under consideration (v. 38). Of course, even now Kumārila's most weighty objection is that no *vyāpti* can obtain between 'absence of perception etc.' and 'absence of A' because now not only the probandum but even the probans is the form of an 'absence' (vv.40-42). But towards the end Kumārila now raises certain other objections as well. Thus he says that in the inference under consideration whether the locus be X or 'absence of A' it cannot have for its feature the alleged probans (v. 50). Kumārila's point is that 'absence of perception etc' is something existing in the cognizer while X and 'absence of A' are both something existing there in space and so the former cannot be a feature of either of the latter two; but as a matter of fact, 'absence of perception' is a valid probans for absence of the thing sought to be perceived. Lastly, Kumārila argues that 'absence of perception etc.' cannot have *vyāpti* with the probandum 'absence of A' because no relation of the form of contact, samavāya etc. obtains between the two (v.53); the point is valid but not much important. More significantly, Kumārila concedes that 'absence of perception etc.' can have with 'absence of A' the relation called cognizer-and-the-cognized but he adds that this relation can be noticed only after 'absence of perception etc' have already cognized 'absence of A' so that it will then be futile to use 'absence of perception etc' as probans for 'absence of A' (v 52). All this brings to light a dilemma of Kumārila. For on the one hand he must talk as if 'absence of perception etc.' is a positive cognitive process (otherwise he might be asked as to why one sitting idle does not cognize an absence) but on the other hand he must talk as if 'absence of perception etc.' is a bare absence (otherwise he loses the right to argue that an absence, in order to be cognized, requires a means of valid cognition of the form of an 'absence' just as a positive thing, in order to be cognized, requires a means of valid cognition of the form of a positive entity (vv.17,45-49, 54-55). And the solution of his dilemma lies in recognizing that 'absence of perception etc' acts as a probans for inferring an 'absence'.

CHAPTER IV

REFUTATION OF IDEALISM

In the field of ontological speculation Kumārila made one big contribution in the form of his refutation of Buddhist idealism which occupies two bulky sections of his text viz Section III entitled *Nirālambanavāda* with its 201 verses and Section IV entitled *Śūnyavāda* with its 264 verses. In those times idealism in its Mahāyāna-Buddhist version was a vigorously defended doctrine; (the idealist trends current in the Brahmanical camp-e.g. the doctrines called *Śabdādvaitavāda*, *Brahmādvaitavāda* etc. were relatively much weak). So whoever then stood to uphold realism thought it incumbent on himself to come out with a criticism of this idealism. Now for various historical reasons Kumārila's school was uncompromising in its advocacy of realism and hence it was that Kumārila devoted so much attention to Buddhist idealism. As Kumārila himself tells us after introducing the topic in section III vv.1-13, this idealism was sought to be defended in two ways, viz (a) by way of examining what constitutes an object of valid cognition and (b) by way of examining what constitutes valid cognition (v. 17). And his intention is to concentrate on the second type of defence which again is undertaken in two ways viz. (a) by way of offering an inference and (b) by way of investigating the nature of man's perceptual faculty (vv. 18-19). Kumārila also tells us that the idealist Buddhists are of two types, viz. (a) those called Yogācāra who posit the existence of cognition while denying the reality of an independent object of cognition and (b) those called Mādhyamika who deny the reality of cognition even (v. 14). And since he examines the basic idealist inference in the Section called *Nirālambanavāda* and the idealist critique of perception in the Section called *Śūnyavāda* (a name for the Mādhyamika view) he somehow seems to associate the critique of perception in question with the second type of idealist Buddhists - as is also evident from his initiating contention of Section IV that when the inference presupposing the reality of cognition is thus refuted the other type of idealist Buddhist comes out with the view that cognition itself is impossible, a view vindicated by him by way of investigating perceptual cognition on whose evidence the inference in question was refuted (vv. 1-2). As a matter of fact, however, what Kumārila animadverts in Section IV that too is a well-known Yogācāra position and one that posits the reality of cognition. Be that as it may, Kumārila's refutation of idealism can be conveniently studied by dividing it into three parts viz.

(i) Introductory (Section III, vv. 1-13)

(ii) Refutation of the basic idealist inference (Section III, vv. 19-201)

(iii) Refutation of the idealist critique of perception (Section IV, vv. 1-264)
We consider these parts one by one.

(i) Introductory (Section III, vv. 1-13)

Kumārila begins by emphasising that 'on accepting the idealist position all practical dealing taking place in everyday life becomes an impossibility (vv. 1-4). For the things in connection with which this dealing takes place viz. the things existing independently over there in space, are considered by the idealist to be illusory manifestation of some underlying reality supposed to be revealed to certain extra-ordinary personnages through some suprasensuous mode of cognition. However, for the fear of sounding too much illogical the idealist resorts to a subterfuge which Kumārila thinks it necessary to expose first of all. For, the idealist calls the things in question not unreal (*mithyā*) but practically real (*saṃvṛtisatya*—a term whose etymology is obscure but seems to suggest that it means something like 'everyday truth') (v. 5). Kumārila retorts that what is not real is simply unreal and that to call it not by its proper name but by the misleading name 'practically real' is nothing short of pedantic like calling saliva (*lālā*) not by its proper name but by the high-sounding name 'mouth-born [beverage (*vaktrāsava*)' (vv. 6-81). To make his position sound further plausible the idealist adds that practical enjoyment of benefits is possible in dream-experience just as much as in waking experience—the idea being that all practical dealing ought to be possible even in the absence of the things concerned just as it is possible in the state of dream (v. 11). Kumārila retorts that what a sensible person strives after is not a dreamlike enjoyment of practical benefits but a real enjoyment of them (vv. 12-13). This should give us an inkling into the type of issues that are going to be raised in the course of Kumārila's forthcoming refutation of Buddhist idealism.

(ii) Refutation of the Basic Idealist Inference (Section III, vv. 19-201)

As is natural to expect, Kumārila finds fault with the idealist inference in the light of his own theory of inference, a theory which we have found to be deficient in several respects. But whether deficient or not, this theory has to be constantly kept in mind if we are to appreciate the points made by Kumārila in the course of his present refutation. The following is how the inference in question runs : "The cognition of pillar etc. is false, because it is cognition, just like dream-cognition" (v. 23); so here the locus of inference is 'cognition of pillar etc.', the probandum 'being false,' the probans 'being cognition', a corroborative instance of the homologue type 'dream-cognition'. Of this inference Kumārila's refutation proper continues upto v. 128; (after that two rather general though related questions are taken up). Here he begins by reporting how in connection with this inference certain points of elucidation and criticism were offered by Śabara, the author of the earliest available commentary on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* and how on some of these points he was differently understood by his own different commentators (vv. 24-34). The following are the most important of these points :

(i) In this inference the phrase 'cognition of pillar etc.' (describing the locus) means 'waking cognition', there being no dispute about dream-cognition being false (in fact, this being the reason why dream-cognition here acts as a corroborative instance of the homologue type) (vv. 24-25).

(ii) Here the word 'false' (describing probandum) means 'that which lacks an object'. To be more precise, it means 'that which lacks an object external to itself', for the idealist Buddhist himself concedes that a cognition necessarily cognizes itself, that is, is its own object (v. 25).

(iii) Śābara has refuted this inference by saying that waking cognition cannot be false because it is of the form of a well-ascertained cognition, there being no reasonable ground for doubting the truth of a well-ascertained cognition (vv. 28-34).

After this preliminary reporting Kumārila launches his own polemic against the inference in question. He examines one by one the thesis as a whole, the locus, the probandum, the probans, the corroborative instance that make their appearance here.

Against the idealist's thesis as a whole Kumārila's objection is that its cognition requires the prior cognition of a character (viz. 'being false') and that of a thing characterised (viz. 'waking cognition'); but if all cognition is without an object then the latter two cognitions should be impossible with the result that the cognition of the thesis itself should be impossible (v. 35). And granting that the cognition of the thesis as a whole is somehow possible the very rise of this cognition, Kumārila adds, will stand opposed to what the thesis itself says; for this thesis says that all cognition is without an object while the cognition in question has this thesis for its object (v. 36). Kumārila also rejects the plea that since the feature 'lack-of-an-object (=falsity)' is not anything real it is improper to enquire as to how it stands related to the locus in question, his ground being that nothing whatsoever can be said about an unreal thing while the idealist is saying so much about the feature in question (vv. 38-40).

Kumārila next examines what acts as locus in the idealist inference—viz. '(waking) cognition (Skt. *pratyaya*)'. He considers four alternative meanings of the word 'cognition'—viz. the object of cognition, the instrument of cognition, the agent which cognizes, the act of cognition, (a Sanskrit word for cognition—e. g. the word *pratyaya*—can easily have all these meanings). Kumārila is ready to accept the first meaning inasmuch as he too will say that an object of cognition is without an object, but he feels that the acceptance of the remaining meanings will involve the idealist in self-contradiction inasmuch as none of these things meant can occur without an object (vv. 41-

42). For example, a word can be said to be an agent or an instrument in relation to the act of cognizing its meaning, but if the words 'cognition' and 'false' are without an object—that is to say, without a meaning—there can be no thesis in the form 'all cognition is false,' (v. 43-44). The idealist might say that he will assign to the word 'cognition' whatever meaning is sanctioned by popular usage; but Kumārila reminds him that in popular usage a cognition is necessarily a cognition of an object (v. 45). Kumārila goes on to add that if the word 'cognition' means something that lacks an object the Mīmāṃsaka debater will disallow its employment, if it means something that has an object the idealist debater will do so (v. 46); a similar dilemma will arise in case one party regards cognition as a quality of soul while the other party regards it as an independent entity (v. 47). Kumārila concedes that there might be cases when a word expressing the locus of an inference is such that its very meaning is under dispute, but his point is that such a plea is not open to the idealist who would have us believe that a word is without an object, that is, without a meaning (v. 48).

Then Kumārila undertakes a very long examination of what acts as probandum in the idealist inference—viz. 'lack-of-object (=falsity, Skt. *nirālambanatā*)'. Kumārila begins by arguing that if 'lack-of-object' means 'lack of all object' whatsoever then a cognition will not have 'lack of object' even according to the idealist himself, for the latter is of the view that a cognition necessarily has itself for its object (v. 49); and if 'lack-of-object' means 'lack of some object or other' then all cognition will have 'lack of object' even according to Kumārila, for he too says that 'cognition of X' does not have a not-X for its object (v. 50). The idealist might submit that a cognition lacks an object in the sense that the thing whose form this cognition assumes is not grasped; Kumārila understands him to mean that the form which a cognition assumes is not grasped and then objects that the idealist who believes that a cognition really assumes this form or that and really grasps itself has no right to say that this form is not grasped (v. 51). And even granting that the idealist means to say that the external thing whose form a cognition assumes is not grasped, Kumārila is ready to endorse him in the sense that an external object is not grasped under the conscious recognition that it is an external object (v. 52); but beyond this Kumārila would not go. For if the idealist mean to say that an external thing is not grasped even under the conscious recognition that it is this thing or that, then Kumārila will repudiate him on the ground that in 'cognition of X' X is always recognized as this thing or that (v. 53). The idealist points out that in the illusory cognition of two moons two moons are not grasped as two moons; Kumārila retorts that even in an illusory cognition certain real things are grasped as real things but that it is called object-less in the sense that these things are not what a sense-organ has come in contact with (vv. 53-54). And he goes on to add that it is rather the idealist who posits no real external objects who should find it impossible to determine the sense

in which an illusory cognition is an objectless cognition; his point is that according to the idealist all cognition must have some object or other of the sort the latter's ontology allows for (v. 56). Then Kumārila raises a formal, and rather trivial, point. For thus elucidated the idealist thesis becomes 'all waking cognition is without an external object', and Kumārila thinks that one who does not believe in the reality of external objects has no right to utter a sentence in which there occurs the phrase 'external object' (vv. 57-59). Viewing the matter from another angle, Kumārila even concedes that cognition does lack an object external to itself, for now he interprets the phrase 'external to itself' as 'utterly dissimilar from itself' and his point is that in so many respects—e. g. respect of being a cognizable entity—a cognition is actually similar to its object (v. 61). And here Kumārila reminds the idealist that even according to the latter a cognition is not utterly dissimilar from its object inasmuch as both are something 'practically real' (*samvṛtīsatya*), his point being that according to the idealist other qua something 'ultimately real' (*paramārthasatya*) is a cognition devoid of all object (v. 61). Then Kumārila says that in another sense too does a cognition lack an object—viz. in the sense that cognition is not of the same form as its object (it being something inherently formless); however, he repudiates as self-contradictory the idealist contention that a cognition lacks an object in the sense that what cognizes and what is cognized are one and the same thing (v. 62). Arguing in the same vein Kumārila says that the cognition that all cognition lacks an object is a reality inasmuch as such a cognition is produced on listening to a sentence to that effect, his only point being that such a cognition is false (v. 64). Then repeating an old point in a new context Kumārila argues that the idealist inference should produce cognition to the effect that all cognition lacks an object but that if this inferential cognition is itself objectless then it should be false to say that all cognition lacks an object, his point being that to say that this inferential cognition is objectless is to say that this cognition teaches a falsity (vv. 65-66). Then proceeding towards a new turning point Kumārila concedes that if by cognition is meant the word 'cognition' then too it is correct to say that a cognition cognizes no object, for certainly the word 'cognition' does not cognize an object (v. 67). But he soon adds that if one thereby means that a word is not even an instrument of cognition one would be faced with grave difficulties, for then it should become impossible for one to state any inference whatsoever (v. 68). And it is Kumārila's belief that the idealist really has no right to employ words with a view to conveying a meaning, for at the time of learning the meaning of a word one must have distinct cognition of this word, its meaning, and the relationship between the two—which is an impossibility on accepting the thesis that all cognition is without an object (v. 69). The idealist might say that while arguing his case he will assume for the time being that words are capable of conveying a meaning; Kumārila retorts that this assumption will stand opposed to what the idealist seeks to prove viz. that

words are incapable of conveying a meaning (v. 71). The idealist might say that all cognition other than that produced by his inference is false; Kumārila retorts that in that case too the cognition of 'otherness' in question should be false (it being not produced by the idealist's inference) and then it should be impossible to decide as to what cognition is false and what not false (vv. 76-78). These last arguments of Kumārila might seem frivolous but let us keep in mind that after completing his refutation of the idealist inference Kumārila is going to consider at length as to why the idealist has no right at all to enter into a debate with a rival. So for the present we only note that in the course of vv. 70-87 Kumārila has said about so many positions that even if the idealist does maintain them he has logically no right to maintain them on account of his basic contention that all cognition is false. But one point of material importance has emerged in the meanwhile. For Kumārila has once proposed a counter-inference somewhat as follows : "An ordinary waking cognition is true, because it is not followed by a contradicting cognition, just like the cognition that contradicts a dream-cognition" (vv. 79-80) Kumārila feels that even the idealist cannot contest the validity of his corroborative instance, for to do so will mean that in the case of the latter's own inference there obtains no valid corroborative instance; after all, dream-cognition is false precisely because the waking cognition that contradicts it is true and Kumārila's point is that other waking cognitions are true just like this particular waking cognition (vv. 80-81). So after finishing that point about the impossibility of word-employment on the part of the idealist Kumārila reverts back to the question as to why an ordinary waking cognition, even if it is not followed by a contradicting cognition, should be declared to be false (vv. 87-90). As we have just noted, Kumārila knows that the idealist cannot argue that waking cognition is false because it is contradicted by dream-cognition (for that will imply that dream-cognition is true); but he is ready to consider the idealist argument that ordinary waking cognition is false because it is contradicted by a yogin's extra-ordinary cognition. (vv. 90-92). On consideration, however, Kumārila finds this latter argument too to be inconclusive, and his simple point is that there is no knowing what a yogin sees or does not see, there being so many conflicting parties all claiming the support of this yogin or that (vv. 94-95). Nay, Kumārila goes on to add that the yogin who says that no external objects exist is saying something for which no corroboration comes from a non-yogin's perception while the yogin who says that external objects exist is saying something for which such corroboration is readily available (vv. 95-96). Kumārila also shows that even the analogy of the illusory perceptions of waking life does not prove that the ordinary perceptions of waking life too are false, for the former type of perceptions are called false precisely because they are contradicted by the latter type of perceptions—which means that these latter type of perceptions are true; moreover, in that case it will have to be granted that the yogin's perceptions are as well false because they too are perceptions of the waking life (vv. 96-98). Lastly, Kumārila submits that the yogin whose perception

allegely contradicts the ordinary waking cognitions is supposed to be necessarily possessed of certain extraordinary capacities but that no such capacities are available in the case of the corroborative instance of dream-cognition whose contradiction is brought about by a plain man's waking cognition (vv. 99-100). By now Kumārila has said almost everything that he had to by way of refuting the idealist inference. Here now remain only two relatively minor points—one related to the probans, the other related to the corroborative instance.

Let us recall that in the idealist inference the probans is 'being cognition' but since the locus here is 'cognition' Kumārila feels that the case is anomalous inasmuch as what has yet to be proved is acting as probans. As we have learnt from his treatment of inference Kumārila's solution for such an anomaly is that the probans is a universal and the locus a particular object where this universal is present. In the present case, however, Kumārila disallows this solution because he and the idealist Buddhist hold two different conceptions of what a 'universal' is (vv. 102-4). So his verdict is that the Buddhist must say that the probans is as much a particular object as the locus is from which follow all those difficulties to avoid which Kumārila had devised the solution noted just above (vv. 105-6). All this is sheer confusion of thought. For the only thing that the idealist is expected to do is to show that his probans characterizes the locus and that it stands in the relation of *vyāpti* with the probandum. Now as it stands the idealist's locus is 'waking cognition' not 'cognition', but in either case it would in fact be characterized by his probans—viz. 'being cognition'. As for there obtaining *vyāpti* between the probans and the probandum there is no logical bar to it too—for the probans is the feature 'being cognition' and the probandum the feature 'being false' and a *vyāpti* does always hold between two features; (that the idealist's *vyāpti* is invalid is an empirical difficulty not a logical difficulty).

In connection with the corroborative instance Kumārila considers a point which has in some way been already raised. For the corroborative instance in question is 'dream-cognition' and Kumārila says that it is not a valid corroborative instance because it lacks the probandum—viz. 'lack-of-object (falsity)'. That is to say, Kumārila feels that even dream-cognition is not devoid of all object, a point he has already raised while discussing the probandum; (there is nothing surprising about it for after all here too Kumārila is saying that the corroborative instance lacks the probandum and this is a statement as much about the corroborative instance as about probandum). While discussing the question Kumārila considers a number of concrete instances of illusory perception and comes out with the contention that in the case of none the object is something whose constituent elements are not something already perceived earlier (vv. 107-14). As to why these instances are called an instance of illusory perception, that is because the object concerned is not here coming in contact with a sense-organ. By way of elucidation Kumārila says that there is nothing anom-

alous about an absent object producing a cognition concerning itself, for what an absent object does not do is to produce valid perception concerning itself (vv. 114-16). Certainly it is never Kumārila's contention that an 'illusory perception of X' is a case of 'valid perception of X' though it is his contention that it is a case of 'cognition of X'.

After thus completing what might be called his refutation proper of the idealist inference Kumārila examines a rather general though related question, viz. whether the idealist has a right to enter into a debate with another party; (towards the close of this examination a question of still more general nature is raised). On the face of it the question seems rather perverse, for nothing can prevent an author from writing a book propounding whatever views he finds worth that. As a matter of fact, however, Kumārila has a point. For all debate presupposes the possibility of distinguishing a true statement from a false one but if all statements we make in our daily life are equally false—as they are according to the idealist—there is no point in holding a debate whose very purpose is to decide whether particular statement is true or false. The idealist's usual defence is that while entering into a debate he for the time being believes in the possibility of distinguishing a true empirical statement from a false one, but this is a thoroughly anomalous procedure inasmuch as it is precisely at the time of entering into a debate that one must stick fast to one's basic philosophical convictions. In the present part of his text Kumārila is hitting at this fatal anomaly of the idealist's stand. He begins by observing that he alone has a right to enter into a debate who believes in the reality of the means of a debate but that the idealist does not believe in the reality of these means (vv. 128-29). The idealist argues that what he offers in a debate is what the rival himself is ready to grant and that it is immaterial whether the former grants it or not (vv. 129-30). Kumārila retorts that in a debate one should offer only what both the parties are ready to grant (v. 131). In this connection he can appreciate the conduct of a debator who offers what he grants but not the rival but not that of one who—like the idealist—offers what the rivals grants but not he himself (vv. 131-135). The idealist repeats his contention that the rival should grant a conclusion if it follows from the premises acceptable to the latter—even while they are not acceptable to the former himself (vv. 135-36). Kumārila retorts that the truth or falsity of a conclusion does not depend on whether or not the premises concerned are acceptable to this party or that but on whether or not these premises are true so that one seeking to establish a conclusion on the basis of certain premises must be in a position to demonstrate that these premises are true (vv. 139-48). Thus on his showing, what happens in a debate is that one party seeks to establish a conclusion on the basis of premises which it can prove to be true while the other party seeks to refute this conclusion by proving that these premises are not true (vv. 149-54). The idealist pleads that what he offers as premises are such as used to appear tenable to him formerly though they appear tenable to him no more

(v. 155). Kumārila retorts that what is untenable is untenable—so that what is untenable now must have been untenable even before (v. 156-57): to cite an analogy, vapour mistaken to be smoke cannot establish the existence of fire (v. 158). By way of citing a counter-analogy the idealist submits that lines arranged in a certain manner stand for a letter but that they are not really this letter; Kumārila retorts that it is nobody's contention that these lines are themselves this letter, they being a mere symbol for this letter and as such as much real as this letter itself so that the premises offered by the idealist are of the nature of vapour mistaken for smoke, not of the nature of certain lines standing for a letter (vv. 160-63). The idealist pleads that the means of debate employed by him are not unreal but only 'practically real' (*samvṛtisatya*) (v. 164). Kumārila retorts that to call what is not real 'practically real' rather than unreal is sheer jugglery of words (vv. 165-66). Elucidating his concept of 'practical reality' the idealist contends that an inference refers to a character and a thing characterized not because such distinct entities exist there objectively but simply because thought to that effect is generated owing to the operation of past impressions and words (vv. 167-68). Kumārila retorts that if nothing objective corresponds to what an inference offers then there should be no reason why one inference is valid, another otherwise (vv. 169-72). To this he adds that in that case whatever objections the rival urges against the idealist should be accepted by the latter who cannot plead that nothing objective corresponds to these objections; on the other hand, the rival can always say about a reasoning offered by the idealist that it is invalid because nothing objective corresponds to it (vv. 173-74). Lastly, the idealist argues that nothing objective corresponds to the rival's objections just as nothing objective corresponds to the former's own reasoning so that these objections are invalid (v. 173). Kumārila retorts that one does not require to raise an objection against the idealist if he himself concedes that nothing objective corresponds to his reasoning (v. 177). After this begins Kumārila's examination of the Buddhist concept of 'impression' (*vāsanā*) which raises purely ontological issues; so we consider it separately.

Kumārila begins by asking as to why one 'impression' should differ from another; it cannot be said that they differ because they are produced by different cognitions, for according to the idealist cognition as such is differenceless while it is rather the difference of one cognition from another that is explained as being due to the difference of 'impressions' that go to produce them (vv. 178-80). And then he adds that if all cognition is produced by an 'impression' then it is difficult to see why one cognition should be and another should not be of the nature of memory (vv. 180-81). Kumārila next raises an objection based on the consideration that the idealist is also a momentarist, that is, one who maintains that a cognition lasts for just one moment and then perishes for good 'without leaving a residue'—as the expression goes). Kum.

āṛila observes that one momentary cognition cannot leave an 'impression' on another momentary cognition (let us call the former cognition 'impression', the latter 'impressed'), for two momentary entities coming one after another cannot find time to operate on one another (vv. 181–84). Kumāṛila's point is that if X is to leave an 'impression' on Y then both X and Y must stay together for several moments (v. 185).

On his part, the idealist argues that if X exists in an identical form for several moments and then produces an 'impression' on Y it is difficult to see why this 'impression' was not produced at an earliest moment (vv. 185–86); so his suggestion is that an outgoing momentary cognition similar to the incoming one leaves an 'impression' on the latter (v. 186). Kumāṛila's immediate reaction is to repeat his contention that a momentary entity coming after another such entity cannot be acted upon by the former (vv. 187–188). And then he goes on to add that an incoming momentary cognition cannot be similar to the outgoing such one unless the former shares with the latter some feature or other but that such a sharing of features is impossible on the part of momentary entities passing away without leaving a residue (vv. 189–90); arguing concretely, if cognition-of-elephant comes immediately after cognition-of-cow then being not similar to the former the latter cannot leave an 'impression' on the former with the result that a subsequent cognition-of-cow should be impossible (vv. 190–92). Kumāṛila further points out that on the idealist position according to which there exist no external objects the rise of a dissimilar cognition should be an impossibility (v. 192). And, granting that the outgoing momentary cognition somehow leaves an 'impression'—or even multiplicity of 'impressions'—on the incoming such one, this impression—or these 'impressions'—should perish along with this latter cognition, so that no subsequent memory should be possible on the basis thereof (vv. 193–95); on the other hand, to maintain that an 'impression' lasts even after the cognition in which it was produced perishes will go counter to the basic tenet of momentarism (vv. 195–96). Kumāṛila also rejects the alternative that the series of cognitions and the series of 'impressions' run parallel to each other, for on accepting it it should be impossible to say that a cognition produces an 'impression' or vice versa (vv. 196–97). And since he can envisage no other alternative that might explain why on the idealist position one cognition should differ from another he declares that the idealist thesis on 'practical reality' (allegedly born of 'impressions' left by past cognitions) is but a brainwave (v. 198). By way of concluding Kumāṛila remarks that the concept of 'impression' makes sense only on the supposition that the cognizer is an abiding entity that repeatedly undertakes an act of cognition (vv. 199–200).

(iii) Refutation of the Idealist Critique of Perception (Section IV. 1–264)

The entire Section IV is devoted to a refutation of the idealist critique of perception. The occasion for it arises because following Śābara and his early commentators Kumāṛila has argued that ordinary waking cognition is a case of genuine perception and

as such must have something real for its object. His point was that the object of genuine perception is always an external object, that is, an object existing independently of cognition, so that to say that the object of genuine perception is something real is to say that an external object is something real. Now the idealist seeks to challenge this whole position by maintaining that even ordinary waking cognition has for its object not an external object—that is, an object existing independently of cognition—but an aspect of cognition itself, so that reality of waking cognition would not argue reality of an external object. Kumārila begins by stating this idealist position in vv. 2-63 and devotes the rest of the section to a refutation of this position. It will be conducive to convenience if before examining the relevant texts a general idea is formed of the precise issues that were raised in connection with this controversy.

The idealist based his stand chiefly on three considerations and as follows :

(1) It was maintained that a cognition has got a form in the sense that cognition of X is an X-formed cognition, cognition of Y a Y-formed cognition. As for what the 'form' of a cognition might be due to, two hypotheses suggested themselves, viz. that it is due to a corresponding external object and that it is due to a corresponding 'impression' already present in the mind concerned. The former hypothesis was rejected as 'heavier' in that an external object is too much alien to a mind while an 'impression' present in a mind is after all but a capacity of this mind itself. It was not realized that 'impression of X' never appears in a mind except in the wake of 'cognition of X' so that to say that 'cognition of X' is due to 'impression of X' is virtually to say that it is due to itself. Again, it has to be kept in mind that the doctrine of 'formed' cognition does not necessarily entail a denial of external objects, for as a matter of historical fact the Sautrāntika-Buddhists subscribed to this doctrine without subscribing to this denial.

(2) It was maintained that all cognition necessarily cognizes itself. It was never argued that this is possible only on the supposition that external objects do not exist but it was always supposed that the position will contribute towards proving that they do not. Here too it has to be kept in mind that the Saurtrāntika Buddhists subscribed to the position in question without denying the reality of external objects.

(3) It was thought inconceivable how cognition which is a subjective happening can stand related to an external object existing there in space. Various alternatives were considered and all found wanting. Particularly noteworthy was the consideration that even if a cognition necessarily requires the presence of an external object it can do so only in the case of genuine perception while in the case of illusory perce-

ption and inference the rise of cognition must be supposed to be due to an 'impression' already present in the mind, the suggestion being that even in the case of genuine perception the supposition of an external object can be dispensed with. It was not realized that so far as establishing the reality or otherwise of an external object is concerned the testimony of genuine perception is most crucial and something not to be dismissed so lightly as that.

Against these idealist considerations Kumārila urged various difficulties and as follows :

(1) He maintained that a cognition possesses no 'form'. Obviously, he could not deny that cognition of X is something different from cognition of Y—so that his present position only amounted to disallowing the usage that cognition of X is an X-formed cognition, cognition of Y a Y-formed cognition. Kumārila's attitude must have been determined by the consideration that the idealist's denial of an external object crucially hinged on his acceptance of the hypothesis of 'formed' cognition.

(2) Kumārila altogether denied that a cognition cognizes itself. On his showing, a cognition is cognized through another cognition resulting from an application of the means of valid cognition called 'implication.' Thus when one recalls an object as something cognized in the past (possibly just a few moments back) and ponders over the implications of this 'cognizedness' one comes to realize that one had a cognition of this object. Here too Kumārila's attitude must have been determined by the consideration that the idealist's denial of an external object crucially hinged on his hypothesis of a cognition being necessarily self-cognitive.

(3) The idealist's contention that it is inconceivable how cognition should stand related to an external object Kumārila countered by maintaining that it is inconceivable how the object of a cognition should be this cognition itself. And as against the idealist's reminder that only genuine perception and no other type of cognition can possibly require the presence of an external object Kumārila submitted that if genuine perception necessarily requires the presence of an external object then it is an immaterial consideration that the other types of cognition do not require it.

The details of this argumentation and counter-argumentation can be examined now; we take them one by one.

(a) The Idealist Case (vv. 2-63)

The idealist begins by observing that the object (*grāhya*) of a cognition is something having the form blue, yellow, large etc. and his query is as to what this something can be (vv. 5-7). His point is that if the form in question belongs to this cognition itself then there is no need to posit an external object, if it belongs to an external object then the reality of an external object is established (vv. 8-9). And his

verdict is that the form in question belongs to this cognition itself and not to an external object, the following being his ground : "Even if the form in question belongs to an external object (*bāhya artha*) since this object cannot act as an object-of-cognition (*grāhya*) unless a subject-of-cognition (*grāhaka*) is posited cognition (*jñāna*) in the form of subject (*grāhaka*) will have to be posited. But since in the cognition-situation there appears just one form not two, this cognition appearing as subject should be devoid of a form and that is something untenable (*niṣpramāṇaka*). If with a view to avoiding this contingency the external object itself is declared to be the subject-of-cognition as well, then it will just be a case of assigning the name 'external object' to an entity acting as both subject-of cognition and object-of-cognition, the entity to which we assign the name 'cognition'. So our net conclusion is that one and the same entity acts as subject-of-cognition as well as object-of-cognition while the supposition that the former is an internal something and the latter an external something is 'false' (vv. 10-14). Thus the idealist admits that the object of cognition is something blue, yellow, large etc. but he refuses to admit that this something is an external object; positively, his position is that this something is an aspect of cognition itself. Even so, he cannot avoid the question as to why if all that exists is of the form of cognition one cognition is cognition-of-blue, another cognition cognition-of-yellow; the following is how he answers this question : "Ultimately speaking, cognition is doubtless pure (*svaccha*). But in the beginningless course of transmigrations (*anādi saṃsāra*) various impressions (*citra vāsanā*) variously caused by a past cognition (*pūrva jñāna*) have acted as a disturbance (*upaplava*) and, in conformity to their own respective forms (*svānurūpya*), have converted it into something impure (*dūṣita*) apparently split (*pravibhaktam iva*) into a subject that cognizes blue etc. and an object that is cognized as blue etc. (*nilādigrāhayagrāhaka*). This is how cognition stands in no need of an external object. As for the phenomenon of mutual causation on the part of a cognition and an impression (*śakti*, lit. capacity), it is beginningless" (vv. 15-17). The idealist thinks that positing a multiplicity of external objects by way of accounting for the difference of one cognition from another is a 'heavier' hypothesis than positing a multiplicity of 'impressions' for the same purpose, his argument being that an 'impression', since it is but a capacity of the cognition concerned, is not something different from cognition while an external object is *ex hypothesis* something different from cognition (v. 18). And finally clinching what might be called his 'argument from form-of-cognition' he remarks : "A form of cognition will have to be posited even if external objects are real, for in the absence of a form a cognition cannot undertake its due task. But then an external object conceived as an object-of-cognition is something distant (=different) from a cognition while its own form conceived as such an object is something proximate (=identical) and something related (=belonging to itself) to this cognition" (vv. 19-20).

The idealist next solicits support from the alleged phenomenon of a cognition necessarily cognizing itself. Here the intended argument was not that the phenomenon proves the unreality of an external object but that a cognition cannot be devoid of a 'form' (v. 21). So in a way this discussion was a continuation of that which went just before and which too was somehow concerned with the phenomenon of a cognition having a 'form'. In any case, it is now first emphasised that cognition is of the nature of an illuminator like a lamp—so that just as a lamp does not illuminate a thing without at the same time illuminating itself a cognition does not illuminate an external object without at the same time illuminating itself (v. 22). Then it is pointed out that it is possible for an external object to come into being and yet remain uncognized but that it is impossible for a cognition to come into existence and yet remain uncognized, for obstacles are possible in the way of an external object being cognized but not in the way of a cognition being cognized (vv. 23–26). The possibility that a cognition might be cognized through a subsequent cognition is ruled out on the ground that it will lead to an infinite regress inasmuch as the latter cognition will require to be cognized through a third cognition and so on *ad infinitum* (v. 27). But granting all this, it does not seem to follow that a cognition must possess a 'form' and not at all that there exist no external objects. The understanding was that if X becomes an object of cognition then X must possess a 'form' so that if a cognition becomes an object of cognition on the part of itself it must possess a 'form'. The same understanding is pressed by pointing out that we often refer to an absent object—e.g. a past object—as a cognized object, the understanding being that in the case of an absent object such a reference is possible only if the cognition concerned itself was earlier cognized as possessing the form of the object concerned (vv. 28–29); similarly it is pointed out that even about a present object one often says 'this object must be blue because my cognition of it is of the form of blue', the understanding being that such a statement is possible only if the cognition in question is blue-formed (v. 30). In the end these findings are summarized by saying: "So an external object is not apprehended unless the cognition concerned is first grasped, nor is apprehension possible on the part of a cognition that is devoid of a 'form'" (v. 30). However, granting even all this it is not yet proved that there exist no external objects; so it is just this that the idealist seeks to prove next.

The argument begins with a repetition of the old point that in the cognition-situation there appears just one 'form' which can belong only to the cognition concerned and not to an alleged external object (v. 32). In this connection there are considered and dismissed various alternative positions which posit an external object and yet seek to show how a cognition can come to have a 'form'; this as follows: (1) It cannot be said that a cognition is 'formless' to begin with and that it comes to have a 'form' after cognizing an external object. For to say that will require that this external object is cognized first and the cognition of it next; but as a matter of fact,

this cognition is cognized first and its object next (vv. 33-34). (2) Nor can it be said that the 'form' of an external object appears to be borne by a cognition; for such a 'form' cannot possibly enter into the body of this cognition nor can it make this object itself quit the scene—all this being a groundless gossip (vv. 35-36). (3) It too is a groundless assertion that the 'form' of an external object is reflected in a cognition. For X is said to be reflected in Y when it is possible to observe separately X as possessed of a form and Y as devoid of a form; but we never observe separately an external object as possessed of a 'form' and a cognition as devoid of a 'form'. Moreover, it is senseless to talk of reflection in the case of colourless entities like sound, smell, taste etc. Lastly, if something is observed only as reflected within the body of a cognition then it is untenable to attribute it to an external object (vv. 36-39). (4) Nor can it be said that the mutual contact of a cognition and external object creates confusion in the mind of an observer who therefore attributes to the former a form which in fact belongs to the latter. For there can be no mutual contact between a cognition existing inside and an external object existing outside. Moreover, it is incomprehensible why not even a single person is free from the confusion alleged. Certainly, in this manner anything can be attributed to any sort of confusion. (vv. 40-41). (5) For a similar reason it too cannot be said that the mutual contact of a cognition and an external object comes to create a 'form' in this cognition as also in this object. For the two parties to contact exist at two different places and, moreover, one of them is tangible the other intangible. To say that the two are related by way of 'existing at the same moment of time' will entail the absurd corollary that a cognition has for its object everything that exists simultaneously with it; nor can they be related by way of 'coming face to face', for a non-physical entity like cognition cannot enter into that type of relation. Moreover, the contact in question must be a total contact, and then one sense-organ should cognize all the five sensory features and even the invisible atomic features. It too cannot be said that a cognition and an external object are related by way of 'subject-object relationship'; for an external object becomes an object for a cognition only insofar as this cognition possess the corresponding 'form', but on the present view the 'form' of a cognition is 'itself due to the subject-object relationship. As a matter of fact, to say that the mutual contact of a cognition and an external object comes to create a 'form' in this cognition as also in this object is tenable only in case it is possible not only to observe separately this cognition and this object but also to observe each as devoid of a 'form', neither of which things is actually possible (vv. 42-49). (6) Nor can it be said that a multiplicity of external objects is to be posited if we are to account for the observed multiplicity of cognitions. For to say that requires an independent observation of cases where a multiplicity of external objects has produced a multiplicity of cognitions, but such an observation is impossible because we never separately observe a cognition on the one hand an external object on the other (vv. 49-50). (7) Yet

more difficulties can be urged against the hypothesis that the contact of a cognition and an object creates a 'form' in each. For one thing, on this hypothesis no 'form' should be created in a cognition that is of the form of memory, dream etc., for in the case of such a cognition no external object at all comes in picture; and when it is once granted that the type of cognition in question comes into being on account of an 'impression' alone then it too should be granted that waking cognition similarly comes into being on account of an 'impression' alone. Thus we come across cases where a cognition possesses a 'form' even in the absence of an external object and never cases where an external object possesses a 'form' even in the absence of a cognition—from which the conclusion ought to be drawn that the 'form' appearing in the cognition-situation belongs to a cognition and to it alone. As a matter of fact, even if it is held that a 'formless' cognition receives a 'form' from outside the outside agency imparting this form ought to be an 'impression' not an external object (vv. 51-54). (8) It too is untenable that a cognition and an external object have got the same 'form'; for the two exist at two different places, they never come into contact, they are never observed separately (v. 55). (9) Similarly untenable is the position that a cognition and an external object are not distinguished from one another on account of a mutual similarity, for only such objects can be said to be similar as can be observed separately (v. 56).

This critical examination of the alternative positions is followed by certain concluding remarks intended to emphasize that neither in the case of an illusory perception like that of two moons (v. 75) nor in the case where the same thing is cognized differently by different observers (vv. 58-60) is it possible for the cognition concerned to assume the 'form' of an externally existing object, the point being that in all these cases the observers concerned are viewing an object created through the instrumentality of an 'impression' and not an externally existing object (v. 61). The final conclusion runs as follows: "So the fact is that whatever be the form of cognition is the form of object not that whatever be the form of object is the form of cognition. Certainly, when its existence is thus dependent on cognition who will posit an object (in the form of something independent) ?" (vv. 62-63)

(b) The Idealist Case Refuted (vv. 64-264)

While presenting the idealist's case Kumārila has given prominence to those points which the latter considers to be most suitable for the latter's purpose, but while refuting this case he has given prominence to just those of these points which he considers to be most suitable for his own purpose. Broadly speaking, this refutation might be divided into three parts, viz. (i) the part covering vv. 64-200 which is most crucial, (ii) that covering vv. 201-29 which considers just one question, viz. how the same object might be cognized differently by different observers, and (iii) that covering vv. 230-64

which considers certain miscellaneous questions arising in connection with textual interpretation. The first part itself is divided into several distinct steps but it will be advisable to examine it as one whole because here Kumārila considers two aspects of the same question again and again, now from this angle now from that. To be precise, Kumārila here attacks two positions maintained by the idealist, viz. (i) that one and the same entity acts as subject-of-cognition and object-of-cognition and that this entity is cognition, and (ii) that a cognition necessarily cognizes itself. As they stand, these positions are considerably distant from each other but in Kumārila's mind they have become closely interrelated. For he fears that if he concedes that a cognition can make itself an object of itself (i. e. the second position) he might be forced to concede that an object of cognition is of the form of cognition (i. e. the first position). This results in his alternatively criticizing the two positions in question in the first part of his refutation. Nothing particular needs to be said about the other two parts, and with this much information in the background we can proceed to consider the three parts one by one.

In the following examination of the first part of Kumārila's refutation of the idealist case the different steps of his argument are taken up in different serially numbered paragraphs.

(1) vv. 64-72 : Kumārila begins by criticizing the idealist's contention that a cognition necessarily cognizes itself and this primarily through taking exception to the analogy cited by the latter in this connection. Thus the idealist has argued that a cognition necessarily cognizes itself just as a physical illuminator necessarily illuminates itself. Kumārila retorts that an illuminator like fire is certainly an illuminator in relation to jar etc. which are a thing illuminated but that it is not a thing illuminated because here is nothing which acts as an illuminator in relation to it (v. 65). On his showing if fire itself is to be cognized it must be cognized through something other than itself—that is, through an eye; similarly, an eye is cognized through something other than itself,—that is, through the inference establishing the existence of the visual sense-organ; lastly, this inference, being an act of cognition, is cognized as acts of cognition generally are—that is, through an application of the means of valid cognition called 'implication' (vv. 66-67). This is a clearest possible enunciation of Kumārila's understanding of the phenomenon of 'cognition of a cognition'.

(2) vv. 63-109 : Kumārila next criticizes the idealist's contention that a subject-of-cognition and the corresponding object-of-cognition are one and the same thing, both being of the form of cognition. He does so by pointing out that there are cases when an object-of-cognition is cognized without there being a simultaneous cognition of the corresponding subject-of-cognition, as also cases where the opposite happens, neither being possible if an object-of-cognition and the corresponding subject-of-

cognition were one and the same thing (vv. 73–78). To cite Kumārila's examples, when a blue or yellow object is cognized as existing over there in space there takes place the cognition of an object-of-cognition but not that of the corresponding subject-of-cognition (vv. 68–81), while when a past occasion is recalled by one as an occasion on which one cognized nothing there takes place the cognition of a subject-of-cognition but not that of any object-of-cognition (82–83). The idealist pleads that an object-of-cognition and the corresponding subject-of-cognition are not cognized simultaneously because the former is cognized by the latter while the latter is cognized by another subject-of-cognition which might or might not be available immediately, his point being that a subject-of-cognition is cognized only when it becomes an object-of-cognition for another subject-of-cognition (vv. 86–88). The point is sought to be supported by the analogy of cases where something is actually present but is not cognized because of the non-availability of the necessary means of cognition; e.g. both colour and hot touch are present in light but the former alone is cognized, the property transience or non-transience belonging to a word and as such being something non-different from it might remains uncognized even when this word itself is cognized (vv. 89–92). Kumārila remains unconvinced, for he simply argues that when X and Y are absolutely identical with one another it should be impossible for one of them to be cognized without the other too being cognized. (vv. 94–96). And by examining the alleged analogical cases it is shown that in each the two things of which one is cognized and the other not are not absolutely identical with each other but somehow different from each other (vv. 97–106). Kumārila's point is that a cognition is one simple, single entity which should be either cognized or not cognized and that if both the object-of-cognition and the subject-of-cognition are one with this cognizer then both should be either cognized or not cognized; at the most one can say that the subject-of-cognition and the object-of-cognition, in order to be cognized, require each other's presence, but such a presence is necessarily available so that nothing should prevent a simultaneous cognition of both (v. 107). The idealist submits that in a cognition both the subject-of-cognition and the object-of-cognition are present but that neither is recognized as such; Kumārila retorts that X and Y appear as different even when X is not recognized as X nor Y as Y, his point being that contrary to our actual experience a cognition must exhibit two distinct forms when two distinct things are present in it (vv. 107–109).

(3) vv. 110–18 : Kumārila then reverts to his criticism of the idealist position that a cognition necessarily cognizes itself. The idealist bases himself on the consideration that the memory of a past cognition is a very common occurrence while theoretically it should be possible in the case of all past cognition; and his point is that the memory of a past cognition should not be possible unless a cognition is necessarily cognized at the time it takes place, which cognizing should be undertaken by this

cognition itself. Kumārila retorts that the memory of a past cognition takes place if this cognition was cognized in the past, it does not take place if it was not cognized; his point is that what is always possible is the memory of a thing-as-cognized-in-the-past and not the memory of a past cognition, while a cognition is cognized-immediately or afterwards—when the ‘implication’ of the cognition of the concerned thing-as-cognized is pondered over. This question-answer is reported by Kumārila in an extremely summary form in v. 118 and later on he delves deep into it in vv. 187-98. But for the rest he is just now preoccupied with an argument which was advanced not in connection with the self-cognition vs. not-self-cognition controversy but in connection with the formed-cognition vs. formless-cognition controversy. Thus the Buddhist had argued that if a cognition is not object-formed but formless then it is inconceivable how ‘cognition of X’ should differ from ‘cognition of Y’. This core-argument Kumārila refutes in vv. 115-17. He says that a cognition cannot be described except through referring to its object so that ‘cognition of X’ differs from ‘cognition of Y’ even if both are identical qua cognition. And he pointedly adds: ‘Just as on your theory one cognition differs from another even if all cognitions are a ‘formed’ something, so also on our theory one cognition differs from another even if all cognitions are a formless something.’ The Buddhist might score a debating point by arguing that two ‘formed’ cognitions can well differ from one another as their ‘forms’ differ but that two ‘formless’ cognitions can differ in no way whatsoever but this will be a futile argument and the fact remains that it is a mere manner of speaking when cognition of X is called X-formed cognition. In any case, we have yet to see how the present discussion is relevant for Kumārila’s immediate purpose. Thus the Buddhist had argued that if cognition is ‘formless’ then one cognition cannot differ from another; to take concrete examples, in that case there should be no difference between ‘cognition of X’, ‘cognition of cognition-of-X’, ‘cognition of cognition-of-cognition-of-X’, etc. On the Buddhist’s showing, in this series the constituent elements of the object increase by one unit while in each case the additional unit is ‘cognition’—so that if a cognition is object-formed the members of this series must differ from one another as their objects differ from one another. In essence all this is reported by Kumārila in vv. 110-14 but we have yet to see how all this is relevant for his immediate purpose. So we must further learn that according to the Buddhist a cognition is not only object-formed but also subject-formed; thus in ‘cognition of X’ the subject-form (also called owa-form) is ‘cognition of X’, in ‘cognition of cognition-of-X’ it is ‘cognition of cognition-of-X’, and so on and so forth Kumārila speaks as if the Buddhist is here trying to prove that a cognition has got a subject-form—this on the ground that in the series in question the constituent elements of the object increase by one unit while in each case the additional unit is ‘cognition’. That is to say, he speaks as if the Buddhist is here arguing that in this series the object cannot have an

additional unit in the form of 'cognition' unless a cognition has a subject-form. As a matter of fact, the Buddhist is here arguing only that a cognition is object-formed.

(4) (a) vv. 119-49

Kumārila once more assails the idealist's contention that the subject-of-cognition and the object of cognition are one and the same thing—calling it an arbitrary assumption (vv. 119-21). The idealist immediately concedes that the subject-of-cognition and the object-of-cognition are verily different from one another, but when Kumārila welcomes this rectification of a mistake the former adds that the two are nevertheless identical qua cognition (v. 122); this reopens the controversy. Kumārila argues that if the subject-of-cognition and the object-of-cognition are one with cognition they cannot be two things, while if they are two things they cannot be one with cognition (vv. 123-26); he would not mind if both the subject and the object are given a common designation 'cognition (Skt. *Jñāna*', the former in the sense 'that which cognizes' the latter in the sense 'that which is cognized' (vv. 127-29). Kumārila's essential point is that the subject-of cognition is something subjective or mental, the object-of cognition something objective or physical. On account of his advocacy of the thesis of 'identity-as-well-as-difference between the subject and the object' the Buddhist has become butt of Kumārila's taunt that the former has forsaken the Buddhist camp and joined that of the Sāṅkhya (v. 123). In view of Kumārila's own frequent advocacy of the thesis of 'identity-as-well-as-difference' this should mean that he is uncompromising in his criticism of the mistaken attempt at obliterating the distinction between the mental and the physical. Even so, Kumārila considers at length (vv. 130-46) one more possible defence of the idealist position that both the subject and the object are of the form of cognition; in essence however, this consideration is so much waste of words. For Kumārila here seeks to determine the mode of applying the word *Jñāna* to the subject as well as the object just as the word 'cow' is applied to this cow or that; and in this connection he particularly criticized the Buddhist doctrine of 'exclusion (*apoha*)' as relevant to the present case. Thus on Kumārila's showing, the idealist then say that two things are called *Jñāna* when they are excluded from all that is not *Jñāna*; but he cannot say that because according to him nothing is of the form of not-*Jñāna*. The fact of the matter is that the tenability or otherwise of the doctrine of 'exclusion' has nothing to do with the tenability or otherwise of the basic idealist position. Be that as it may, Kumārila concludes by remarking: "Since the subject and the object cannot both be of the form of cognition either of these must be said to be of that form; and since that would be acceptable to both the parties to dispute the subject ought to be said to be of the form of cognition" (vv. 147-48)

(b) vv. 149-179

Uptil now Kumārila was considering the position that the subject-of-cognition and the object-of-cognition are but two aspects of the same entity called

cognition; now he broadens the scope of his enquiry and is ready to consider the alternative that the subject-of-cognition and the object-of-cognition are two different cognitions. Important ideas come to light as a result of this. Kumārila begins by arguing that since the subject and the object must exist simultaneously and since no two cognitions can exist simultaneously one cognition cannot act as the subject and another as the object (v. 149). And he also rejects the alternative that the relation of subject-and-object obtains between two simultaneously existing cognitions such that one belongs to one cognition series and the other to another, for there must obtain the relation of cause-and-effect between an object and the cognition produced by it (that is, between the object-of-cognition and the subject-of-cognition) while no such relation can obtain between any two simultaneously existing entities (vv. 150-51). This consideration also applies to two aspects of the same cognition so conceived that one acts as the subject the other as the object, for the relation of cause-and-effect can not obtain between these two entities (v. 158). Kumārila then rejects the suggestion that an outgoing cognition by producing an 'impression' in the incoming one becomes an object of the latter, for in that case this alleged object will be a past something (vv. 158-59). His point is that it is only in the case of an illusory cognition like dream that the object is a past something appearing as a present something while in the case of a genuine perception the object must be a present something (vv. 160-61). To clinch the matter still more convincingly, Kumārila argues that a past something cannot act as an object of perception just as an event of past life or a future event cannot—to which it is added that even if it does so there is no evidence that it is of the nature of cognition and not of the nature of an external object (vv. 162-63). Even granting that the outgoing cognition acts as an object for the incoming one Kumārila raises following objections against the idealist position. "The outgoing cognition must be of the nature of an object alone, a subject alone or both. If it is of the nature of an object alone then it will be but another name for an external object; moreover, in that case not being of the nature of a cognizing something it should not produce an 'impression' in the incoming cognition just as a future cognition does not, a cognition born in another cognition series does not, a thing not definitively known does not, a thing perishing as soon it is born does not. If it is of the nature of a subject alone it cannot act as an object for the incoming cognition; moreover, in relation to what should it act as a subject? And we have already refuted the alternative that a cognition is of the nature of both an object and a subject; moreover, in that case it should stand in no need of the incoming cognition in the form of a subject, nor should the incoming cognition stand in need of the outgoing one in the form of an object. Again, a cognition and its object are supposed to be similar to each other but the outgoing cognition and the incoming one are not similar to each other inasmuch as the former acts as an object not subject the latter as a subject not object. Lastly, on the momentarist hypothesis the outgoing cognition cannot produce an 'impression' in the incoming one just as the cognition belonging

to another cognition-series does not" (vv. 163-71). After this much argumentation Kumārila in the end recapitulates the essential points of his entire earlier criticism of the idealist thesis that the subject-of-cognition and the object-of-cognition are one and the same thing. On his showing, the subject-of-cognition is different from the object-of-cognition because the cognition of one is possible without the cognition of the other, just as the cognition of taste is possible without the cognition of colour (vv. 172-74). Employing another analogy it is made out that even if born of a cognition a cognition cannot act as both subject and object, just as even if born of a cognition an 'impression' does not (v. 175). Kumārila is ready to grant that one thing might possess a number of 'capacities' but he cannot see how one thing can possess both the capacity to act as something mental and the capacity to act as something physical (v. 177-87). This is why he rejects the idealist's recommendation that with a view to avoiding the 'heaviness' of hypothesis the reality of external objects should be repudiated and that of cognitions alone admitted (v. 179).

Kumārila ends the main part of his discussion by once more taking up the question whether a cognition necessarily cognizes itself. The idealist has argued that since cognition as a means of cognizing external objects it must itself be cognized before these objects are cognized; Kumārila retorts that the sense-organs too are a means of cognizing external objects but they are not cognized before these objects are cognized (vv. 179-80). Again, the idealist has argued that since no obstacles stand in the way of a cognition being cognized as soon as it is born it should be cognized as soon as it is born; Kumārila retorts that a cognition is in no position to cognize itself while there exists no other cognizer to cognize it when it is born; that is why a cognition is not cognized as soon as it is born (vv. 180-81). Positively, Kumārila maintains that a cognition is subsequently cognized for the first time when it is realized that the existence of the object concerned as a cognized something remains unaccounted for unless it be presumed that the cognition of this object had earlier taken place, this being called cognizing a cognition by way of employing the means of valid cognition called 'implication' (v. 182). Kumārila considers the objection as to why a cognition should not cognize itself when it is of the nature of an illuminator; by way of reply he recommends two alternatives, viz. (1) that a cognition does not cognize itself because it is busy cognizing its own object and (2) that a cognition does not cognize itself because it is its very nature that it should cognize its object but not itself just as it is the very nature of an eye that it should cognize colour but not taste (vv. 184-87). Lastly, Kumārila considers in details the idealist's contention that if a cognition is not cognized by itself at the time it is born then there should be no subsequent memory of this cognition, a contention briefly considered earlier in another connection. Thus from the alleged fact that the memory of all past cognition is a possibility the idealist has drawn two conclusions, viz.

(1) that a cognition is necessarily cognized at the time it is born (for otherwise no memory of it should be possible at a subsequent date),

(2) that a cognition is necessarily cognized by itself (for if it is cognized by another cognition then since the memory of this other cognition too will be possible it too should be cognized by a third cognition and all this will lead to an infinite regress) (vv. 187-88).

Against this Kumārila objects that it is not our common experience that one recalls a long series of past cognitions (v. 189). But the idealist will retort that such a contingency does not arise precisely because his own hypothesis has taken care of it, for according to this hypothesis only that cognition is possibly recalled which actually took place in the past. So Kumārila's real objection against the idealist is that not all cognition which took place in the past is possibly recalled but only that one which was cognized in the past; as he puts it, to recall something that was not cognized is like recalling a barren woman's son (v. 191). As for the objection that if a cognition is cognized by another cognition then the series of cognitions should never come to an end, Kumārila says that the series in question can be easily terminated whenever one feels like (vv. 190-91, 193-95). As for the objection that if a cognition was not cognized at the time it was born then it should never be recalled, Kumārila says that it cannot be recalled but it can be cognized for the first time by recalling the object cognized by it and pointing out the implication of the cognizedness of this object (v. 192). These observations of Kumārila should considerably clarify his stand on the question of self-cognizability or otherwise of a cognition. In many cases we find that both Kumārila and the idealist are appealing to the same body of facts with a view to drawing conclusions that are diametrically opposite. But that should not surprise anyone, for after all a debate is held only to decide as to which of the two hypotheses better accounts for the facts recognized as such by both the parties concerned. Be that as it may, Kumārila again concludes his discussion by rejecting the idealist's recommendation that the reality of external objects be repudiated on the ground that if a cognition has for its object not an external object but an aspect of itself then it will be having an object that is so much proximate to itself and something related to itself, for Kumārila finds it impossible to conceive how the object of a cognition can be an aspect of this cognition itself (v. 200).

Thus ends what we have called the first—and the chief—part of Kumārila's refutation of the idealist case. Its second part is discussion of the question as to how it is possible for the same object to be cognized differently by different persons, a part to which we turn next.

Kumārila begins by considering the cases of illusory perception where the object of cognition is something not actually present, a fact from which the idealist draws

the conclusion that even a case of genuine perception should come about without the object of cognition being actually present (vv. 200–11). In this connection Kumārila emphasizes two points viz.

(1) that even in a case of illusory perception the object of cognition is not such as is never present anywhere (what happens is that here an object existing at one place or time is mistaken to be located at another place and time) (v. 201 and (2) that it is well possible for a non-perceptual type of cognition to arise even in the absence of the object concerned, this being possible when an appropriate 'impression' is operative (and even when it is not thus operative, as the text adds enigmatically) (v. 202).

Kumārila emphasizes that even the idealist has to account for the difference that obtains between one cognition and another, and he also notices that the hypothesis of an 'impression' is the latter's explanatory hypothesis (vv. 203–6). But his point is that the hypothesis of an 'impression' accompanied by an express repudiation of the hypothesis of an 'external object' has played havoc with the idealist's ontology (vv. 210–11).

Kumārila next considers the cases where one and the same object is viewed differently by different observers and all the views expressed are apparently valid, a fact from which the idealist draws the conclusion that in no case is a common object viewed by two observer (vv. 212–25). Kumārila's verdict is that in such cases the object itself is possessed of numerous facets, of which this one is noticed by this observer and that one by that according as this observer is possessed of this stock of past 'impressions' and that one possessed of that (vv. 215–16). As he trenchantly puts it, if a thing is observed to possess a multiplicity of forms then it is proper to attribute to it this multiplicity of forms rather than deny to it all form altogether (v. 218). His point is that just as all the sensory features colour etc. are always present in a physical object but only those of them are actually cognized in relation to which a sense-organ is appropriately operative, similarly all the so many descriptive features are always present in it but only these of them are actually cognized which happen to occur to a competent observer (vv. 223–24). As for the idealist's contention that in common parlance people say 'the object over there is as our cognition reveals it to be, Kumārila retorts that people do not truly mean to say that the object over there is nothing but that their cognition being a means of revealing objects the object over there must be as their cognition reveals it to be (vv. 226–27). All this too throws interesting light on the relative attitude of Kumārila and the idealist so far as basic ontological issues are concerned.

Lastly, Kumārila makes some miscellaneous remarks by way of passing verdict on certain problem arisen in the course of textual interpretation; they too are of some interest and stand as follows :

(1) vv. 230-33 : "When the opponent says that a cognition as soon as it is born cognizes an object and is cognized he is not seeking to prove that an external object does not exist, for this will not prove that. He is rather asking us as to what prevents a cognition from being cognized as soon as it is born. And he is told that a cognition is not cognized then because means for such a cognizing are not available then. To say this was necessary because there are logicians who concede that a cognition is cognized at the same time when it is cognizing an object; but even such a concession logically involves the banishment of an object."

(2) vv. 234-41 : "When the opponent says that an object is cognized only after the cognition concerned is already born he is not seeking to prove this much, for we already concede that. What he is doing is to force on us the logical implication that the cognition concerned since it is already born before the object is cognized must also be cognized before the object is cognized. However, not only in case a cognition is cognized before an object is cognized but also in case it is cognized along with the latter the existence of an object is in jeopardy (there appearing just one form in the cognition-situation and this form preferably belonging to a cognition). That is why all efforts are made by us to prove that an object is cognized before the cognition concerned is cognized."

(3) vv. 242-44 : "When it is admitted that there exists one case where cognition is cognized before an object is cognized the idea is not to prove that a cognition is not cognized before an object is cognized, for that will be irrelevant,—rather suicidal-talk. (The case in question is when one recalls a past occasion as an occasion on which one cognized nothing.) The point is that the opponent insists that a cognition is cognized before an object is cognized because he thereby seeks to prove that a cognition is possessed of a 'form', and he is being told that even in the one exceptional case where a cognition is cognized before all object is cognized the cognition remains formless. Certainly, in the case in question there is no question of the cognition concerned having a form."

(4) v. 245 a : "When it is suggested that if in the cognition-situation just one form makes its appearance then let this be the form of an object but not that of a cognition the idea is not to deny the reality of a cognition, for the object itself will remain uncognized unless a cognition takes place. So what is emphasized is that the cognition of an object comes first while the cognition of the cognition concerned is dependent on this cognition of an object."

(5) vv. 245-47 : “When it is said that a cognition cannot be described except as bearing reference to an object, the ideal is to emphasize that even the idealist does not hold that cognition as such is ever perceived. For according to the idealist what is perceived is not cognition as such but cognition as polluted by the touch of an object.”

(6) vv. 248-59 : “When the idealist is told that in the absence of external objects it should be impossible to explain as to why one particular thing is produced by just one particular thing, e.g. why cloth is produced by threads, jar produced by clay, he will doubtless reply that he would seek to explain why one particular idea is produced by just one particular idea just as the realist seeks to explain why one particular thing is produced by just one particular thing. But the idealist’s reply will lack cogency. For on the basis of observing concomitance in presence and concomitance in absence it can be decided as to what physical thing possesses the capacity to produce what physical thing. But nothing of the sort can be done in the case of ideas as posited by the idealist. For by the ‘capacity’ of an idea the idealist understands just an ‘impression’ but there is no knowing whether an ‘impression’ is different or non-different from an idea. What is still worse, an ‘impression’ is said to be of the form of ‘practical reality’ not ‘ultimate reality.’ And what is worst, there is conceivable no operation—e.g. the observation of concomitance in presence and concomitance in absence—that might enable us to determine as to what cause leads to the emergence of what ‘impression’.”

CHAPTER V

DOCTRINE OF SOUL

Another important piece of ontological speculation is offered by Kumārila in his section on soul (Section XVI, *Ātmavāda*). He begins by observing that if soul (in the form of an eternal conscious entity) does not exist then all Vedic injunctions stand condemned inasmuch as they often promise a fruit-of-action to be reaped in a next birth (vv. 3-4). In this connection Kumārila always has in mind two *prima facie* views, viz. the materialist view according to which body itself is the vehicle of consciousness and the Buddhist view according to which consciousness is of the form of a series of momentary cognitions; this becomes evident at the very outset (vv. 4-5). However, the view examined first of all is a somewhat odd one. For it argues that since at the time of realising the fruit of an act one does not recall that here is the fruit of that particular act it is no use positing an eternal soul and no use following Vedic injunctions and prohibitions (vv. 8-12). Kumārila replies that the possibility or otherwise of the recollection of a past act at the time of the realising of its fruit is an irrelevant consideration, for the impossibility in question will not prove that soul does not exist or that the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions are useless (v. 13). By way of illustration he says that one prepares a comfortable bed to sleep on even if at the time of sleep one does not recall that the feeling of ease now being experienced is a result of that prior preparation of bed (v. 18). Nay, going further he remarks that if at the time of reaping the fruit of an act one automatically recalled that act one would not consult scriptures with a view to learning as to what act brings about what fruit (v. 19). Then Kumārila considers the objection that if soul be an eternal i. e. absolutely changeless entity it should not be possible for it to be both the doer of an act and the enjoyer of its fruit (vv. 20-21). He replies that the same soul can be both a doer and an enjoyer just as the same person can be a child now and a youth afterwards (v. 23) or just as the same snake can be found in a huddled state now and in a straightened state afterwards (v. 28). Kumārila's point is that a single thing can well act as the common substratum of changing states (v. 29); as he puts it, 'when a later state emerges the earlier one does not vanish for good but just gets dissolved in the common substratum in a form suitable for the later state (v. 30)'. The objection just considered was favourite of the Buddhists who themselves considered consciousness to be of the form of a series of momentary cognitions. So turning tables against them Kumārila seeks to

show that it is on the momentarist hypothesis that it is impossible for the same agent to be both the doer of an act and the enjoyer of its fruit; the following is how he argues (vv. 32-72): "In the case of an act that takes time to be completed even the doership on the part of the same agent is impossible on the momentarist hypothesis (v. 36), while the contingency that the doer and the enjoyer are not the same is present here in the case of all act whatsoever (v. 38). Nor will it do to say that the doer and the enjoyer belong to the same series (*santāna*), for if this series is something momentary it will not serve the purpose while if it is something ever-lasting it will be either like the soul posited by the Vaiśeṣika which is absolutely different from its states or like the soul posited by the Sāṅkhya which is partly different from its states (vv. 39-42). It is also futile to say that an impression (*vāsanā*) left by the doer makes possible the reaping of fruit on the part of the enjoyer, for on the momentarist hypothesis there is nothing where their impression can get seated during the interval separating doing from enjoying (vy. 44-45). Even granting that the doer and enjoyer belong to the same line-of-succession (*paramparā*) the fact remains that they are not one and the same (v. 46). On its part, however the concept of line-of-succession or series itself remains untenable on the momentarist hypothesis, for nothing can go to unite the members of a series under one title unless they have something in common (which showing is here dismissed as impossible) (vv. 47-50). Resorting to an analogy the momentarist argues: 'A man and his son are different from each other and yet this man rears up this son and later on receives a benefit from him. This sort of relationship does not obtain between persons not belonging to the same line of descent. Similarly, the relation of doer and enjoyer obtains, between two cognitions which are different from each other and yet belong to the same series (v. 51-52).' But it is never our experience that the doer is different from the enjoyer; moreover a man in order to receive from his son benefit later on must be one and the same personality throughout the interval (something which the momentarist dismisses as impossible) (vv. 53-54). Nor is it possible for cognitions to migrate from one body to another; certainly, an intangible entity like cognition cannot be pushed away from one place to another as air pushes from one place to another a flame of fire (vv. 59-61). As a matter of fact, even in the case of a living body it is inconceivable how cognition associated with it moves on from place to place (v. 61). As for the concept of an intermediary body created temporarily and acting as the medium of transmigration it is utterly illogical; and even if such a body exists it would not make possible the movement of cognition from one place to another (vv. 62-64). As for the contention that cognition gets seated in a foetus it is nonsensical; for cognition means apprehension of an object and such an apprehension is possible only on the part of a full-fledged body fully equipped with the needed cognition-apparatus (vv. 65-66). As a matter of fact, cognition has to be deemed absent in the states of swoon etc. precisely because then there takes place no apprehension of an object (v. 66). Nor will it do to say that during the states in question cognition

stays there in the form of a capacity, for all capacity needs a seat to reside in (v. 67). To say that body, sense-organ etc. are the needed seat will mean embracing materialism (v. 68). To conclude, if in a foetus cognition stays in the form of a capacity then either this capacity itself or whatever acts as its seat will be just another name for soul (vv. 71-72)". From this critique of the Buddhist position Kumārila draws the corollary that a soul must be eternal, ubiquitous, naturally possessed of the capacity to cognize; (such a soul should be in a position to get connected with one body after another even without moving about from place to place) (v. 73). Then it is argued in details that a soul can be a seat of an act (vv. 74-91). In this connection Kumārila finds it necessary to disassociate himself from the Vaiśeṣika position according to which action, since it is exclusively of the form of a vibration, cannot characterize an ubiquitous entity like soul (v. 74). His essential point is that whatever acts (of the form of vibration) take place in the body, sense-organs etc. which a soul has earned as a result of its past acts must be supposed to be due to the impelling activity of this soul which is therefore to be treated as the real agent in the case of all these acts (vv. 76-79); to cite an analogy, it is like a priest performing a sacrificial act but the actorship being ascribed to the client who has made monetary payment to the priest for the latter's expert services (v. 79). Kumārila also uses another analogy to show that the impelling activity of an agent can assume a variety of forms : it is through moving to and fro that the soldier employs his sword in the act of slaughter, it is through his mere words that the commander-in-chief orders about his subordinates, it is through his mere presence that the king orders about his men (vv. 85-16). Then Kumārila seeks to show how certain arguments offered by the Vaiśeṣika philosopher in support of the existence of soul are open to an opponent's attack (vv. 92-107). The discussion is not much fruitful, first because the arguments in question are not particularly important and secondly because in all the cases Kumārila himself maintains virtually the same position as the Vaiśeṣika philosopher. Lastly, Kumārila develops in considerable details the position that the notion of 'I', which is a matter of our everyday experience, has got soul for its object (vv. 107-36). He concedes that in the statement 'I go' the word 'I' refers to body inasmuch as going is not possible on the parts of a soul (v. 108); but his point is that in the statement 'I know' it could refer to nothing but the knower and the question is as to who this knower can be (v. 110). Kumārila feels that this knower can be either a cognition itself or a soul acting as the seat of cognition (v. 110), and that if he successfully argues against the first alternative the second must hold the field. The materialist alternative that this knower can be cognition seated in body, sense-organs etc. is dismissed off-hand though after some amount of elementary argumentation (vv. 111-14).] With this aim in view this alternative is subjected to criticism as follows (vv. 115-36) : "On the supposition that the momentary cognition is knower it makes no sense to say 'I knew this thing then and I am knowing it now'; for the

statement-part 'I knew this thing then' is false of the present cognition, the statement-part 'I am knowing it now' is false of the past cognition, while the two together are false of each (vv. 115-19). Nor can it be said that the two cognitions in question are somehow one because they are similar, for this explanation will not work in the case of the statement 'I knew a cow then and I am knowing a horse now'. (vv. 121-22). It will not do to say that even in this new case the two cognitions in question are similar qua knower, for then one should find it possible to employ the word 'I' not only in respect of oneself but in respect of all knower whatsoever (vv. 122-23). Nor can it be said that two cognitions, in order to be referred to as 'I', must belong to the same series, for even there they continue to be two different cognitions so that the later one should refer to the earlier one as 'it' not as 'I' just as it refers to as 'it' not as 'I' a cognition belonging to another series or a jar (vv. 123-24). A statement like 'I am heavy,' 'I am lean' is false, because we also say 'thy body is heavy' 'my body is lean' (v. 127); on the other hand, in the statement 'here is my soul' the word 'I' can be said to stand for soul and the word 'soul' to a temporary cognitive state of this soul (vv. 130-31)". Kumārila concludes the section by arguing that it should be a misconceived venture to read denials of soul into a Vedic statement, for there are so many Vedic statements — most prominently the sacrificial injunctions — which posit soul implicitly and so many — most prominently the Upaniṣadic discourses on the subject—which do so explicitly (vv. 140-47).

ERRATA

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>Read</i>	<i>For</i>
19	12 From below	world-creation	word-creation
	11 From below	untenable	untouchable
	4 From below	Thus are	Then he
21	21	never	rever
23	10 From below	whatever	whether
		producer	produce
24	16 From below	rival views	rival
26	21	be	de
32	6 From below	out	one
43	14 From below	mere	more
54	13	The Buddhist	The Buddhists
		maintains	maintain
65	10 From below	asādhāraṇa	Sadhāraṇa
		viruddhāvyaḥcārī	asādhāraṇa
66	7 From below	explicitly or implicitly	explicitly
67	9	be	be those
	7 From below	the	that the
68	15 From below	problem	proban
69	12	ruled	ruled
	13 From below	of just	just
71	17	will	will say
76	8 From below	case	in case
	3 From below	posits	points
84	11	thus	there
86	13	of the	the
91	14	only	other
106	12 From below	must	then
108	17	is	as

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